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INTRODUCTION
What is there in common between socialism and labour in Canada? Or, phrased 
differently, is there a history of socialism and the labour movement in Canada?
Historians and other academics have asked themselves these questions, or ones like them, 
for a long time. Some students of history doubt the relevance of such questions at all.
But there is a historiography attesting to the importance of associating ideas of socialism 
with a labour movement. Historians of the left, E.P. Thompson foremost among them, 
have concentrated a great deal of their work upon consciousness in “working class” 
culture. Historically, class consciousness has developed, in part, through its own 
opposition to other interests in capitalist society.
And here we ask ourselves, to what extent is a class conscious of itself? How 
does this consciousness manifest itself? In Canada, there is a history of socialism, to be 
sure. Yet, to speak of a labour movement that actively engages itself with the aim of 
bettering the condition of working people is to speak of something different. The 1932 
Regina Manifesto of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (Farmer, Labour, 
Socialist) is a historical document testifying to the socialist aspirations of a large 
membership drawn from Canadian society.
In 1932, the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada (TLC) was not so forthcoming 
in its support of overt political action. In fact, labour in Canada and the United States, 
until the late 1930s, had a history that involved itself in party politics only (although, in 
the tradition of trade unionism, only one part of labour drew upon the example and 
philosophy of such unionists as Samual Gompers in the United States.) Also influencing 
the development of labour and politics were the “Lib-Lab,” Independent Labour Party,
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2
and Fabian Society traditions inherited from the British Isles). Robert Babcock
explained, in his Gompers in Canada, that:
in comparison to most European countries there appeared to be little class- 
consciousness in both Canada and the United States, but Canadian unionists 
seemed less fractious than Americans and more willing to co-operate with each 
other in the struggle for their mutual advancement. In Canada both the Knights 
[of Labor] and the crafts co-operated to seek redress through political action.1
A great deal of social legislation has been passed in North America through the efforts of 
organised labour. The interests of labour, and of workers generally, were increasing 
wages, shortening the working-day, obtaining job security, and securing compensation 
for injuries. But we know as well, in studying workers on the shop floor, in their homes 
or involved in recreational activities, there are other examples of class consciousness. 
Some workers involved themselves in political or social agencies within the community 
while others displayed patterns of behaviour “separating workers from their employers 
and providing a rough unity for protest and confrontation organised along lines of class.”2 
In considering the formal and informal participation of workers in class politics, we see a 
variety of interpretations and modes of analyses.
This thesis considers the politics of workers at the grass roots. It is a study of 
Local 1075 of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America (UAW or United Autoworkers) Local 1075 in Fort 
William (now Thunder Bay), Ontario, during 1952-1962. The UAW was an excellent 
example of an industrial union displaying all the attributes of a large, militant 
organisation. To what extent, though, is a study of an international union representative
1 Robert Babcock, Gompers in Canada: A Study in American Continentalism Before the First World War 
(Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1974), 14.
2 Mark Leier, Red Flags and Red Tape: The Making o f  a Labour Bureaucracy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1995), 3.
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of its entire membership? This thesis focuses upon a union local and its actions on labour 
and socio-political issues in the 1950s and early 1960s. Research in the history of this 
labour union local in Thunder Bay, now Local 1075 of the Canadian Autoworkers 
(CAW), illustrates such themes as the institutionalisation of a union, the bureaucratisation 
of union services and leadership, gender and ethnic identities on the shop floor and in 
union leadership, and the impact of socio-economic regional development upon 
Northwestern Ontario specifically and Canada more generally.
The reading, research, and writing for this project were challenges for me. 
Beginning a history of a union local in Thunder Bay is not a simple task. The growth of 
labour historiography in Canada over the past forty years offers a variety of historical 
methods in interpretation and analysis. My growing appreciation for labour history is 
best described as having been organic. I use the term, “organic,” here in a holistic sense, 
in that my knowledge of labour and its theory has grown commensurately with my
•3
writing and research. My familiarity with labour history has grown apace only with my 
reading and researching of it.
The union local at the Canadian Car and Foundry plant (Can-Car) has long held a 
special place in the history of the Lakehead. A study of Local 1075 International Union, 
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) 
focuses themes of historical importance in a regional and contextual setting. Thunder 
Bay’s is a history on the periphery, a drawn-out epic of growth and decline. Thunder Bay 
is a city in the geographic centre of Canada but it is also in the northern hinterland of a 
large province. Temporally, the twin cities at the Lakehead, Fort William and Port
3
The term, “organic,” is a terrible word, but for a young student, the experience o f writing a research thesis 
is a matter of continual learning. Still, having written a thesis, one is overwhelmed with a sense of still 
having only touched the smallest part of a vast body o f learning. I take the word, “organic,” from
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Arthur, have experienced competition that spanned almost one hundred years (1880s- 
1970). Social, cultural, and economic forces have worked to make Thunder Bay what it 
is. The Can-Car plant, situated on the Kaministiquia River, is an integral part of the 
history of Fort William (now Thunder Bay).
The Can-Car plant is important to understanding economy and employment at the 
Lakehead. At times employing over one thousand people, this plant has been very 
important to the regional welfare of Thunder Bay. Fort William and Port Arthur had a 
history of competition and economic instability. Historical periods of large-scale 
immigration and economic growth attributed to war, an inter-war period of decline and 
recession in production coupled with the isolation of the Lakehead communities from 
Canada’s large urban centres, have resulted in periodic declines in economic 
performance. The twin cities, both of which were established as independent 
municipalities in the last quarter of the nineteenth century long competed for social, 
cultural, and economic control of the Lakehead. The establishment of a railway-car 
manufacturing plant by the Canadian Car and Foundry Company in 1912 was partly a 
result of the inter-city rivalry that manifested itself in over ten years of intense municipal 
boosterism.4
In 1992, Gordon Burkowski published a book celebrating eighty years o f the 
plant’s operations. The book, Can-Car: A History 1912-1992, is an excellent survey of
Raymond Williams’ own use of the word in Culture and Society. It is as precise or imprecise a term as I 
can find to describe my experience as a Masters student.
4 For more on the inter-city rivalry o f Fort William and Port Arthur, see A.W. Rasporich, “Faction and 
Class in Modem Lakehead Politics,” The Lakehead University Review  7 (Summer 1974):31-65; A.W. 
Rasporich, “Twin City Ethnopolitics: Urban Rivalry, Ethnic Radicalism and Assimilation in the Lakehead, 
1900-1977,” Urban History Review 18 (February 1990): 210-29; Thorold Tronrud and A.E. Epp, ed., 
Thunder Bay: From Rivalry to Unity (Thunder Bay: Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society Inc, 1995); 
Thorold Tronrud, The search for factories in a staple economy : Thunder Bay's manufacturing industries, 
1880-1980 (Thunder Bay: Lakehead Centre for Northern Studies, [ 1989-91 ]); and Thorold Tronrud, 
Guardians o f  Progress: Boosters and Boosterism (Thunder Bay: Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society, 
1993).
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plant productivity and managerial accomplishments. The history of the plant’s 
production is varied: it has gone from producing rail cars, to aircraft, to forest harvesting 
equipment, to buses, to subway and GO train cars. However, Burkowski’s book lacks an 
exploration of workers’ experiences, union development, and contextual historical 
analysis. A close reading of Can-Car does illustrate the precarious nature of the history 
of the plant.5 Production has not maintained a steady pulse through the past ninety years. 
In a city where employment was generally unstable, the seasonal and cyclical 
periodisation of full, half, and low production in a plant this size has had a serious impact 
upon the city’s labour force.
The labour force was comprised of men and, at times, women, many of whom 
supported not only themselves but also dependants of various sorts. Each family’s need 
is measured in a different way: to quote an old story, “All happy families resemble one 
another, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”6 The impact of seasonal and 
cyclical unemployment at the Lakehead has varied over the past eighty years along with 
the changing patterns of production at the Can-Car plant. The introduction of the United 
Autoworkers of America into the operation of the Fort William plant in 1952 was a part 
of a changing process of employment and labour organisation at the Lakehead. Within 
an economy favouring organisation into industrial unions, the workers of Can-Car 
followed a Canadian pattern of unionisation that found its expression in the community. 
As modes of production changed following 1945, workers increasingly looked to the 
large international unions of the Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO) to achieve 
the gains in pay and quality of life that Canadian workers expected after the war ended.
The formation of Local 1075 UAW was a result of the economic and social
5 Gordon Burkowski, Can-Car: A History, 1912-1992 (Thunder Bay: Bombardier Inc., 1995).
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factors in Fort William and Canada following the war. The union local’s good health in 
the ten years following its founding depended largely on economic, social, and cultural 
conditions at the Lakehead. The threat of closure of the Can-Car plant in 1958 brought 
the union local and the community at large together in an all-out effort to keep the Fort 
William plant in operation. In this respect, the plant’s success, employment in the 
community, and the welfare of the city itself were intertwined in a movement of action. 
Beatrice and Sidney Webb maintained that each worker has a distinct set of interests as 
producer, consumer and citizen, a tripartite distinction.7 In this instance, workers, 
municipal leaders, and local politicians combined their resources to fight regional and 
national pressures aiming to achieve corporate centralisation and the downsizing of plants
o
taking place in the national economy in the closing years of the 1950s.
Successful operation of the plant has depended in no small way upon the efforts 
of the union local’s leadership and its rank and file. Efforts to maintain employment at 
the plant came to a head in 1958-1962, amidst repeated threats of plant closure, lay-offs, 
and short and long term unemployment, and displayed the resiliency of the union in the 
face of hostile company management and a national government that was unwilling (or 
unable) to promise aid to an isolated regional economy as it faltered in the unsteady 
economy of the Cold War.
One of the historical questions arising out of this experience concerns the 
conversion of Canada’s war industry to one producing goods for a growing North 
American market of consumers. The Canadian Car plant in Fort William depended, from
6 Opening lines to Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina.
7 Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Industrial Democracy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1897), 818-23.
8 See K.J. Rea’s The Prosperous Years: The Economic History o f  Ontario, 1939-1975 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1985) for an excellent examination o f the economic recession o f the late 1950s and of the 
Diefenbaker administration’s policies to deal with it.
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soon after its establishment at the Lakehead in 1912, upon the production of war material 
during the Great War, and from the late 1930s it depended upon the production of aircraft 
for its survival. Following the end of the Second World War and demobilisation of 
Canada’s military, the production of aircraft at the Lakehead came into question. Many 
historians and political scientists, most notably Donald Wells, have pointed out the 
difficulty that Canadian industry faced in the middle 1950s as factories dealt with 
decreasing demand at home and abroad for defence production.9 The episode in 1958, 
culminating in rumoured contracts for the A.V. Roe Arrow jet fighter, Bomarc missiles, 
and armoured amphibious personnel carriers, illustrates the dependence, real or 
otherwise, that the Fort William plant had upon defence contracts for its continued 
operation.
This thesis focuses on the years 1952-1962. It begins with the transformation of 
the International Association of Machinists (IAM) local into the UAW local at the Fort 
William plant, extends its analysis through the economic prosperity of the early and 
middle 1950s and into the turbulence and economic instability of the late 1950s, and ends 
with the resumption of “steady” production at the plant in 1962. The year 1962 provides 
a logical end-date because that year witnessed a “changing of the guard” of the local’s 
own leadership. The following years are better left as a new chapter in the history of the 
union local. The workers involved in the leadership of the union local from 1952 to 1962 
demonstrated remarkable skills and values in terms of leadership, integrity in work, and 
dedication to working-class culture on the shop floor, in the community, and in society 
generally.
9 Donald Wells, “Politics and the Economic Conversion o f Miitary Production in Canada,” Studies in 
Political Economy 27 (Autumn 1988): 95-115. The Korean War did create a demand for military goods, 
but the plant in Fort William felt little of this demand.
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This thesis recognises Eric Hobsbawm’s observation, “not just that such people 
should be rescued from oblivion or from what E.P. Thompson called, in his memorable 
phrase, ‘the enormous condescension of posterity’,”10 but that the point is, rather like 
Hobsbawm’s own, that collectively such men and women are major historical actors. The 
historical study of women and men, as they act and interact within the structure of 
unions, demands attention. Labour history is not only a study of structures, concepts, and 
themes; it is also the practical utilisation of a discipline acknowledging what Alice and 
Staughton Lynd’s Rank and File asserts: “that workers made history: first, as human 
agents acting collectively against and within the constraints of corporate capitalism; and 
second, as historians themselves ‘make’ history - by thinking about, analysing, and 
interpreting the past.”11
Those figuring in the pages of this thesis have not been forgotten nor are they the 
hapless victims of a condescending posterity. My informants have lived good lives in 
Thunder Bay, and they do not feel that they were dealt a raw deal in their working lives.
I want to disassociate myself at the beginning from any ivory tower approach to the 
writing of labour history. I hope the respect I hold for both the study of labour and the 
subjects of my study will be apparent in the reading of this thesis.
Bryan Palmer observed of E.P. Thompson that, within the moving relationships of
opposition and choice, Thompson looked to the past to renew the present, the better to
1recover possibility in the future. A study in labour history is especially gratifying 
because it is about working people who experience joy, pain, love, and sorrow, and who
10 Eric Hobsbawm, Uncommon People: Resistance, Rebellion and Jazz (New York: The New Press, 1988), 
vii.
II John Borsos, “Building Bridges: Rank and File and The Emergence o f  a UAW Revisited,” Oral History
Review 20 (Spring-Fall 1992): 98.
12 Bryan Palmer, E.P. Thompson: Objections and Oppositions (London: New Left Books, 1994), 10.
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persevere. When things seem oppressive, it is then that we must draw from past 
experiences to gain strength. The labour movement, and more specifically trade and 
industrial unions, have proven to be a social manifestation where people act collectively 
to gain power over their own lives. I look to the past because the history of others bears a 
certain resemblance to those experiences of my own. Eric Hobsbawm described this 
sentiment well:
For where we stand in regard to the past, what the relations are between 
the past, present and future are not only matters of vital interest to all: they 
are quite indispensable. We cannot help situating ourselves in the 
continuum of our own life, of the family and group to which we belong.
We cannot help comparing past and present: that is what family photo 
albums or home movies are there for. We cannot help learning from it,
13for that is what experience means.
It is the experience of struggles and hard-won victories that appeals to the student of 
history. We must re-discover the past and make it relevant; we must believe, again, that 
historians might ‘investigate the past in the hope that it may enable their fellow men to 
control the future,’ and we must refute the idea that history’s ‘educational value lies in 
the exercises it provides for the mind and not for what it contains.’14
Previously, I mentioned Thompson’s exhortation “to rescue the history of workers 
from the condescension of posterity.” Bryan Palmer goes far in describing the tradition 
of Thompson neither as condescension nor as the “experiential validity of aspiration.”15 
Thompson’s own conceptual premise translates into a penchant for objection. Students 
of history work within a dialogue, an ongoing discourse, which uses an historical method.
13 Eric Hobsbawm, On History (New York: The New Press, 1997), 24.
14 J.H. Plumb in his introduction to a collection o f essays he collected and edited, Crisis in the Humanities 
(London: Penguin Books, 1964), 9.
15 Palmer, E.P. Thompson, xi. This is an interesting expression, but I think it is appropriate given 
Thompson’s own penchant for Marxist dialectics. The relationship of theory to historical method is 
interpreted as an ongoing debate between scholars. One should always be open to reinterpreting the 
application of facts and concepts to one’s work.
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An understanding of employment at the Lakehead in the years following 1945 contributes 
to our own historical knowledge of economics, society, and culture. This study seeks to 
interpret the situation of workers in the Can-Car plant over a period of ten years and to 
consider their experiences within the changing economic and social conditions in Fort 
William. The union helped to condition not only the shop floor culture but also the 
conditions of employment at the Lakehead.
Several themes come out in reading primary documents dealing with a union 
local’s history. Union militancy in the post-war era vacillated in both the union 
leadership and the rank and file of various industrial unions. The CIO’s larger members, 
one of which was the UAW, have been the subject of many historical and social science 
studies of worker militancy following the Depression of the 1930s. An important work 
outlining the history of the UAW in Canada, Charlotte Yates’ From. Plant to Politics, 
examines the economic and political relations between union action and government 
policy from the 1930s to the 1990s.16 This thesis examines the connection between 
national and international union policy and the opinions and practices of the union local. 
Local 1075 UAW existed within the national economic and political climate described by 
Yates, and worker militancy (or lack thereof) occurred within the historical context of 
time and circumstance. The local in Fort William deviated on occasion from the 
practices followed and attitudes displayed by larger unions in southern Ontario and the 
northeastern United States during this time. The notion of militancy has to be explored in 
the pages of this study.
A second significant theme for the local was the development of bureaucracy and 
increased institutionalisation. The concept of “institutionalisation” is useful in the
16 Charlotte Yates, From Plant to Politics: Autoworkers in Postwar Canada, 1936-1990 (Philadelphia:
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interpretation of union leadership, the leadership’s role in decision making, and its 
relationship to the rank and file membership. Michael Barry, in an article published by 
Labour History in 2001, presented a synthesis of the debate ongoing in the late 1980s 
between Australian historian Jonathan Zeitlin and his use of the traditional tools of 
institutional analysis and those labour historians critical of such an approach to 
explaining the nature of employment or the dynamics of the labour process within 
industry.17 Michael Barry studied waterfront workers in New Zealand during the years of 
the Depression. His findings corroborated Zeitlin’s criticism of “rank and filism,” a 
concept which divides the aspirations of the rank and file from a union’s leadership, and 
support his dissatisfaction with suggestions that trade unions and formal bargaining 
structures served to impede the aspirations of workers. Barry denied there was a rift 
between the bureaucratic policies of union officials and the militancy of their members.18
The division of a union membership from its leadership is difficult to define in a 
small union local. In its early years of development, when the union local’s leadership is 
drawn from a small membership, the interests and practices of individuals in positions of 
responsibility, such as local executive, trustees, or shop stewards, are not very different 
from their constituents. Yates’ studies, which elaborate and interpret the policies and 
relations of an international or district/ regional union executive and bureaucracy within a 
large union membership, develops concepts that demand re-evaluation. The introduction 
of such themes as gender, class, and ideology complicate the understanding of 
“structures” dividing leadership and membership even more. The interests of individuals
Temple University Press, 1993).
17 Michael Barry, “Institutional and Social History Interpretations of New Zealand Waterfront Industrial
Relations, Depression to Early 1940s,” Labour History 80 (May 2001): 121-23.18Jonathan Zeitlin, “From Labour History to the History o f  Industrial Relations,” Economic History 
Review 40 (1987): 165-67.
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are not strictly defined by an institution’s structure. Rather, the interplay of human 
agents acting and reacting within a historical context bring about the development of the 
institution: the union local.
This thesis is an attempt to find a middle ground. Mark Leier’s Red Flags and 
Red Tape: the Making o f a Labour Bureaucracy provides an example for methodological 
analysis and interpretation. It uses a case study of one labour organisation to examine the 
interplay between bureaucracy, class, and ideology.19 The degree of institutionalisation 
or militancy of a bureaucracy has been identified by labour historians in the past fifteen 
years as a characteristic of unions in the post-war period. Individual workers in the 
Thunder Bay plant reacted to the changed climate of economic stability, depending on 
their own life experiences. How did individuals deal with the structure of their union? 
What impact upon workers in the plant did gradual changes in the union structure, such 
as dues check-offs, collective bargaining, retirement plans, prospects of health insurance, 
and severance packages, have? The 1950s and early 1960s saw real advances in 
industrial relations. The creation of a bureaucracy, at both the local and regional level of 
the UAW, facilitated the material gains of labour in the way of wages and benefits. This 
study explores the degree to which such gains were made in Thunder Bay and the impact 
that these gains had upon the aspirations and expectations of a union membership.
The union local was a structure within a national and regional economy. Though 
the gains made by labour in the 1950s were not insignificant, they were only one 
manifestation of change taking place at work and in the community. While the plant in 
Fort William was a place of employment for men and women for many years prior to 
1952, the years following the establishment of the local were different. Membership in
19 Leier, Red Flags and Red Tape, 4.
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the local created a sense of belonging, and increasing numbers of workers associated
themselves with the union local, as attested by the development of an agreement for a
closed shop in 1953. As well, many people from outside the plant were associated with
the union in varying capacities, because of their relation to workers’ families in the
community. Gender and ethnicity, then, demand recognition as different, but by no
means lesser, themes in the development of the union. The presence or, compared to the
gendered diversity of the war years, the notable absence of women on the shop floor has
to be discussed as well as the contribution of women to the union in other capacities, in
the community and in the women’s auxiliary.
And, finally, the relation of politics and labour is explored and assessed. The
concepts of labourism, socialism, and communism are important to an expanding
literature on labour history. The actual discussion of each concept in and for its own sake
is beyond the scope of this paper. Shaw’s own attempt at a similar discussion eventually
filled a book, in which he began,
we must clear our minds that the institutions under which we live, 
including our legal ways of distributing income and allowing people to 
own things are natural, like the weather. They are not. Because they exist 
everywhere in our little world, we take it for granted that they have always 
existed and must always exist, and that they are self-acting.
For Socialism is nothing but an opinion held by some people on that point. 
Their opinion is not necessarily better than your own opinion or anyone else’s.20
The concept of labour does not fit into any of the neat boxes that Shaw described in 1928, 
but each of the different terms can be applied in varying degrees to the Canadian labour 
movement. Nor can it be denied that a great deal of Shaw’s political conceptualising is in 
need of revision. The leaders and membership of Local 1075 identified themselves
20 George Bernard Shaw, The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism, Capitalism, Sovietism and Fascism 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1928), 37.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
within a political environment that was half-way between the political and economic
world of Shaw and our own. Irving Abella’s Nationalism, Communism, and the
Canadian Labour Movement does an excellent job in examining the condition of labour
1in the 1940s and early 1950s. But since Abella completed his book, much new work 
has been done assessing the political and social climate in which Canadian unions lived 
after the war. This thesis considers the role of the union local and community at Fort 
William within the larger Canadian historiography.
The last aspect of a worker’s employment is retirement. The question of 
unemployment was one that plagued the newspapers and governments at Ottawa and in 
every provincial capital from the end of the war through to (and beyond) the economic 
slowdown of the late 1950s. During the Diefenbaker administration, unemployment 
became less a question and more an economic fact. At the Lakehead, unemployment had 
always been a fact, and union leadership walked a fine line between bargaining gains and 
making concessions. The closing of the plant in 1959 was the first instance, in the union 
local’s history, that job losses threatened to become permanent.
In what ways did workers cope with the threat of job loss, and what devices did 
the union executive use to keep the plant open? How did Fort William react to the 
possibilities of the plant’s closing, and what municipal and regional institutions did they 
mobilise to hinder the plant’s removal from the Lakehead? The factors connecting the 
Fort William Can-Car plant to its mother plant in Montreal, as well as to the national 
economy and politics, need to be examined and assessed. Studying the conditions 
threatening a plant closing, as well as the deciding factors that enabled it to continue, will
21 Irving Abella, Nationalism, Communism, and the Canadian Labour Movement (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1973).
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tell us a good deal about the role of the industrial region of Thunder Bay within the larger 
metropolis-hinterland relationship.
In discussing workers and their “consciousness” in the face of threat or 
opposition, I will do so carefully. The records testify to the actions and sentiments of 
workers. One must be careful to follow Thompson’s exhortation that workers are not to 
be “classes which are marshalled, sent on manoeuvres, and marched up and down whole 
centuries bearing so little relation to the actual people disclosed in the archives — or for 
that matter, in the streets around us.” The early history of the union local saw many 
instances of dissent and disagreement of the membership over decisions made by 
leadership. Observations and generalisations about such concepts as bureaucratisation, 
membership militancy, gender, ethnicity, and employment are “the metaphorical
99expression of most complex, and generally involuntary, processes.” For working 
people, class consciousness is not a single “mode of expression” but a collection of 
different and conflicting expressions. The notion of class and identity is to be explored 
within the context of community at the Fort William plant. We will find that many 
individuals in the plant identified themselves collectively in opposition to the political, 
economic, and social conditions around them.
22 E.P. Thompson, “The Peculiarities o f the English,” in The Poverty o f  Theory and other Essays (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 294.
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Chapter One 
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
To turn to the issues of historical method, we need a methodology that can 
reconcile two premises, that labour in a capitalist system is weak in comparison to 
propertied interests but that labour can and does succeed in changing the material and % 
social conditions of this capitalist society, despite formidable economic and political 
opposition. E.P. Thompson’s quotation from Vico’s The New Science summarises this 
best:
It is true that men have themselves made this world of nations..., but this world 
without doubt has issued from a mind often diverse, at times quite contrary, and 
always superior to the particular ends that men had proposed to themselves; which 
narrow ends, made means to serve wider ends, it has always employed to preserve 
the human race upon this earth. Men mean to gratify their bestial lust and 
abandon their off-spring, and they inaugurate the chastity of marriage from which 
families arise. The fathers mean to exercise without restraint their paternal power 
over their clients, and they subject them to the civil powers from which the cities 
arise. The reigning orders of nobles mean to abuse their lordly freedom over the 
plebeians, and they are obliged to submit to the laws which establish popular 
liberty. The free peoples mean to shake off the yoke of their laws, and they 
become subject to monarchs.. .That which did all this was mind, for men did it 
with intelligence; it was not fate, for they did it by choice; not chance, for the
23results of their always so acting are perpetually the same.
Read into this excerpt the history of industrial relations in the twentieth century, and we 
have a framework within which we can begin to make our observations. Vico’s is an 
early example of theory in history upon which historical materialism would be built.
The premise upon which the labour movement in Canada is built, that of workers’ 
unity and mutual interest in a capitalist society, is fraught with contradiction. One sees in 
one instance the manifestation of a united and militant union local, and in another a 
labour body divided within itself into factions supporting this policy or that. The very
23 Thompson, ‘The Poverty o f Theory,’ 86.
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term “labour movement” is often no less ambiguous than other terms in current usage, 
such as “democratic society,” “feminist movement,” or “capitalism.” The term “labour” 
can be criticised because of its tendency to nudge us towards “over-consensual and 
holistic notions.”24 Thompson described such words as “clumpish terms, which by 
gathering up so many activities and attributes into one common bundle may actually 
confuse or disguise discriminations that should be made within them.” Keeping this 
admonition in mind, there is a necessity to link the concrete with the less specific.
Taking the union local as an example, we need to identify those bridges that link a small 
membership at the Can-Car plant with the interests of other labour bodies at the regional, 
provincial, national, and international levels of organisation. At the same time that 
commonalities are identified, differences within labour will arise. We need to place these 
commonalities and differences within the context of history, within the context of labour 
history.
I think the concept of the totality of history might do this. The concept of totality 
in historical interpretation poses a challenge, in some parts hopeless, and in other parts 
provocative. It is an old concept but I think that students new to history are being urged 
to consider the application of empirical analysis as difficult. Also, the emphasis upon the 
thematic consideration of history can exclude some forms of analysis that, in many 
instances, are quite important, such as the political and the economic. The concept of 
totality has been rejected, so it seems to the new student of history (of which I am one), 
along with other Marxist concepts of class, class struggle, mode of production, etc.
Bryan Palmer’s Descent into Discourse: The Reification of Language and the Writing of
74
E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common (New York: New Press, 1991), 13.
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Social History clarifies the issues important to Marxist theory.26 By maintaining the 
importance of the material, we can, as John Borsos maintains, “realize what Bryan 
Palmer has offered in Descent into Discourse as one of the promises of modem social 
history: to employ the methods of poststructuralists without privileging text over action,
27or rhetoric over reality.”
Eric Hobsbawm employs the term “totality” in his book, Labouring Men, but it is in 
his 1979 lecture, “Has History Made Progress?” that he describes the argument as 
follows:
[The] imperialism or ecumenism of historical studies is a good thing. History is 
“total,” to use a fashionable phrase, though even the current range is only a 
selection of those things which happen to interest late-twentieth-century 
historians. And it is an even more welcome development, insofar as it tends to 
turn history into what I believe it ought to be, the general framework of at least 
the social sciences.28
Is totality still useful today as a concept? Any attempt at totality in the study of history is 
open to the same criticism as the notion of objectivity. The application of historical 
method to empirical observation must seem limited and fraught with contradictions. The 
historical argument concerns always the “exposure of concept to evidence, or the 
organizing by concept.”29 If we interpret history as process and tendency, rather than as 
laws and rules, we see that the examination of various case studies and episodes in 
history helps to corroborate the concepts and systems that theory gives voice to. When I 
am describing the debate between law/structure and historical process, I am referring
26 Bryan Palmer, Descent into Discourse: The Reification o f  Language and the Writing o f  Social History 
(Philadelphia: Templeton University Press, 1990).
7 John Borsos, “Building Bridges: Rank and File and The Emergence o f  a UAW Local Revisited,” Oral 
History Review  20 (Spring-Fall 1992): 102.
28 Eric Hobsbawm, “Has History Made Progress?,” in his On History (New York: The New Press, 1997),
67.
29 E.P. Thompson, “An Open Letter to Leszek Kolakowski,” in The Poverty o f  Theory and other Essays 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 387.
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specifically to the arguments put forth by Thompson in response to the theories of such 
Marxist structuralists as Althussar, in Thompson’s essay, “The Poverty of Theory.”
The concept of totality has a history of its own. We see in modem historiography 
an attempt to come to grips with the study of history in the light of a discourse that is less 
dogmatic, abstract, and theoretical. Sean Scalmer’s article in the Australian journal, 
Labour History, concisely describes the contrast between E.P. Thompson and Raymond 
Williams in the 1960s and that embodied in Britain’s New Left Review. In his article, 
Scalmer writes that:
The analysis of totality accused Thompson’s own work of populism. It [the New 
Left Review] insisted that Thompson’s work ignored the need for abstraction, as it 
did the tendency of social relations to structure the world ‘behind the backs’ and
IBthe perceptions of workers.
Thompson responded to such criticism, in this instance that of Perry Anderson and Tom 
Naim, in his essay, “The Peculiarities of the English.” Against the models and structures 
invented or elaborated by intellectuals in the 1960s, Thompson said that every historical 
experience is unique. He wrote that too much protestation about this calls into question, 
not the experience itself (which remains to be explained) but the relevance of the model 
against which it is judged.31 A study in totality requires an historical analysis of great 
proportions, and it would consist of a study of individual episodes and experiences using 
historical concepts and models.
But of course, and in this Thompson was quite specific, the concepts and models 
(if model is, in fact, the correct way to describe something which is actually metaphorical 
in nature) must act upon and be acted upon by the subject or object of experience. Here
30 Sean Scalmer, ‘Experience and Discourse: A Map o f Recent Theoretical Approaches to Labour and 
Social History,’ Labour History 70 (May 1996), 158.
31 Thompson, ‘The Peculiarities of the English,’ 247.
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again we see history as process and recognise that the idea of human agency calls for an 
historical interpretation recognising this: “women and men placed in actual contexts 
which they have not chosen, and confronted by indivertible forces, with an overwhelming 
immediacy of relations and duties and with only a scanty opportunity for inserting their
«32own agency.
Since the 1960s, many historians and social scientists have criticised Thompson’s
approach to experience and human agency through historical process. Rather than
summarise Scalmer’s entire accounting of the post-structural critique of Thompson’s
view of history, I will quote the following:
The unveiling of the power and interest of intellectuals has entered into the 
historiographical debates of the present. The order and objectivity of historical 
explanation has increasingly been treated as a fiction, and the role of historical 
discourse in imposing that order has been highlighted by writers like Roland 
Barthes and Joan Scott. The role of historians as intellectuals who construct the 
actors that inhabit their narratives has been opened up to critical scrutiny, and the 
concept of a commonly accessible “experience” attacked as a damaging barrier to 
the examination of difference?3
I am cognisant of the difficulties of Thompson’s approach. I believe that examination of 
historical circumstances sheds light up the material circumstances of the past. This 
thesis draws on Thompson’s example, and a tradition existent in Canadian 
historiography, in its treatment of Local 1075 UAW.
The writing of Canadian labour history has changed a great deal since the 1960s.
It is important to consider these changes, to examine this growth that has taken place in 
the past twenty-five years. A beginning point in introducing the debates surrounding the 
development of labour history is the renowned 1981 article by David Bercuson entitled 
“Through the Looking Glass of Culture: An Essay on the New Labour History and
32 Ibid., 279.
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Working-Class Culture in Recent Canadian Historical Writing.” Bercuson took issue
with a dichotomy between the “new” history and the “old.” He began his article with a
critique of the concept of totality, and defined for us the difference he saw developing
between an older history and a new one.34
The new labour history is not new for the “what,” but for the “how.” Quite 
simply, the entire conceptual framework differs from other labour or social 
history. The studies in Kealey and Warrian, the Langdon essay, the Palmer and 
Kealey books, and other works of this genre are intended to be restricted but 
intensive studies of workers in different places and at different times which will 
eventually form a new synthesis of Canadian social history. The method, as 
Palmer describes it, involves the use of “sharp detail of limited chronology or 
restricted region to illustrate the human dimensions of the past.” In the process, 
“theory is meant to inform historical inquiry and, in turn, to be informed by 
historical research.” In the words of E.P. Thompson, the historian must “proceed 
from definitions to evidence and back from evidence to definitions..
The new labour history is usually marked by a concern with “working- 
class culture.” It is always difficult to categorise a group of historians. 
Regardless of the ideological or conceptual approach they identify themselves 
with they are, after all, individuals. One may be more concerned with the 
question of culture, or view culture differently, than the next. One may be more 
guided by evidence, another by theory. Nevertheless, it is clear that for those in 
Canada who have styled themselves practitioners of the new labour history, a 
concern with culture is basic.35
The new history, said Bercuson, was characterised by a primary concern with culture.
Later in his article, Bercuson went one step further in defining the new labour history,
this time in the British context, that it “tends to be explicitly Marxist and is almost solely
concerned with exploring the culture of the [British] working class.” Bercuson’s
observation that, with the new labour history, “a concern with culture is basic” recalls the
association we can make between the new labour history and the work of E.P. Thompson
33 Scalmer, “Experience and Discourse,” 160.
34 Bercuson identified some o f the “older” historians in his article, amongst them H.A. Logan, Trade 
Unions in Canada (Toronto 1948); Bernard Ostry, “Conservatives, Liberals and Labour in the 1870s,” 
Canadian Historical Review 41 (1960): 93-127, Paul MacEwan, Miners and Steelworkers: Labour in
Cape Breton (Toronto 1976); and D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike (Toronto 1950).
35 David Bercuson, “Through the Looking Glass o f  Culture: An Essay on the New Labour History and 
Working-Class Culture in Recent Canadian Historical Writing,” Labour/Le Travailleur 7 (Spring 1981): 
96-97.
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and Raymond Williams.36
It seems the new labour historians of the mid to late 1970s were interested in 
integrating class into historical scholarship. Joan Sangster not that long ago picked up 
upon the observation of Greg Kealey, “suggesting two overlapping cohorts of the 1960s 
and 1970s: the first doing more ‘institutional’ but certainly novel topics, and a second 
cohort, more interested in ninteenth century class formation, class, culture, and
nn
Marxism.” Bercuson identified one major difference between the older history and the
new and that was the application of class analysis to a discipline that traditionally
minimised the agency of Canadian workers in a capitalist society. But the transition in
Canadian labour history, from an older to a newer history, was complex. From the
Marxist perspective, Palmer reminds us that “Marxists and labour historians must not
give up the battle for ideas and understandings.” By the early 1990s, writing surrounding
the “old” and the “new” debates in historical analysis had largely been dispelled, owing
to developments in analytical and theoretical methods from a newer and different
perspective. But these Canadian historians who formed the “second cohort” continue to
remind us that historical materialism is still at odds with mainstream history in Canada:
Others [practising Marxists] have chosen different polemical paths, crossing 
swords with the crankily mainstream demand that social history’s insignificance 
and banality be reversed by a return to the “good old historiographic days,” when 
books were books because they dealt with subjects prime-ministerial. Such 
pronouncements could leave us thinking that all is well in the now diversified and 
increasingly inclusive practice of historical production.38
36 For a comment on the development o f history, culture, and a radical tradition, refer to Stephen 
Woodhams, History in the Making: Raymond Williams, Edward Thompson and Radical Intellectuals 1936- 
1956 (Halifax: Femwood Publishing, 2001).
37 Joan Sangster, “Feminism and the Making o f Canadian Working-Class History: Exploring the Past, 
Present and Future,” Labour/Le Travail 46 (Fall 2000), 130.
38 Bryan Palmer, “Class and the Writing of History: Beyond BC,” BC Studies 3 (Autumn 1996): 77. 
Palmer’s article cites Michael Bliss and J.L. Granatstein in a footnote as two examples o f  the ‘crankily 
mainstream.’ No wonder. We might cite Granatstein’s Who Killed Canadian History? as one example of 
such.
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Developments in the 1980s led the debate on method and theory away from the 
inclusion of the institutional and cultural in Canadian history towards the consideration of 
histories which had been, for the most part, during the 1970s on the periphery of 
academe. Or, one might say, Canadian history became more inclusive in its consideration
"?Q  . .of an analytical framework. The historical changes in economy and society during the 
1970s had an important impact upon women and Canadian universities.40 As such, says 
Joan Sangster,
Labour and women’s history did not originate, but were rejuvenated in the 1970s. 
This renaissance was encouraged by political and social movements of the time, 
as well as by the opening up of previously elite universities to a new cohort of 
youth, including more women, who had high ideals, and were quick to cast a 
critical eye on their elders.
In a more optimistic political climate, thirty years ago, feminist activists, 
including academics, harboured hopes for a reinvigorated working-class 
movement, transformed by feminism and committed to a broadly based politic of 
liberation for oppressed peoples. An intellectual and political space was created, 
which, though never dominant in the academy and the community, fostered new 
critiques of history and society and thus also hope for a different future. Out of 
this climate emerged the first attempts to create a Canadian feminist working- 
class history.41
Canadian history changed through the course of the 1980s and articles in various 
historical journals, including the Canadian Historical Review and Labour/Le Travail, 
began to commit more content to the discussion of historical topics in feminist, gender, 
race, class, and Native Peoples history. But one is reminded again and again, and for 
good reason, not to be complacent, nor to take for granted what has already been 
accomplished.
"IQ
Veronica Strong-Boag, “Moving Beyond Tired Truths’: Or, Let’s Not Fight the Old Battles,” BC  
Studies 3 (Autumn 1996), 86.
40 A work outlining the economic changes in Ontario, and their social and political impact during the 
period under discussion is K.J. Rea’s The Prosperous Years: The Economic History o f  Ontario, 1939-1975 
(Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1985).
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The writings of postmodernists in the past fifteen years have begun to use and
interpret class, gender, race and other forms of analysis in new and creative ways. In
Canadian historiography, however, the issues raised by postmodernists in recent years
have thrown the study of labour, as well as that of other fields, into turmoil. Concerning
class and gender, the older form of historical writing took issue initially with these two
concepts in an interesting way.
The issue of gender made its way into this context when it was introduced as 
evidence that class, or at least class consciousness, did not really exist. Since the 
working-class was fractured by different experiences based on gender, ethnicity, 
religion, and region, David Bercuson argued, class was obscured and a unitary 
class consciousness lacking.42
Marxists acknowledge that historical materialism and Marxist dialectics can integrate 
differences in gender, ethnicity, religion, and region. But within the debates in historical 
materalism, there are opposing views. Veronica Strong-Boag maintains that, currently,
This growing awareness of the multiplicity, simultaneity, and fluidity of human 
identities and relationships does not imply a meaningless relativity. That version 
of postmodernism has no appeal for feminist scholars who understand that power 
has many faces.43
Mark Leier writes that development if postmodern theories in reality and historical 
methodology are increasingly calling into question the “primacy of class, arguing instead 
that we, should see the interconnectedness of all forms of oppression and that history is 
too messy to fit into Marxism.”44 And so these criticisms repeat, in an different vein, the 
commentaries on Marxist materialism from twenty years ago. In her criticism of 
contemporary postmodern historians, Sangster writes:
41 Sangster, “Feminism and the Making o f Canadian Working-Class History,” 129.
42 Ibid., 132.4̂
Strong-Boag, “Moving Beyond Tired Truths,” 84.
44 Leier, “Response to Professors Palmer, Strong-Boag, and McDonald,” BC Studies 3 (Autumn 1996): 93.
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Such arguments have fostered new understandings of the power of language and 
narrative structure in our reconstructions of women’s experience, reinforcing a 
healthy scepticism concerning our strategies of historical recovery. And attempts 
to de-centre the “unitary” subject have encouraged exploration of the many axes 
of identity, including sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, age, and culture shaping 
the working-class subject. The question is: how do the multiple identities 
fracturing the subject of postmodern history differ from the multiple identities 
characterising Bercuson’s construction of the working-class subject? He assumed 
experience did exist, but working-class consciousness and culture were not a part 
of it. Poststructuralist-informed histories assume experience can’t be located, and 
again, class and class consciousness are not in sight. Do they both, ultimately, 
come to a similar ideological resting point? Moreover, does the emphasis on the 
“unlimited identities” of the subject lead us into a cul-de-sac of interpretive and 
political immobility, merely “hymning the virtues of schizophrenia?”45
We see that the discourse surrounding worker agency, class consciousness, and the role 
of the historian in examining labour history continues around issues unique to 
historiography generally. What Bercuson and Sangster have in common, though, is the 
belief that “Canadians should carve out an alternative project - drawing on our different 
political history - by exploring theory dedicated to redefining materialism, production, 
reproduction, and sexuality.”46
Where Canadian labour historians stand in this growing debate depends very 
much on the strengths and/or weaknesses inherent in various arguments and theories, 
foremost among them those of Karl Marx and Michel Foucault. The next part of this 
chapter considers an essential element in the discourse between Marxists and 
postmodernists. Taken together, debates stimulated by the historical example of E.P. 
Thompson, by Marxists and postmodernists alike, can increase our own knowledge of 
history and the pursuit of Canadian labour history.
45 Sangster, “Feminism and the Making o f  Canadian Working-Class History,” 159.
46 Ibid., 165. Bercuson did not express the sentiment the same way. Prof. Bercuson wrote that ‘the 
assumption that Canadian workers experienced an identification and a culture much like that of British 
workers is only assumption i f  it is not backed by proof. Even if  Thompson is right about England, his 
concepts do not necessarily apply anywhere else,” Bercuson, ‘Through the Looking Glass o f Culture,” 34.
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Thompson’s methodological emphasis in his historical work, if we take The 
Making of the English Working-Class as an example, was upon the experiential, “as 
experience is the start of a process that culminates in the realisation and articulation of 
social consciousness, in this case a common identity of class.”47 Joan Scott is critical of
K
Thompson’s use of the concept of experience, because it rests upon forming the relations
of production.48 Some historians have accused Thompson of “essentializing” history.49
Thompson wrote in this context,
It should not be supposed that these formulae supply an instant analytical resource 
to unpick the meaning of every action.. .Each. . .  action took place in a specific 
context, was influenced by the local balance of forces, and often found its 
opportunity and its script from the factional divisions within ruling groups or from 
issues thrown up in national political discourse. This question has been discussed 
cogently by Nicholas Rogers in Whigs and Cities; he (perhaps unfairly) suspects 
me of “essentialist” analytical procedures.50
The “suspicion of ‘essentialist’ analytical procedures” in Thompson’s work is an
extension of the criticisms articulated by Scalmer. It should be evident by now that I am
using E.P. Thompson as an authority in labour history methodology in my own theory; so
it might do to vocalise one more criticism, this one voiced by an eminent feminist
scholar, on Thompson’s methods:
In Thompson’s account class is finally an identity rooted in structural relations 
that pre-exist politics. What this obscures is the contradictory and contested 
process by which class itself was conceptualized and by which diverse kinds of
47 Joan Scott, “Experience,” in Judith Bolter and Joan Scott, ed., Feminists Theorize the Political 
("NewYork: Rutledge, 1992), 30.
8 E.P. Thompson opposes some of the orthodox traditions in Marxist theory, one of the foremost being 
Stalin’s theory on “Base” and “Superstructure.” See Thompson, “The Poverty o f Theory;” or read 
Thompson, “Folklore, Anthropology, and Social History,” Indian Historical Review 3 (January 1977): 247-
66 for an excellent essay on social history, culture, and the Marxist tradition.
49 Bryan Palmer defines this term, in a notation to his Descent into Discourse, to mean “the insistence that 
class exists only when class forces are uniformly conscious o f  their unproblematic class place in the society 
and act unambiguously and persistently on the basis of that consiousness.” Palmer writes that “Essentialist 
views o f class, and the consequent rejection o f class, have thus long been a part o f the one-sidedness of 
conservative historiography and political comment.” Palmer, Descent into Discourse, 253-54.
50 Thompson, Customs in Common, 93-94.
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subject positions were assigned, felt, contested, or embraced. As a result,
Thompson’s brilliant history of the English working class, which set out to 
historicize the category of class, ends up essentializing it. The ground may seem 
to be displaced from structure to agency by insisting on the subjectively felt 
nature of experience, but the problem Thompson sought to address isn’t really 
solved. Working-class “experience” is now the ontological foundation of 
working-class identity, politics, and history.51
I
Joan Scott’s criticism of Thompson seems to focus upon his tendency, as a Marxist
historian, to give pre-eminence to class as identity. Thompson once wrote that, “It seems
that historians in the Marxist tradition who have been influenced by the Gramscian
concept of hegemony have also been looking with fresh eyes at the forms of ruling class
domination and control.”52 I do not think that a class-centred and materialist
interpretation of experience and history need be hostile to, or exclusive of, other factors
and concepts such as gender, ethnicity, or the “Other.” In anticipation of Scott’s reading
of him, Thompson once wrote,
If we are concerned only with becoming, then there are whole periods in history 
in which an entire sex has been neglected by historians, because women are rarely 
seen as prime agents in political, military or even economic life. If we were 
concerned with being [read here, experience] then the exclusion of women would 
reduce history to futility. We cannot understand the agrarian system of small 
cultivators without examining inheritance practices, dowry, and (where 
appropriate) the familial development cycle. And these practices rest, in turn, 
upon the obligations and reciprocities of kinship, whose maintenance and 
observation will often be found to be the peculiar responsibility of the women.
The “economy” can only be understood within the context of a society textured in 
these kinds of ways; the “public” life arises out of the dense determinations of the 
“domestic” life.53
We need not believe, necessarily, that for Marxist feminists the self-imposed requirement 
that there be a “material” explanation for gender has limited or slowed the development
51 Scott, “Experience,” 30.
52 Thompson, “Folklore, Anthropology, and Social History,” 254.
53 Ibid., 251.
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of new lines of analysis in our theories of gender and history. This is what Joan Scott 
asserts in the opening chapter of her Gender and the Politics o f History54
The historian, using the concept of totality, need not consider only those “facts” 
which s/he deems to be pertinent to the study. Rather than call this an institutional 
history, or a social history, the concept of totality might facilitate an historical 
examination that is political, social, economic, and feminist in theory. Those historical 
details expressing something here in common, and something there held different, will at 
times be open to alternate methods of interpretation. Of course, the narration of an 
episode may well leave out something important, or put too much emphasis on this or 
that conceptual distinction. This thesis attempts to interpret a small span of years in a 
union local from a varied perspective. “But what seems answerable in easy ways to 
sociologists and political scientists often proves for historians to be a difficult, painful, 
complex process of reconstruction in which essential evidence is contradictory or, worse, 
just not available.”55 As Bryan Palmer pointed out in Studies in Political Economy. 
‘Totality is hard enough to conceive in the abstract. In the concrete empirical 
investigation of the past, it is destined to be an elusive ideal, something to strive for, a 
way of conceiving class relations in the past that must inevitably fall at least a little short 
of our imagined possibilities.’56 In Canadian labour historiography the methodology 
varies from political, to economic, to institutional, to social forms of historical analysis.
It is tempting to focus a study upon a single specific case study and to interpret the 
development and growth of the study in historical context.
54 Joan Scott, Gender and the Politics o f  History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 34.
55 Bryan Palmer, “Listening to History Rather than Historians: Reflections on Working Class History,” 
Studies in Political Economy 20 (Summer 1986): 77.
56 Palmer, “Listening to History,” 77.
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We need an historical method that can reconcile two sets of premises. The two
premises seem mutually exclusive, but an understanding of both is necessary if we are to
comprehend the character of labour, the labour movement, and unions generally. The
word, “movement,” has a connotation of something whole, an concept that has
characteristics and functions that seem dynamic and identifiable. Marxist theory
identifies class and class struggle as historical concepts, and many labour historians use
the idea of “labour” to convey the similarities that workers share. Yet, within the labour
movement, differences exist that seem to fracture the entire structure. Postmodernists,
and academics since the 1970s, have pointed to gender and ethnicity as concepts that
divide workers more than they bind them together. Amidst these differences in theory,
however, most Marxists and labour historians maintain that class consciousness is still
relevant to historical analysis today. This chapter seeks to reconcile differences and to
develop a theory and methodology that allows for differences while maintaining the
importance of class as an historical concept.
The first premise is the observation accepted by some labour historians, that:
Without the working men’s continuous pressure from without, interference on the 
part of government in [industrial disputes] would never have taken place. But at 
all events, the result was not to be attained by private settlement between the 
working men and the capitalists. This very necessity of general political action 
affords the proof that in its merely economic action capital is the stronger side.57
In this conclusion of Marx, we see the necessity of men and women to act collectively in 
their class interest if they are to better their own material conditions in a capitalist society. 
Large-scale union organisation is one means for workers to involve themselves in 
opposing employers and capital, although it is not the only one. Also, the pressure
57 Marx, “Wages, Price and Profit,” from Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1970): 223.
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exerted by workers upon capital, by the withdrawal of services and picketing (ie.: strike
action) can provoke the intervention of government. During the 1950s and 1960s,
unionisation was the most effective vehicle for groups of workers to combat employers
and their capital, but Marx’s premise on the strength of capital remained tme. Elizabeth
Fones-Wolf draws the following conclusion in assessing the conflicts between labour and %,
capital in the United States:
The overwhelming advantages of wealth and power business brought to its 
campaign to build company consciousness made labor’s opposing efforts 
seem insignificant. Indeed, the social unionism of the CIO has been 
almost forgotten as historians have tended to dismiss the social 
consciousness and social vision of the post war labor movement. It has 
been too easy to read the rise of business unionism and the steady decline 
of organised labor back into the immediate post-war era.58
Fones-Wolf corroborates Marx’s own belief that the outcome in the conflict between 
capital and workers was never a foregone conclusion. The alternative to a conclusion, we 
might guess, would manifest itself in a political and economic revolution. Such being the 
tendency in this system, is this saying that the working class ought to renounce their 
resistance to the power of capital and abandon their attempts at making the best of 
occasional chances for their temporary improvement?59 Of course not for, on this 
question, we move to our second premise.
The second premise grows out of the first. In spite of the economic weakness of a 
labour movement, and despite divisive elements such as racism, sexism, and elitism that 
hampers the collective efforts of workers around the world, gains have been made in 
Western society that have bettered the working and living conditions of wage earners.
Here, I must go from the general to the more specific. In 1867 Marx remarked on the
58 Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945- 
1960 (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 1994): 127.
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current condition of class politics in Europe and made the following observation:
A radical change in the existing relations between capital and labour is as evident 
and inevitable [on the Continent] as in England. At the same time, on the other 
side of the Atlantic Ocean, Mr. Wade, Vice-President of the United States, 
declared in public meetings that, after the abolition of slavery, a radical change of 
the relations of capital and of property in land is next upon the order of the day...  
These signs.. . do not signify that to-morrow a miracle will happen. They show 
that, within the ruling-classes themselves, a foreboding is dawning, that the 
present society is no solid crystal, but an organism capable of change, and is 
constantly changing.60
The political and social changes credited by Marx with altering the face of European 
society did not commence in the 1860s. In The Making of the English Working Class, 
E.P. Thompson saw industrial relations in England as being transformed as early as the 
1780s. With gradual changes in industrial relations came the improvements in wages and 
quality of life that we have come to expect in Western society. In Britain, Australia, the 
United States, and Canada, the general condition of the working classes has improved 
considerably since the nineteenth century.61 Some of the ameliorations of social life were 
demanded of the possessors of property and further industrial expansion was possible 
only by social change.62
These changes in living conditions have not taken place as a result of the paternal 
regard of government or business. Indeed, in some countries, intense industrial 
development was released only by social revolution. James Struthers’ No Fault of their
Marx, “Wages, Price and Profit,” 225.
60 Marx, “Preface to the First German Edition o f ‘Capital’,” from Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: 
Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970): 231.
61 An excellent article outlining the labour historiography in Australia is Eric Fry, “Australian Labour and 
Labour Elistoriography,” Labour/Le Travailleur 12 (Fall 1983): 113-35. Also comparing the historical 
development o f the Australian economy with that of Canada and the United States, see David Greaseley 
and Les Oxley, “A Tale o f Two Dominions: Comparing the Macroeconomic Records of Australia and 
Canada since 1870,” Economic History Review 51 (1998): 294-318.
62 J.H. Plumb, “The Historians Dilemma,” in Plumb, ed., Crisis in the Humanities (London: Penguin Book,
1964), 38.
63 T,
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Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State, 1914-1941 is an excellent 
historical examination of the slow and painful process of liberalisation of legislation and 
federal acceptance of responsibility in the realm of social welfare and provision for the 
unemployed.64 The role of organised labour in this process is difficult to delineate 
despite the leadership of such national labour and socialist bodies as the Trades and 
Labor Congress of Canada (TLC) and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation 
(CCF). As if the actual mandates and roles of labour councils and unions in Canada were 
not varied enough, the spectre of unemployment, worker apathy, and a conservative 
labour leadership make the relationship between labour and government a complicated 
one indeed. Yet, despite the concentrated efforts in the 1950s of such groups as the 
Canadian Manufacturers’ Association (CMA) and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce 
(CCC) to oppose social reform, as well as the traditional leadership of conservative 
political parties in the House of Commons, Canada has developed a social conscience and 
social legislation that expresses it.
In an age when the services we take for granted are increasingly threatened by 
conservative elements in society (the new Right), it is important to reconsider the gains 
made by labour in the past and to reconstruct the process so that it is strengthened today. 
The period of this thesis, the 1950s and 1960s, was one in which the waxing strength of a 
small union local mirrored, to some degree, the changes in political reform taking place 
in the rest of Canada. It is interesting to note the degree to which workers at the 
Lakehead identified with the changes taking place in society, and see how they attributed 
these changes to a strong labour movement.
64 James Struthers, No Fault o f  their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State, 1914-1941 
(Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1983).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
Historians note changes in industrial relations considerably different from those
related in Stuart Jamieson’s study, Industrial Relations in Canada. Canada still has those
“special problems” noted in the premise to Industrial Relations, namely immigration and
other internal divisions in Canada’s labour movement.65 These “problems” have
continued to characterise Canadian industrial relations to a varying extent, but, whereas
similarities between American and Canadian labour were seen as strengths in the 1950s,
today things appear very different. In 1957, Jamieson wrote that:
A number of factors that were strong deterrents to unionism and collective 
bargaining in previous decades have been much less effective during and since 
World War II. Industrial relations legislation now prohibits employers in most 
industries in Canada, as in the United States, from actively opposing the 
organisation of trade unions and requires them to recognize and bargain with 
properly certified organizations. Much more adequate and comprehensive 
government programs for achieving economic stabilization, full employment, and 
social security have reduced some of the more pressing areas of poverty and low- 
wage competition in labor markets. These measures.. .  have reduced or mitigated 
numerous divisive forces in Canadian life.66
Following the Second World War and the major post-war strikes in the late 1940s,
industrial relations in Canada were characterised as good, partly because of a revitalised
economy, partly because of the larger, industrialised labour force, and in large part
because of the gains made by “Big Labor” in the United States. Also, the analysis of
industrial disputes and Canadian labour issues was conducted differently. Mark Leier
describes the writings of Jamieson and his academic contemporaries in the 1960s as those
of the “industrial relations experts”:
How can we explain the militancy of the 1960s? Jamieson asked. What were the 
particular abuses that caused workers to go on strike and turn to more radical 
politics? By understanding how an interventionist state had resolved problems 
while maintaining a capitalist economy, industrial relations experts hoped to rub
65 Adolf Sturmthal, in the preface to Stuart Jamieson’s Industrial Relations in Canada (Ithica, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1957), vi.
66 Jamieson, Industrial Relations, 25.
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salve on today’s sore spots. Implicit in this history was a kind of Whig analysis 
that saw unions and socialists as point dogs for reform. They had their place and 
were worthy of study precisely because we could learn how to reduce their impact 
on society, politics, and the economy.67
The writing of Canadian labour history over the span of the 1950s and 1960s was largely
conducted by those with a tendency to neglect the use of class in their analysis of labour.
V
Class analysis, during the period under consideration, remained largely in the
background. In the foreground, holds Leier, were other methods of understanding labour
history, and not only of an industrial sort. A number of academics in the socialist
democratic tradition were also attempting to explain issues common to labour using a
political frame of analysis.
Seeking to explain the relative success of the Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation (CCF) and the New Democratic Party (NDP)... they painted labour’s 
struggles as a prelude to the real battle- the creation of a social democratic 
government. Dorothy Steeves’s biography of Ernest Winch, The Compassionate 
Rebel, fits into this category, as does R.A. Johnson’s thesis on the Socialist Party 
of Canada (SPC), “No Compromise — No Political Trading”; Walter Young’s 
Anatomy of a Party, and, to some degree, Paul Phillips’s No Power Greater. All 
of this early labour history was written by those who had a professional interest in 
approaching the subject in a limited and presentist way. On the one hand, there 
were those who wanted to draw specific lessons about maintaining industrial 
peace; on the other hand, there was a group of politicos who looked to the past to 
explain and historicize their efforts in the present. For both camps [the industrial 
relations analysts and the political writers], class consciousness and class conflict
z o
were seen as problems to be solved rather than as areas to be understood.
Leier’s observation on the interests of these writers examining labour history in the 1960s 
are important to our understanding of the historiography. What makes an analysis of 
class issues especially difficult in today’s circumstances, though, is the fact that many 
workers in the 1950s and 1960s, especially those serving in a leadership capacity, 
identified, sometimes intimately, with the political and industrial philosophies circulating
67 Mark Leier, “W[H]ITHER LABOUR HISTORY: Regionalism, Class, and the Writing of BC History,”
BC Studies 3 (Autumn 1996), 62-63.
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in the academy at the time. As we will see, the political tradition of the union leadership
at Can-Car during the 1950s was largely that of the CCF. It is no coincidence that the
MP for Port Arthur during the Diefenbaker era was Douglas Fisher (CCF). In the sense
of this history, we see indeed that “class is a daily experience, and that it is important to
study the consciousness workers actually had rather that to look for an ideal,
revolutionary consciousness.”69
If we consider class at the Can-Car plant, we find that it manifests itself in unique
ways. The class struggle is apparent in the way workers choose to identify with a
militant and politically active union. The language that some workers choose to express
their solidarity (most notably the leadership) was one emphasising the socialism of the
CCF. Local 1075 displays few characteristics that we might come to expect from a
militant Communist union of the 1940s. When the rank and file of the local enunciated
their displeasure with the union leadership’s party politics, they were using a political
language that was conservative, not radical.
Jamieson’s analysis of Canadian labour in the 1950s no longer held true thirty
years later. In 1984, Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz wrote:
It is one of the greater ironies of the present conjuncture that just as the Canadian 
state finally moved in the 1980s to guarantee formally liberal democratic 
freedoms in an indigenous constitution, so has it simultaneously moved towards 
foreclosing those aspects of liberal democracy that specifically pertain to 
workers’ freedoms. 0
The balance shifted in the relations between Canadian labour, government, and business. 
Panitch and Swartz wrote their article at the time when federal and provincial
6Q
Thompson, The Making o f  the English Working Class, 12.
70 Panitch and Swartz, “Towards Permanent Exceptionalism: Coercion and Consent in Canadian Industrial 
Relations,” Labour/Le Travail 13 (Spring 1984): 134.
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governments in Canada began to rely upon coercion and back-to-work legislation as a 
means of bypassing the rights of workers to negotiate their own work contracts.
Rather than generalise about the condition of Canadian labour going into the new 
millennium, this thesis examines the development of a small bargaining unit in the 1950s 
in the economic and social condition of its time. It contributes to an understanding of 
labour and Canadian society in the 1950s so that we might better compare and contrast 
the changes in labour and society with today.
The changes in the condition of Canadian labour were great in the years following 
1950. The standard of living for most Canadians was improved in the 1950s and 1960s 
and the labour movement contributed to such changes. But it would be incorrect to 
generalise the 1950s as “golden years” for Canadian labour. In the United States, labour 
in the 1950s improved the working conditions of those who were white and male.
Pamela Sugiman describes the southern Ontario auto industry in the years just prior to 
1950: “Since the beginnings of the industry, white men have dominated the auto­
manufacturing workforce. Anyone who was not white and male was in the minority, 
different, an intruder, treated as unequal.”71 Employers and employees perpetuated such 
unequal treatment of workers. Racial prejudice conditioned the process of job hiring, 
workplace segregation, and restriction of wages, skills training, and job promotion. In 
the United States Kevin Boyle notes that,
In the immediate postwar years the CIO swung to the right. First, it purged its 
communist members, who had been the foremost advocates of black rights within 
the labor movement. The unionists who then assumed control of the CIO - the 
UAW’s Walter Reuther and the United Steel Workers’ David McDonald, for 
example - centralized and bureaucratized union power, in the process 
undermining the local militancy that had been the mainstay of black activism.72
71 Pamela Sugiman, “Privilege and Oppression: The Configuration o f Race, Gender, and Class in Southern
Ontario Auto Plants, 1939 to 1949,” Labour/Le Travail 47 (Spring 2001): 85.
72 Kevin Boyle, “ ‘There Are No Union Sorrows that the Union Can’t Heal’: The Struggle for Racial
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The generalised observation of Jamieson, that Canadian and American industrial relations 
shared a great deal, here shows through; one has only to read Irving Abella’s 
Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: the CIO, the Communist Party and the
7̂Canadian Congress o f Labour, 1935-1956 to see this. Boyle argues that, despite their %,
rhetorical commitment to racial equality, Reuther, McDonald, and their fellow CIO
officers generally accepted, rather than confronted, traditional shop floor and community
racial standards.74 There can be no doubt that such policies of industrial union leadership
impacted upon smaller bargaining units throughout the United States and Canada: this
thesis is mindful of the union local in such a context.
The impact of race, in relation to men and women of colour, in Canadian
manufacturing industry during the 1950s was similar to what it was in the United States.
Pamela Sugiman finds that,
In spite of the scant numbers of black men in the plants, auto manufacturers drew 
on widespread cultural beliefs about race and gender, and exploited and 
reinforced the structural inequalities that working-class blacks faced in wartime 
southern Ontario. Employers manipulated these beliefs in hiring workers, 
allocating them to jobs reserved to women, and establishing the terms of their 
employment. In doing so, management was central to the construction of 
difference among workers - a notable achievement given the striking social 
homogeneity of the workforce as a whole.75
Equality in the United Automobile Workers, 1940-1960,” Labor History (1996): 6. It must be noted that 
the purges of the late 1940s and early 1950s took place under terrific political pressure from “outside” the
American labor movement.
73 Irving Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: the CIO, the Communist Party and the 
Canadian Congress o f  Labour, 1935-1956 (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1973). For more on the 
commonalities between American and Canadian labour in this context, see also Irving Abella and others in 
Robert Preston, ed., The Influence o f  the United States on Canadian Development: Eleven Case Studies 
(Durham, N.C.:Duke University Press, 1972).
74 Boyle, “Union Sorrows,” 7.
75 Sugiman, “Privilege and Oppresion,” 86.
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Sugiman qualifies her examination of the UAW in Canada with the statement that, given 
that developments within Canada departed significantly from those in the U.S., her
• 7 6findings are not generalizable across national boundaries. This observation can be 
further refined in its application to manufacturing in a northern Ontario community. That 
women and men of colour were less abundant at the Lakehead in the years following 
1950, compared to southern Ontario, does not make the consideration of race and class 
relations less important. In point of fact, in a part of Canada where an indigenous First 
Nations population is becoming ever more prominent in the Lakehead community, 
questions of race might become very important. The general nature of employment at the 
Lakehead is beyond the scope of this thesis, but one might ask what effect the exclusion 
of First Nations people from the workforce at Can-Car had upon the workers employed 
there.
An excellent study by Thomas Dunk examines the construction of racial and 
ethnic characteristics in Thunder Bay as powerful symbols in the myths which the 
“Boys,” these working men in his case study adopted to explain their own and others’
7 7  •places in a perceived set of power relations. The perceived differences in “race” were 
culturally constructed, but the differences among social groups were developed and 
exaggerated in an economic and social context separating the work and living spaces of 
different cultural groups. Categories such as “white” and “Indian,” relates Dunk, were 
formed on different principles than categories such as “Italian” and “English.” One 
referred principally to physical characteristics, whereas the other was based upon country
76 Ibid., 87.
77 Thomas Dunk, I t ’s a Working Man's Town: Male Working-Class Culture (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1994): 101.
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of origin and culture.78 In the Can-Car plant, the differences in identifying principles
between the one (“Indian”) and the other (“white”) was obvious. Aside from the physical
differences between the Indian and the European as they were seen in the community,
there were also boundaries encouraged by past hiring policies of company management:
the Indian remained outside the plant, the European was within it.
Focusing on the Can-Car plant’s working culture, we see the fact that issues
pertaining to race were peripheral to workers’ identity. What was more relevant were
those differences arising out of ethnicity, differences between English and Scottish,
Italian and Ukrainian, for these were the prominent cultural groups in the workforce at
the plant. For many workers at the plant, their views on the “Indian” population at the
Lakehead were formed, not through intimate contact at work or by complicated
intellectual theory, but rather through alienation.
For many white people in Thunder Bay and in northwestern Ontario as a whole, 
the most important racial and ethnic distinction today is between whites and 
Indians. The Indian is perceived as an inferior other against whom whites define 
themselves. The Indian is also a powerful symbol in the whites’ understanding of 
their relationship to other whites, especially those in the metropolis located in the 
southern part of the province. The Indian thus plays a symbolic role in two sets of 
relationships, one between local whites and local Natives, and the other between 
local whites and other whites.79
Dunk focuses an important distinction. The concept of alienation or, as one
anthropologist said, the “marginalization” of workers is not only represented in white
workers’ identity in contrast to that of the Native. Margins, here, are not a geographic,
descriptive location. Nor is the term used in describing those margins as areas of
deviance from social norms. Anthropologist Anna Tsing writes rather, that the concept
of the “marginal” is an analytic placement that makes evident both the constraining and
78Ibid., 103.
79 T,
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oppressive quality of cultural exclusion and the creative potential of rearticulating, 
enlivening, and rearranging the very social categories that peripheralize a group’s
on
existence. Historians such as Joan Scott have used Tsing’s concept of the marginal in 
their own historical writing, especially in their consideration of the concepts of race, 
gender, and sexuality. Does the concept of the “marginal” extend to a political or 
economic analysis of labour at the Lakehead? Have historians used other means and 
terminology to describe the antagonism that develops out of the social and economic 
processes arising from production and consumption in a Canadian economy?
The concept of metropolis and hinterland, here expressed in the cultural terms of 
white and Indian, play themselves out socially and economically when we compare 
labour issues specific to the Lakehead with those arising in Windsor, Hamilton, or 
Toronto. Here I speak of relations between political and labour representatives in the 
Thunder Bay region, as they may or may not have felt that issues and concerns relevant 
to northwestern Ontario were being voiced in the south, where union and government 
decisions were generally made. “The white male working class in northwestern Ontario 
is quite aware of its place in the social relations of production and actively expresses
o i
resistance to its subordinate position in various symbolic ways.” It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the historical relations between Natives and whites at Thunder Bay have 
been, since 1950, formed as a part of this symbolic resistance to its subordinate position: 
in many ways, white workers at the Lakehead have viewed First Nations as having a 
stronger position in society, regarding the central government, than they themselves have.
Speaking of white workers and power brings us to the next theoretical hurdle, that 
of class and gender. Women played two roles in the community of workers. As Pamela
80 Anna Lowenhapt Tsing, “From the Margins,” Cultural Anthropology 9 (September 1994): 279.
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Sugiman observed, women worked in industry in roles prescribed to them by men; 
women’s activism at the Can-Car plant was in part also linked to their kinship roles as 
wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters of working men. As Linda Kealey concludes of 
women not directly involved in wage labour, by “boosting” the union label, joining 
auxiliaries, and participating in workers co-operatives, working-class women acted
S'?within their roles as consumers rather than producers. It would be false for me to write, 
as Joan Scott believes some labour historians do, out of a kind of popular-front mentality, 
and place gender (along with race) on a list of variables that I acknowledge as important 
but do not take the time to study.83 Women formed a large proportion of the workforce in 
the plant during the Second World War. Unfortunately, women were removed almost 
entirely from the workforce in the late months of 1944 and through 1945. With the focus 
of this thesis on the local after 1952, the role of women in the plant’s workforce is 
correspondingly restricted. Future research should be directed towards the process by 
which women were introduced back into the production lines at the Can-Car plant. We 
must remember that women were employed in the plant’s offices in a secretarial capacity 
and that further study of the plant might include an analysis of Local 81 of the Office 
Employees International Union.
This thesis examines the impact of women upon the union local, in some cases as 
members of the workforce, but more often as part of a family unit, or more directly as 
members of the union local’s Ladies’ Auxiliary. Joy Parr, in her Domestic Goods, 
observed that, “Both men and women acquired goods and services their households 
needed and found worth and well being for themselves and their families in activities
81 Dunk, I t ’s a Working M an’s Town, 153.©2
Linda Kealey, Enlisting Women fo r  the Cause: Women, Labour, and the Left in Canada, 1890-1920 
(Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1998).
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beyond the market, both inside and outside the home.”84 Theory in gender facilitates a 
discourse where men and women, their respective identities and their interdependencies, 
can be considered and compared. A discussion of women in the Can-Car workforce of 
the 1950s is problematic on the surface because of the workforce’s composition. 
Compared to the war years, when women made up over one-third of the plant’s 
employees, by the early 1950s there were fewer women on the shop floor than one could
oc
count on the fingers of one hand. Correspondingly, the union’s membership in Fort 
William during the 1950s and 1960s had almost no women in it.
By examining the role of the family in union activities, or the union in family 
activities, one can begin to see the complexity in positioning the shop floor, the union, 
and men on one side of the formation of working class identity, and women and family 
on the other. This dichotomy, between men and women, work and family, is false, or 
incomplete. The discourse between union Local and Ladies’ Auxiliary, the effect of the 
one on men, and the other, on women, is too one-sided. What was the impact of the 
union, or the Ladies’ Auxiliary, upon women? In portraying the mobilisation of workers’ 
wives in union efforts as morale boosting, or fund-raising, or recruiting, did union 
officers give any thought as to what such an organisation would mean in the lives of the 
women; or, was their only concern how the women’s group could benefit the union? 
Paula Pfeffer raises these questions in her own research and concludes that, unbeknownst 
to the union leadership, the women’s organisation took on meaning in the lives of its
83 Scott, Gender and the Politics o f  History, 55.
84 Joy Parr, The Gender o f  Breadwinners (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1990): 3.
85 For further readings on women, the Can-Car plant, and war work, see Helen Smith and Pamela 
Wakewich, “ ‘Beauty and the Helldivers’: Representing Women’s Work and Identities in a Warplant 
Newspaper,” Labour/Le Travail 44 (Fall 1999): 71-107.
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members.86 Such examples of collective identity might take us back to theories on class. 
We will discuss the theme of gender in the fifth chapter of this thesis. We should remain 
mindful of the scepticism of Joan Scott about such an examination, but I do not think it is 
wrong to think that the Ladies’ Auxiliary illustrates the collective identity of a small body 
of women.
A brief comment on oral history is in order. The value of oral testament in the 
writing of history is obvious, but the means or methods in oral history are something else 
entirely. John Borsos, in his article “Building Bridges,” elaborates on the Lynds’ concept 
of doing “oral history from below.” Borsos believes Alice and Staughton Lynd’s Rank 
and File: Personal Histories o f Working-Class Organizers is an excellent example of 
American working-class history that has been neglected by historians. Their explicit 
intent, he says, was to get beyond a situation in which one group of people experience 
history (the workers) and another group of people (professional historians) interpret the 
experience for them.87 Borsos’ contention is that “for all the impact the work of the 
Lynds had on the development of oral history as a research method, they have been less 
influential in the field for which they were most centrally rooted - American working- 
class history.”88 I do not question the veracity of this statement here, and I will look at 
what the Lynds’ oral history may offer for the examination of a union local.
The Lynds’ Rank and File was written at a time (in 1973) when “a new 
restlessness [was] evident in wildcat strikes, in rank-and-file rejection of contracts, in
Paula Pfeffer, “The Women Behind the Union: Halena Wilson, Rosina Tucker, and the Ladies’ Auxiliary 
to the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,” Labor History 36 (Fall 1995): 558.
87 John Borsos, “Building Bridges: Rank and File and The Emergence o f  a UA W Local Revisited,” Oral 
History Review 20 (Spring-Fall 1992): 98.
88 Ibid., 97.
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demands for humanizing work and for a pollution- and hazard-free work situation.”89 
The Lynds used their concept of “rank and file” to differentiate the workers on the job 
from those workers who made up the paid union leadership. Rank-and-file activity, they 
explained,
usually means people on the job taking whatever action they think is necessary, 
doing something for themselves rather than waiting for someone else to do it for 
them. It means people acting on their own, based on their own common 
experience.. . Rank-and-file activity may be directed against an intolerable 
employer or an unresponsive union bureaucracy. At best they are concerned with 
material benefits for their own members, not with the welfare of working people 
everywhere. At worst they [the large unions] have become a new kind of 
company union, financially independent of the rank and file because the company 
deducts union dues from the worker’s pay check (dues check-off) and politically 
all-powerful because the contract takes away from rank and filers the right to 
strike (no-strike clause). This is the situation that makes some union men and 
women say that they have two enemies, the company and their union leadership.90
The Lynds’ use of oral testimony was not directed against union leadership, but they did 
write their book at a time when “too many industrial unions [had] become bureaucratic 
closed corporations, like the craft unions of the old AFL.”91 They believed that most 
labour history was created neither by famous leaders nor by faceless masses in crisis 
situations. The resources they had recourse to, therefore, were not limited to 
contemporary documents of union bureaucracy. They used recordings of conducted 
interviews, personal memoirs, speeches, and leaflets.
The distinction between the oral testimony of the rank and file and the more 
traditional materials produced by the union bureaucracy is not accurate, nor simple. The 
very concept of “rank and file” over-simplifies the complex relationship between the 
paid and non-paid union leadership. Union executives, especially at the local union level
89 Alice and Staughton Lynd, ed., Rank and File: Personal Histories by Working-Class Organizers
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981): 2.
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of administration, are unpaid and generally representative of their shop floor constituents. 
Union leadership is directly recruited from long-time workers, in their capacity to serve 
as members of the local executive, as shop stewards, trustees, or respected tradesmen. 
Oral testimony can serve to clarify these distinctions, to point to differences, and to alter
09opinions from those apparent in the written records of the union local.
Peter Friedlander’s The Emergence of a UA W Local includes an excellent 
introductory essay entitled “Theory, Method, and Oral History.” Friedlander used oral 
history because of the nature of the questions he sought to answer in his study. The 
limitations imposed by the evidence had little significance: not only was the information 
needed unavailable except in the form of the memories of participants; but information 
could be developed through critical dialogue.93 The Lynds also believed that oral history 
could facilitate a varied number of experiences, that ‘their accounts [would] throw light 
on what has been experienced or may be experienced with variations by a much larger 
number of people.’94
Oral history can point to difference, in that every individual can interpret the 
causes of, and the effects arising from, that event differently, but questions also emerge 
about the structure and reliability of memory and about the nature of the interview 
process itself. Friedlander describes the difficulties in that history as a discipline has its 
own language, its canon of interpretation, its collection of problems occupying the
92 The written records I mention here take on a variety o f forms, but for the most part consist of: local
executive and committee reports and minutes, union local papers, collective agreements, personal and
official correspondence, international union newspapers and leaflets, local newspapers, municipal
government council minutes, municipal Chamber o f Commerce records, Provincial Parliament and Federal
House of Commons records (Hansard), and the federal publication Labour Gazette.
Peter Friedlander, The Emergence o f  a JJAW Local, 1936-1939: A Study in Class and Culture (Pitsburgh:
University o f Pitsburgh Press, 1975): xii.
94 Lynds, Rank and File, 6.
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forefront of contemporary inquiry.95 The importance of augmenting the information we
can gather on the local from the memories of individuals, helps us to understand the
various influences which played in the union local’s internal development. As
Friedlander remarks in the closing sentences of his Introduction,
It seems impossible to arrive at any understanding of the political and 
organizational struggles within the leadership of the UAW without establishing a 
solid foundation of several studies of key locals.. .  the examination of a small 
local does shed a considerable amount of light on these broader questions.96
This thesis attempts to clarify the concepts of class and class struggle as they 
appear in the study of a small union local. Charles Lipton wrote, in 1967, that “records of 
efforts by Canadian working people to improve their conditions go back to the 18th 
century.”97 He went on to explain that as capitalist industry grew, the wage-earning class 
or working class emerged. Lipton’s is an excellent example of class and class 
consciousness used aggressively.98 Local 1075 provides examples of class struggle and 
close analysis that suggests the existence of class consciousness. Bryan Palmer explained 
that:
If we could stop the clock of history at some point in the mid-nineteenth century 
and take an aerial photograph of an entire nation’s social relations, we would see 
many things, some of them quite unfocused. But dotting the landscape would be 
the inert presence of class, measured out in concentrations in factories, mills, 
mines, docks, fields, and construction sites, visible to the trained eye in 
neighborhoods, families, and taverns, drawn most heavily in the urban centers, 
but spreading throughout the countryside as well. Swirling around this presence 
of class would be a myriad of struggles, in which contending voices shouted and 
whispered for improved work conditions, higher wages, familial needs, political
95 Friedlander, The Emergence o f  a UAW Local, xxi.
96 J U - AIbid., xxxui.
97 Charles Lipton, The Trade Union Movement o f  Canada, 1827-1959 (Toronto: New Canada Publications,
1967), 1.
98 Lipton’s book can be read as an apologetics for an autonomous Canadian labour movement. He used the 
concept o f “class-collaboration” to show a neglected aspect o f the U.S. trade union movement: “not its 
labour and union side, but its business union, craft, class-collaboration side: caused by the ability of U.S. 
big business to grant, from its super-profits, concessions to sections of the U.S. workers, and thus create 
among them a privileged strata.” Ibid., 134.
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rights, social recognition, a grog allowance, or a piece of park. Barely heard and 
visible in only a few locales would be class consciousness itself, and there would 
be some moments in time when it would be silenced and obliterated altogether."
The history of Local 1075 UAW provides occasions where the whispers of class struggle 
sound, when members asserted themselves in struggles for better wages, an improved 
working environment, more fringe benefits, and real job security.
99Palmer, Descent into Discourse, 140
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Chapter Two
THE YEARS PRECEDING THE LOCAL, 1930-1952 
In 1952 the workers at the Can-Car plant made the transition from a craft union to an 
industrial union. The decision was not a foregone conclusion nor was it taken lightly by 
workers who were still members of the craft union, the International Association of 
Machinists (IAM). The transition from one union to another was an important one for 
plant workers, and it said much about the change in politics, economy, and social 
relations taking place in Canada following the Second World War.
Such changes in the relations of Canadian society began well before the 
conclusion of the war. For many Canadians, the most significant changes took place in 
their place of work. Since the 1930s, organised labour in the United States had 
experienced changes in the social and political structures of international unionism. The 
relationship between the Canadian Trades and Labor Congress (TLC) and the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) was formally established in 1886 but these groups grew along 
distinct lines.100 In Canadian industries owned by corporations in the United States, as 
was true of the automotive industry, labour organisation crossed national boundaries.
The movement into Canada in the late 1930s of unions of the Congress of Industrial 
Organisations (CIO), and its ensuing combination with the All-Canadian Congress of 
Labour (ACCL), served to highlight the tensions in industry and production between 
skilled and unskilled workers, those who felt represented by organised labour and those 
who were not. These industrial unions rejected AFL policies eschewing organisation of
100 John Crispo, International Unionism: A Study in Canadian-American Relations (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Company, 1967): 97. Crispo’s book is an excellent analysis o f the historical and contemporary relations in 
and between industrial unions and the Canadian labour movement up until the early 1960s. Taken in 
context with the roughly contemporaneous writing o f Stuart Jamieson’s Industrial Relations in Canada, we 
have two authoritative sources not only for the industrial and labour relations o f the time but also for the 
academy’s interpretation of it.
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unskilled workers and insisted on an aggressive organisational campaign amongst 
industrial workers.101 Given that these changes in the structures of organised labour were 
taking place long before the 1950s, how did they impact Canadian industry in the 1940s 
and early 1950s, and in what ways did these changes effect Canadian workers?
1
International Unionism and Canadian Industry, 1930-1945
For most Canadian workers the Depression that began in 1929 was a trying 
period. Until the late 1930s, workers were mostly pre-occupied with trying to survive:
“with the collapse of the Canadian economy thousands of men and women were thrown 
onto the streets, without jobs, without money, without savings, and, worst of all, without 
hope.”102 In Thunder Bay, the reduction of jobs in manufacturing in Fort William started 
as early as 1921 when the plant stopped the production of boxcars and minesweepers it 
had begun in 1914.103 In the absence of employment, the Can-Car plant in Fort William 
was not the site for organising resistance against the employer. Rather, the company’s 
strategy during the Depression was to sell the plant. Responsibility for maintaining the 
investment went to a few security guards and a boiler room crew directed by a 
superintendent.104
The changing character of labour organisation must be considered in the larger 
Canadian context if we are to understand why later changes in work took place in the Fort 
William plant. While employment in the Fort William manufacturing industries was at a 
low, industry in North America was undergoing a transformation in union organisation.
101 Irving Abella, The Canadian Labour Movement, 1902-1960 (Ottawa: The Canadian Historical
Association, 1978), 18.
102IU . ,Ibid., 17.
103 Burkowski, Can-Car: A History, 1912-1992, 19.
104 Ibid., 23.
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Much of the union organisation at the Lakehead in the 1930s occurred in the primary
resource industries, such as the Bushworkers’ union or the Lumber Workers’ Union
based at Onion Lake.105 The organisation of the Workers’ Unity League was directed
towards these workers during the Depression years and a great deal has been written by
northwestern Ontario scholars concerning these developments. A.W. Rasporich writes:
Few modem Canadian cities, with the exception of Winnipeg, have had a more 
radical political history during the First World War and Depression years.
Equally few, Calgary and Vancouver perhaps excluded, have participated as 
broadly in the variety of political movements thrown up by the twentieth century.
.. Ideological cleavages representative of class conflict, and factional tensions 
reflective of a fragmented political sociology were thus the two central features of 
Lakehead politics in the twentieth century. 6
These politics have been described as radical, or as politics of discontent. These
industries involved in the extraction of primary resources from the region of northwestern
Ontario contributed to the hinterland-metropolis relationship of the region.107 The
consideration of northwestern Ontario as a distinct hinterland of the south is relevant to
the consideration of society and politics at the Lakehead.
G.R. Weller asserted a quarter century ago that very little attention had been paid
to “the effect that hinterland status has on the internal politics of such regions.”108 In
terms of labour and employment, the politics of work was two-fold. The first element
was what Weller calls the Economics of Extraction. The politics of northwestern Ontario
105 A.W. Rasporich, ‘Faction and Class in Modem Lakehead Politics,’ Lakehead University Review 1 
(Summer 1974), 45.
106 Ibid., 33.
107 G.R. Weller points out that a great deal has been written about Canada’s position as a hinterland o f the 
United States, or o f hinterland provinces and their corresponding relations to the metropolitan centre of 
Canada. Examples o f these works are: H.A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian 
Economic History (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1956); D.G. Creighton, The Commercial Empire 
o f  the St. Lawrence 1763-1850 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937); and J.M.S. Careless, “Frontierism, 
Metropolitanism and Canadian History,” Canadian Historical Review 35 (1954): 1-21. Careless 
summarizes the interpretations of the others.
1 flO
G.R. Weller, “Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario,” Canadian Journal o f  Political 
Science 10 (December 1977): 731.
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were, Weller says, “moulded by its economic base- not only by the economic base as it 
actually exists but also by that which some feel should have existed or should exist in the 
future.” 109 The large-scale extraction of primary resources such as timber and precious 
metals led to the great expectations of Thunder Bay’s becoming “the Chicago of 
Canada.”110 The Lakehead’s geographic position at the head of Lake Superior 
contributed in the nineteenth century to residents’ expectations that the region might 
develop like its neighbour to the west, Winnipeg. But the ports of Fort William and Port 
Arthur, despite their being terminal rail links, did not develop on the scale envisaged by 
early municipal boosters. Ultimately, the hinterland turned to extracting ‘fundamental 
economic and social change or, failing that, as many concessions as possible from the 
metropolis.’111
We can expand upon the concept of region by using it to augment our knowledge 
of the growth of trade unions and political labour parties. Greg Patmore, writing on 
Australian labour history, points out that focusing on institutions ignores ‘how the great 
majority of the working classes lived and worked, and what they thought and shows little 
interest in functional regional history, which includes histories of a town or city and its 
hinterland.’ He believes that regional or local history may challenge “orthodox
112discussion’ of ‘how class consciousness and politics worked in a specific setting.” 
Examination of institutions, including unions and governments, in the context of region 
enhances our understanding of history.
110 Thorold Tronrud, Guardians o f  Progress: Boosters and Boosterism (Thunder Bay: Thunder Bay 
Historical Museum Society, 1993), 10.
111 Weller, “Hinterland Politics,” 738.
112 Greg Patmore, “Working Lives in Regional Australia: Labour History and Local History,” Labour 
History 78 (May 2000), 1.
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Understanding the politics of metropolis and hinterland illustrates the 
relationships of regions and sub regions in Canada. At the Lakehead, the politics of the 
extraction of primary resources dates to before the twentieth century. It is not difficult to 
follow the relationship further and see that there were efforts by the metropolis to extract 
as many of the resources of the hinterland as cheaply as possible without having to allow 
any fundamental change in the metropolis-hinterland relationship. Out of the economic 
relations between northern and southern Ontario grew the expectations of investors, 
residents, and workers as to what the relationship should be. The relations between the 
radical workers’ unions of the 1930s and the primary resource industry in and around 
Thunder Bay are not within the scope of this thesis, but it is important to identify a
1 I T
radical tradition as an important part of employment in the north. Though production 
did not commence again at the Can-Car plant until 1930, the changes taking place in both 
northern and southern Ontario would have a profound impact upon workers during and 
after the Second World War.
The most important thing to note about the hinterland-metropolis relationship in 
the context of Ontario is that many of the historical changes taking place in Toronto had 
implications for the Lakehead. Labour organisation in the United States changed 
considerably when the Committee for Industrial Organization broke with the American 
Federation of Labor in 1936 over the issue of “dual unionism.” The problem with dual 
unionism was that it conflicted with the belief of many “international union leaders [who] 
became convinced of the necessity of [first] consolidating labour forces throughout the 
North American continent” in a unitary labour organisation.114 The effect of this break
113 See Ian Radforth’s Bushworkers and Bosses (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1987), specifically 
his chapter “Bushworkers in Struggle, 1919-1935,” 107-33.
114 Babcock, Gompers in Canada, 73.
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for the Canadian Trades and Labor Congress was not immediate but, by 1939, the
differences in philosophy between craft unionism and industrial unionism was strong
enough that the TLC expelled the industrial unions and split the unity of labour in
southern Ontario and Canada generally.
The history of international unionism in Canada, the relations connecting Canada
with the United States economically, has been long and strong:
International unionism represents only one of many long-standing Canadian- 
American associations and is certainly not the most significant. Much more 
important, for example, has been the corporate link between the two countries.115
The United Autoworkers took advantage of increased production in the late 1930s to
organise the manufacturing industries of southern Ontario. The large automotive plants
in Windsor, Oshawa, Toronto, and Hamilton employed great numbers of workers and, in
the late 1930s and 1940s, the auto industry in Ontario witnessed the organisation of the
larger part of its workers under the aegis of the UAW.
The Canadian plants of the three American automotive manufacturers, Ford,
General Motors, and Chrysler, were the first sites of organisation for the UAW. These
assembly plants employed large numbers of people and were centrally located in the
industrial centres of southern Ontario: “Captivated by the glamour, the excitement, and
particularly by the success of the CIO, Canadian workers desperately begged it [the CIO]
to come to Canada.”116 Most of the recruiting by the CIO in Canada in the early years
was accomplished with Canadian resources. The appeal of the large industrial union lay
in its ability to grow quickly and make considerable gains for its members. Unions such
as the UAW appeared in industries which had been regarded by the craft unions as
unorganisable. As Abella has observed:
115 Crispo, International Unionism, 1.
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The CIO had clearly revolutionalized Canadian labour; it had created a powerful, 
aggressive and most important, viable, industrial union movement. It had, in 
effect, organized not only the unorganized, but, as well, those thought to be 
unorganizable.117
The idea of organising the unskilled was not new since other Canadian labour bodies had 
attempted this, including the Knights of Labor, the One Big Union, and the Workers’
1
Unity League. However, the CIO was the first labour body to issue out of the United 
States to achieve success in organising and maintaining a large membership.
Considering the nature of manufacturing in Ontario, and the organisation of that 
industry's workers, southern Ontario exerted tremendous economic and political 
influence upon other regions in Canada. The relations of metropolis and hinterland 
cannot be limited geographically or in time, we see connections between the United 
States and Canada, between southern and northern Ontario, and between southern 
Ontario and other regions in Canada. The anticipation of war in the late 1930s created a 
demand for production in many of Canada's industries, including manufacturing. These 
changes in the Canadian economy brought about the commencement of aircraft
production at the Can-Car plant. According to Gordon Burkowski, ‘Canadian Car and
118 ,Foundry received its initial order for 40 aircraft on December 5, 1938.’ The increase 
in production brought increased opportunities in employment, and the workforce at Can- 
Car began to grow from roughly a dozen during the 1930s to its wartime peak of almost 
5,000 workers.119
The Nature of Employment
116 Abella, The Canadian Labour Movement, 18.
117 Ibid., 19.118
Burkowski, Can-Car: A History, 54.
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y Ibid., 60.
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Many people were thankful for the employment that war brought. In the words of 
one labour historian, “Instead of a shortage of jobs, there was now a shortage of labour. 
Naturally,. . .  the young single unemployed of the 1930s were the first to enlist in the 
armed services. But everyone who wanted to could work.”120 In co-operation with local 
school officials, the Can-Car management arranged for the training of Fort William's 
young men and former students at the Fort William Vocational School.121 The demand 
for the Hurricane aeroplane, first for use in Great Britain and later in the United States, 
ensured a steady and increasing supply of wartime contracts for the plant. The increasing 
demand for skilled and unskilled workers led to the hiring of women. “In keeping with 
national and international trends, [Can-Car hired] as many as 2,707 women at the peak of 
war production (40 per cent of the total 6,760 employees).”122 The vast demand for 
production of the Canadian war effort had a great impact on the lives of men and women. 
The employment of women in areas of industry believed, prior to the war, to be the 
preserve of men grew thanks to the necessities of war.
The changes in employment patterns at the Can-Car were different from those of 
the earlier years of production. During the First World War, the majority of employees at 
the Can-Car plant had been men. As well, the production involved, first, in the 
manufacture of the boxcars so sorely needed to transport grain for the war effort and, 
later, in the building of twelve minesweepers for the French navy was different from 
building warplanes. Much of the work was done out of doors, it required a degree of 
strength and skill in working steel, and the types of construction, production of boxcars 
and ships, were industries historically performed by skilled tradesmen. Production
120 Abella, The Canadian Labour Movement, 20.
1 2 1
Burkowski, Can-Car: A History, 58.
122
Smith and Wakewich, “Beauty and the Helldivers”, 72.
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during the Great War required a manpower of roughly 1,500, whereas employment in the
Second World War required a workforce of almost 7,000. Compared to the years 1914-
1918, the Second World War had a profound impact on workers on the shop floor.
These changes in the Can-Car plant workforce were in keeping with national and
international employment trends. Industrial unions across Canada and the United States
took advantage of huge increases in the national workforce by organising workers on a
massive scale and using the opportunity of the war to demand changes from employers
and government. While voicing support for Canada's war effort, unions pushed for
recognition by employers of the workers' right to organise:
Aside from the Communists, there was strong support within the labour 
movement for the war. But this was coupled with an equally strong feeling that 
this time labour's contributions would have to be recognized.124
The efforts of unions, despite opposition from business and in government, succeeded in 
winning from the federal government the famous order-in-council, P.C. 1003. This 
cabinet order would become the “foundation of industrial relations in Canada in the post­
war period as province after province adopted its provisions in their own labour 
legislation.”125
Conditions were not uniformly favourable to labour organisations across the 
country. The effects of the improvement in legislation and general working conditions 
are impossible to measure in any general way.126 For women, the effect of the war's end 
was the cessation of their employment: “the plant dismissed all but 3 female plant floor
1
Burkowski, Can-Car: A History, 10.
124 Abella, The Canadian Labour Movement, 20.
125 Ibid., 21.
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Helen Smith and Pamela Wakewich point to Pamela Sugiman's Labour's Dilemma as an example o f a 
local study illustrating the impossibility o f  presenting a single wartime work experience common to all 
women. This thesis also takes it for granted that workers' experiences are very difficult to surmise in the 
quickly changing conditions o f  wartime, but I think it would be safe to say that many women were very 
disillusioned with the gains made by labour when the war ended. There were some who would have been
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workers at the war's end.”127 Although government propaganda and the popular media 
had suggested that women worked through the war years to advance the Allied war 
effort, historical studies suggest that many women sought wages and benefits by 
participating in the manufacturing industries. Though the majority of women entering 
the industrial workforce in 1943 may have believed this, many single women anticipated 
leaving the workforce at the end of the war in order to pursue marriage and the promises 
of domesticity.128 But work brought benefits: “not withstanding the perception that their 
incomes were merely supplementary, most women made valuable economic 
contributions to the family household. In fact, financial necessity was the overriding 
reason they entered auto employment.”129 Those women married to soldiers fighting 
overseas were able to supplement the pay their husbands sent home.
The management of Canada's leading industries understood that the employment 
of women during the war was a temporary affair. The war itself did not do much to 
change the popular image of women in industry: the propaganda of business and 
government continued, during the war, to propagate the image of women and femininity. 
Pamela Sugiman writes that, “in confining women to specific jobs in the plants, in 
regarding them as temporary labour, and in presenting their employment as a patriotic 
mission, employers never fully relinquished the image of women as secondary wage
1 TOearners, undeserving of full rights in the workplace.” The workplace segregation of 
the sexes, as well as the separation of women and men on early union seniority lists, 
served to continue the division of labour in the workplaces and in the unions of the
happy to continue their employment augmenting the family wage.
12 Burkowski, Can-Car: A History, 90.
128 Pamela Sugiman, Labour’s Dilemma: The Gender Politics o f  Auto Workers in Canada, 1937-1979 
(Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1997), 70.
129 TUMIbid.
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1940s. Material conditions in employment could only serve to ensure that change at the
war's end was minimal:
Whether focusing primarily upon the propaganda or the lived experiences, [a] 
revisionist scholarship largely concludes that women's participation in war work 
did not radically change the social value placed upon women in the labour force 
either during or at the end of the war; in fact there was a renewed vigour in the 
post-war era to reinforce the middle-class ideal of the breadwinning husband and
i i i
housekeeping wife.
Following a slowdown in war production at the end of 1944, few Canadians were 
surprised to find that working women were the first to be laid off in anticipation of the 
war's end and the return home of Canada's soldiers. That thousands of Canadian women 
had come to enjoy work outside the home, or depended upon the resulting income to 
support themselves and their dependents, was of little concern to management or 
government.
Despite the relegation of women to supportive roles in industry, unions and 
workers made real gains during the war in the form of job security, union recognition, 
wage increases, and work benefits. Following the war, the patriarchal notion of the 
“family-wage” re-emerged, and the search for respectability by such institutions as the 
CCL and TLC led to a withdrawal of support for issues important to women.132 In its 
place, such documents as the “Official Program for Social Security of the UAW-CIO in 
Canada” (1946) seemed to assume “that women would win the peace by marrying the 
men for whom the ‘Official Program’ proposed wall-to-wall job security and wage 
protection.”133 All of this came at the cost of massive lay-offs of the thousands of women 
employed in various sectors of the manufacturing industries. Unions were forced to push
Smith and Wakewich, “Beauty and the Helldivers,” 73.
132 Alvin Finkel, “Trade Unions and the Welfare State in Canada, 1945-1990,” in Cy Gonick, e d Labour
Gains, Labour Pains: 50 Years o f  PC 1003 (Winnipeg: Society for Socialist Studies, 1995), 62.
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Canadian employers and provincial governments to accept the labour movement's call for 
wage and work conditions that enabled men to support their families. Unorganised 
workers, in turn, would come to expect the same gains as those made by the membership 
of unions in Canada.
What impact did these gains, made by various industrial unions but specifically in
the larger industries of southern Ontario, have upon Canadian workers in general? One
of the most important factors influencing Canadian members of the industrial unions
were the conditions of employment of American workers in the automobile and
manufacturing industries of the northeastern United States, namely increased wages and
the attainment of job security:
There are a number of reasons why Canadian workers found themselves members 
of international unions. Not the least of these were the lack of viable domestic 
alternatives and the advantages which the established American unions held out 
for their prospective members, whether located north or south of the border.134
The appeal of the militant industrial unions in the late 1940s was great for many workers 
in Ontario. The Can-Car plant in Thunder Bay had been organised as bargaining unit 
#719 of the International Association of Machinists at the beginning of the war. H.A. 
Logan explained, in his Trade Unions in Canada: Their Development and Functioning, 
that:
With the change to a war footing the proportions [for the IAM’s recruiting] 
changed entirely. While membership in the shops increased, this amounted to 
little in comparison. The greatest gains were in aircraft and shipbuilding.
Aircraft construction was given to the I AM by the AFL in 1933 in complete 
jurisdiction and though challenged by others was reaffirmed later. Two big locals 
in Vancouver signed contracts with Boeing Aircraft and with the government 
shipyard in 1940. Vickers Nordheim and Fairchilds were signed in Montreal, 
Victory Aircraft in Malton, Ont., and Canadian Car and Foundry at Fort William,
Ibid., 63.
134 Crispo, International Unionism, 11.
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Ont., and Amherst, N.S.135 
The Fort William plant was organised as part of a large campaign by the IAM in the early 
years of the war. Workers at the plant in Thunder Bay could clearly not share the gains 
the UAW achieved for its members in the 1940s, but the membership of IAM Lodge 
#719 was appreciative of what their own union had done. It is quite possible that, %
following the war, workers began to question the future of the plant under a union that 
had organised the local in a plant manufacturing aircraft. Prior to the formation of Local 
1075 UAW, however, employees had twice attempted to leave the IAM and form a new 
bargaining unit:
By the start of the 1950s, workers had become considerably more assertive. This 
was reflected in a move to replace the relatively docile IAM with the [UAW], In 
the first vote on the issue, taken in 1947, the UAW was just a handful of cards shy 
of forcing a representation vote. The Company, which was not eager to deal with 
a union with UAW's reputation for militancy, signed its most favourable contract 
ever with the IAM in 1949; but the deal was not enough to keep 70 % of the 
workforce from voting in the Auto Workers in 1952.1 6
The first attempts failed and it was not until the fall of 1951 that members had enough 
support to convert the shop floor to UAW jurisdiction. The switch occurred despite an 
IAM contract which made provision for: a) the organisation of all employees of the Fort 
William plant except salaried employees, police guards, watchmen, and gatemen; b) a 
voluntary check-off procedure (which should have strengthened the union leadership's 
ability to cope with its financial responsibilities); c) a forty-four hour workweek; and d) a
1 T7considerable improvement in rates of pay.
135 H.A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada: Their Development and Functioning (Toronto: MacMillan 
Company of Canada Ltd., 1948), 132.
136 Burkowski, Can-Car: A History, 127.
137 “Collective Agreement between Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Limited and Lakehead Lodge
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A Local Union in Transition
In the early 1950s the International Association of Machinists and the United 
Autoworkers of America were members of rival labour organisations, with the UAW a 
major participant in the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The CIO had been very 
active in American politics of the late 1930s and 1940s and the CIO was respected by its 
millions of members and feared by business and government alike. In Canada, the CIO 
allied itself with the All-Canadian Congress of Labour in 1939 to form the Canadian 
Congress of Labour. The IAM, on the other hand, was a long-standing member of the 
American Federation of Labor and conducted itself in Canada under the jurisdiction of 
the Canadian Trades and Labor Congress. The transition of the bargaining unit from the 
jurisdiction of one union to another would not be a smooth one. In Canada, the UAW
I on t
and the IAM did not sign a non-raiding pact until the summer of 1952. Any decisions 
prior to this date regarding a change in union jurisdiction involved hostile relations 
between the unions.
Following 1945, relations of the industrial and craft unions were strained as a 
result of the increase in job specifications arising out of war production. Such unions as 
the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) put forward resolutions at the 12th Annual 
Convention of the CCL, in 1951, for “amalgamation with the TLC and the CCCL 
[Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour] and reunion with the Communist- 
dominated World Federation of Trade Unions.”139 In 1952 the UAW and the IAM, 
reacting to increased competition between their locals in the aircraft industry, renewed 
and strengthened a "No-Raiding Pact" between the two unions. The two attempts at a
No. 7 19 ,1.A.M., Fort William, 1951-1952,” 3-11.
138 Labour Gazette 53 (1953): 989.
139 Labour Gazette 52 (1952): 1322.
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change in union organisation at Can-Car prior to 1952 had been conducted in a hostile 
manner. By 1952, the UAW leadership in Windsor acknowledged the need for an 
expression of support in the Can-Car plant before they would be willing to send up an 
organiser to Fort William. According to the UAW-IAM pact, ‘in industries such as the 
aircraft industry, where both the UAW and the IAM have organised a substantial number 
of the workers, it [is] agreed that joint committees of representatives from each union 
should be appointed to co-ordinate collective bargaining procedures and relationships.’140 
It is probable that because of the change in production at the plant in Fort William, from 
planes to buses, the IAM’s jurisdiction over workers was questioned. Amidst these 
changes, workers voted to join the UAW in 1952.
In 1952 production at the plant had already changed from the production of 
aircraft (maintained throughout the war) to the manufacturing of buses. These changes in 
production created even greater changes in worker organisation. The years following 
1952 saw the union develop policies that compared favourably with the achievements of 
the labour movement of the 1950s. The transition from the jurisdiction of one union to 
another was not a change that could, by any means, be taken for granted. Considering the 
great development of the UAW and the CCL-CIO unions in the 1940s, it is not surprising 
that workers in Thunder Bay chose to throw in their hat for a union which they perceived 
to be progressive, militant, and democratic. It must be emphasised that the sustained 
length of employment and the relatively stable job security of individual workers in the 
late 1940s facilitated the change from a craft to an industrial union.
140 Labour Gazette 53 (1953): 989.
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Chapter Three 
UNION POLITICS
Many of the gains workers made in the 1950s were won over the bargaining table. In this 
way, much of the political philosophy of the Local's early leadership was derived from 
UAW educational material. Refer to the Appendix for an excerpt from a pamphlet sent to 
the various Canadian locals from the Regional Office in 1961. In it are listed some of the 
important projects the UAW had accomplished between 1947 and 1960 (see appendix).
Political Objectives: An Analysis
At a higher level of bureaucratic development, one element in a union's 
leadership might be more political, in terms of community and regional affairs, than 
another. At the level of Local 1075, the Executive was small enough, and the leadership 
drawn from the membership experienced a low enough turn-over, that policy in union 
affairs was consistent. An example of this is that, in the decade 1952-1962, the Local had 
only five different presidents, and most of the incoming presidents had been vice- 
president to the preceding president. During this whole time, the Local enjoyed the 
services of the same Executive Recording Secretary.141 The shop stewards also provided 
an excellent pool from which the leadership recruited new Executive members.
The relationship between the Executive and political action was close. The 
Bargaining Committee, also drawn from the Executive and the chief representatives of 
the membership (and including the International Representative), was very important in 
the structure of the local. The International Representative was Norman Bicknell and he
141This is largely the strength o f the Executive minutes as a historical source. George Fawcett, Recording 
Secretary to Local 1075 for over 10 years, kept very good records. With Fawcett's passing in 1962, the 
records deteriorated considerably, owing to a rapid succession o f new Secretaries, the majority of whom
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was a member of the District’s staff. He assisted the Local’s Executive for the ten years 
under consideration here, and was involved in trying to organise other places of 
employment at the Lakehead, such as the Canadian Iron Foundry in Fort William.142 
Most of the gains made by the Local in bargaining with the company were made through 
the leadership of the Executive, Political Action, and Bargaining Committees.
In wages, the Local made considerable gains between its formation in 1952 and 
the early 1960s as examination of the Collective Agreement between the UAW and Can- 
Car for 1962-1965 clearly shows. To take only one example, labour classification, and 
compare the IAM contract with the UAW's first 1952 contract, in the IAM contract a 
blacksmith (a skilled tradesman) reached the top of the scale at $1.34 an hour whereas, in 
the UAW contract, the maximum wage was $1.56 an hour. Effective June 1959, a 
blacksmith could make $1.89 an hour and, by 1962, the equivalent labour classification 
could earn $2.12 per hour. Compare these gains with these of a labourer: 1951 contract, 
$1.03 per hour.; 1952 contract, $1.20; 1962 contract, $1.68.
The winning of a wage increase is political for a union's leadership, in that it is the 
most visible means by which the rank and file can measure the success of their union. In 
this respect, labour as commodity becomes one of the chief political concerns of a worker 
because it is the hourly wage which motivates the individual to workplace militancy. 
Lukacs has observed that “the objectification of their labour-power into something 
opposed to their total personality (a process already accomplished with the sale of that 
labour-power as a commodity) was made into the permanent ineluctable reality of their
were drawn from other Executive positions. The records are o f much lower quality. The weakness o f the
minutes, 1952-1962, is that they offer a single individual’s perspective.
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daily life.”143 And the wage is very much the basis of the worker's life: it has to buy 
food, clothing, shelter, health care, and other essentials of life, as well as luxuries 
becoming available in the 1950s. We will see, in our examination of the Local 
Executive, the complex relationship between the primary interests of the rank and file 
membership and the political and social responsibilities accepted by the union leadership 
as greater concern.
As regards the 40-hour week, the Local was able to achieve this in the Collective
Agreement of 1958-1960 (though every day included an extra 1/2 hour for lunch that was
not paid). The IAM agreement of 1951 had called for an eight-hour day, Monday to
Friday, and a half-day on Saturday of four hours, totalling a workweek of 44 hours. In
overtime, the IAM agreement “paid time and a half’ for the first eight hours of overtime
and “doubletime” for hours beyond the first eight of overtime. The UAW agreement for
1952-1953 called for “time and a half’ for the first four hours of overtime and
“doubletime” thereafter. The shortening of the workweek had long been an objective of
the labour movement. The UAW Local’s achieving a 40-hour workweek provided its
members with the working week that many labour activists had been calling for since
before the turn of the century. As we see in debates within the CCL in 1952, however,
the 40-hour week was still considered an arbitrary number:
Two resolutions recommending this [a 3 5-hour week] were combined into a 
watered-down version calling only for the "progressive reduction" of the work 
week with no reduction in take-home pay...  The adopted resolution justified the 
demand for a reduction in the work week by asserting that it would “spread 
employment and maintain purchasing power in the hands of the working 
Population.”144
143Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (London: Merlin Press Ltd., 1968), 90.
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Interestingly, a delegate from Windsor’s Local 200 UAW was one of the sponsors of the 
resolution for a 35-hour workweek and explained that his union “submitted the resolution 
as a means of giving employment to more men. Ford of Canada has been laying off men 
and asking us to work overtime while men are unemployed. Let them shorten the shifts 
and employ more men.”145 The call for a 3 5-hour workweek, at a time when 
unemployment was the number one political issue for Canadians, was criticised as a 
“make-work device.” CCL Secretary-Treasurer Donald MacDonald pointed out that a 
35-hour workweek would create 700,000 more jobs than there were workers available in 
Canada.146
The political debate over unemployment and the problem of seasonal 
unemployment and lay-offs made such issues important to all workers, not only the 
labour leadership. As will be mentioned, Local 1075’s Ladies' Auxiliary involved itself 
in the Thunder Bay and District Labour Council’s efforts to reduce unemployment at the 
Lakehead. Increases in wages, shortening of the work week, union efforts to develop the 
Guaranteed Annual Wage, and the political process of lobbying government to take 
greater responsibility for providing assistance for the unemployed were all strategies 
designed to reduce unemployment and its impact. In the early 1950s, the unemployment 
question was largely viewed as being solvable. The Local did what it could to implement 
policies at the plant and much of the work was done at the bargaining table. Bargaining 
and compromise at the Local reflected the fact, as Charlotte Yates has described it for the 
Canadian UAW in general, that “the post-war settlement was constructed intermittently 
and was the product of struggles between workers, union leaders and individual
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corporations.”147 At the level of the Local, Local 1075’s Executive moved a resolution 
empowering its PAC to conduct an advertising campaign on unemployment in the local 
newspapers (in the form of a paid advertisement and as a letter to the editor in the Fort 
William Daily-Times) in 1954. The resolution criticised: 1) the fact that the federal 
“government ignored the UAW National Full Employment lobby;” and 2) the further fact 
that “both local MPs voted against government action to relieve unemployment at this
1 4.8time.” To convince the public of the importance of the unemployment issue, the Local 
leadership decided in April of 1954 to buy $100 of radio time to aid the Thunder Bay and 
District Labour Council in its program against unemployment.149
Progress on pensions was slow through the 1950s, because many unions and 
labour bodies were busy pushing business to take responsibility for workers’ health care. 
Later in the decade, labour was lobbying government to initiate public health coverage. 
The IAM agreement of 1951 made no provision for social security nor any form of 
pension plan. The UAW agreement of 1952 did no better. Retired members did not 
achieve any significant form of company pension until a non-contributory Pension Plan 
was instituted on 1 January 1963. I say significant, because there was a form of pension 
in effect in 1954 for some UAW locals; Henry Wiesbach, Political Action Director of the 
CCL, criticised these early plans in a presentation to Local 1075 in 1954, for there was 
“discrimination between the sexes” regarding the accessibility of retired members to 
pensions.150 By 1958, the Bargaining Committee was meeting with the company to
147
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149 Ibid., 26 April 1954.
150This criticism o f early pension plans related to larger union locals in southern Ontario that maintained 
female representation in the workforce following the Second World War. This was, in no small part, 
another example of women's interests not being addressed in the process o f bargaining between unions and 
management in the early postwar years.
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discuss a pension plan but, because of uncertainty regarding the future of the plant, 
further discussion on pensions was suspended.151 Needless to say, for the period 1952- 
1962, pension plans in Canada generally, and for the Local’s members specifically, were 
poor. In a brief to the Cabinet in 1960, the Canadian Labour Congress “urged on the 
Government the need for ‘a system of old age security in which income of the beneficiary 
will bear some relationship to his income before retirement.’ Private pension plans did
i co
not satisfactorily fulfil this function.”
The Old Age Security initiated in 1952 only partially met the needs of the elderly
in Ontario. Again, it must be emphasised that the Bargaining Committee until the middle
1960s was more concerned about unemployment and plant lay-offs than fringe benefits.
The understandable concern of many workers about lack of employment security
and stability was of major importance in the 1950s, when there were periods of reduced
production because of economic conditions in Canada and the United States. The general
issue of unemployment found a focus in the plant when workers experienced lay-offs.
Government began to view the issue of unemployment as part of the structural integrity
of the economic system. We see evidence of this in an address by Milton Gregg, the
minister of Labour, to the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association (CMA) in 1951:
We have become too complacent about this matter, that we have come to accept 
seasonal unemployment as a feature of the Canadian economy which is either not 
really very serious or about which little, if  anything, can be done. If this is so, I 
think it is time that we seriously try to assess the effects of this problem.153
J Ibid., 25 October 1958.
5̂2Labour Gazette 61 (1961): 225.
152Labour Gazette 52 (1952): 900.
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Unemployment in Ontario was low until 1958 when the unemployment rate rose from
3.4% the year before to 5.4%.154 Unemployment prior to 1958 was relatively low
compared to modem standards!
The issue of health benefits was closely entwined with that of pension plans.
Progress in social security was made very slowly during the 1950s, but it was during this
decade that much of the groundwork for the later achievement of workers’ benefits was
laid. The early 1950s witnessed a growing trend towards public support for a federal
system of health care. In 1951 speakers at the CMA's annual meeting pointed to pension
and welfare plans, as well as hospital, medical, and surgical benefits, as important issues
for workers and employers. The view of one manufacturer on the subject was that
the future appears to hold increased costs for somebody. The amount of daily 
hospital benefits is rising constantly because of increasing hospital charges...  As 
the cost of service rises, rates under the plans will rise, and either employees will 
meet the increases calmly or will call upon their employers for more assistance.155
In 1952, the CCL interpreted the health problem in a different light than the CMA, when 
it passed a resolution calling for ‘a proper health plan in conformity with the requests of 
organized labour, the Canadian Legion and other broadly representative citizen 
groups.’156 This resolution called for a an insurance scheme which would provide 
adequate medical, surgical, optical, dental, and hospital treatment for all Canadians.
To put the national trend into perspective, the membership of the Local, as has 
been said before, expressed its dissatisfaction on the subject of health benefits to the local 
Executive in 1952, not long after the UAW local was established. Negotiations continued 
in the fall of 1953 and bargaining between the Local and Can-Car management was
1 S4
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stalling on the issue of Blue Cross and PSI (Physicians’ Services Incorporated) 
premiums. On a Friday in September of 1953, the membership carried out a job action 
which was described as “an apparent walk-out in regards to Company negotiations. The
1 ̂ 7Company went to press and called it a ‘wild cat’.” This action provides a number of 
historical insights. We see that: 1) the membership felt justified in taking job action, in 
this case something resembling a walk-out, because of the Company’s refusal to take its 
demands on benefits seriously; 2) the Company felt justified in refusing the demands of 
its employees; 3) the Company took the issue of the walk-out out of the context of the 
plant itself and addressed the problem in the community at large (in this case, in an article
of the Fort William Daily-Times); 4) the membership’s action was not, in this case, led by
1the Executive, but was accepted by the leadership as acceptable and legal. Here we see
what Yates described of the Canadian UAW in general: during the early to mid-1950s,
“the instability of employment combined with the harsh realities of assembly line life
proved a serious obstacle to stabilizing relations between auto corporations and the
UAW, as it often led to spontaneous wildcats and in some cases protracted legal strikes in
attempts by the union to win its demands.”159
To summarise well what was taking place in the UAW during this period, and as
has been discussed thus far, Don Wells describes the process as follows:
Workers’ gains came in the form of wage improvements and Keynesian ‘welfare 
state’ measures such as unemployment insurance, pensions, welfare, and public 
health-care programs. Fordism helped to provide a mass market to balance mass 
production, enabling large number of workers to acquire ‘middle class’ lifestyles.
1 S7
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158The Executive minutes are imprecise as to the nature o f this job action, but they do make clear that the 
International Representative to the Local, Norman Bickell, proclaimed the walk-out a legal action. In a 
Special meeting with membership two weeks later, he declared that “the main purpose here is to build a
fighting union."
1 9Yates, From Plant to Politics, 197.
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The “welfare state” measures reduced the volatility of business cycles: recessions 
triggered increases in unemployment insurance, welfare, and other state 
payments, hence improving consumer demand. This stimulated economic 
recovery and helped smooth out the ‘boom and bust’ peaks and troughs of 
business cycles. Not least in significance, this economic stabilization provided 
many workers with job security for the first time.160
The compromise described by Wells was a difficult one, and the process was far from
simple. The responsibility for health care was complicated by so many other issues,
including pensions, cost of living allowances, and the Guaranteed Annual Wage (GAW).
In 1954, the Ontario Chamber of Commerce was still opposing the enactment of dues
check-off legislation, and the legality of most forms of strike action, and “declared itself
opposed to any form of compulsory health insurance.”161 Much of the rhetoric behind
such opposition was motivated by the belief that such proposals had been “enunciated”
by “President Walter Reuther of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.” Capital
practised the age-old criticism of international unionism, that all labour initiatives
“originated outside Canada without consideration of the impact [they] would have on
» 1 f t JCanadian prices and the markets for Canadian goods.”
Here we see evidence of the philosophy that the rights and quality of life of 
workers are dependent upon the economic condition of the market and that the demands 
of capital must be met before the needs of workers. This philosophy was not new to 
Canadian industry and labour generally, but what was interesting was labour’s ability, in 
the 1950s, to substitute a new argument for company, and then state, social assistance in 
responding to the old nineteenth-century assumptions underlining laissez-faire and liberal 
economic policies. What made the efforts of Canadian labour so effective was that it was
160Don Wells, “The Impact o f the Postwar Compromise on Canadian Unionism: The Formation of an Auto 
Worker Local in the 1950s,” Labour/ Le Travail 36 (Fall 1995), 148.
161 Labour Gazette 55 (1955): 162.
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able to impress upon its membership the validity of this alternate philosophy, a political 
philosophy that had been advocated, in part, by Canadian labour, the Communist Party 
earlier on, and the CCF since at least the early 1930s. Contrary to the widespread belief 
of business, the demand for government or business responsibility in the realm of social 
welfare was not an American phenomenon; its roots lay far back in a radical tradition that 
is not only American but also Canadian and British.
As we see in the UAW pamphlet for 1961, the union was able to impress upon its 
members that it had gained health coverage for its workers. Indeed, by 1962 the local 
and the UAW had achieved the following for its membership at Can-Car: 1) standard 
ward hospital coverage as required by Ontario law and as provided by the Ontario 
Hospital Services Commission; 2) Blue Cross Supplementary Plan semi-private ward 
coverage, or the equivalent; and 3) Physicians’ Services Inc. (Full Plan) or the equivalent. 
The company paid 60%, and the employees 40%, of the monthly cost of these plans.164
In 1962, the Local was still trying to improve the provision of health care for its 
members, this time by initiating an advertising campaign in the paper and pushing for 
public Medicare like that begun in Saskatchewan.165 The Local had hopes that Medicare
163The next chapter examines in greater detail the relationship between Canadian labour, the CCF, and 
Local 1075. To appreciate the rhetoric that American business threw against the liberal philosophy of 
American labour, are Elizabeth Fones-W olf s Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and 
Liberalism, 1945-1960 is very insightful in interpreting what took place in the United States during this 
period. An interesting backdrop to understanding the development of a philosophy o f social welfare and its 
contrast with the conservative and liberal economic traditions in Britain is Raymond Williams’ Culture and 
Society, 1780-1950 (Garden City, N Y : Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960). Williams’ observations, as well as 
his method o f interpretation, are important to any understanding how the values and mores of a society are 
contracted in a complex process that is historical and material. His consideration o f historical and 
intellectual evidence would hold well for this study, that ‘In naming these points, it is o f course necessary 
to add at once that they are clearly very closely interrelated, and that some might be named as causes, and 
some as effects, were not the historical process so complex as to render a clear division impossible’ 
(Williams, Culture and Society, 35).
Agreement Between Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd. Canadian Car Fort William Division and 
International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers o f  America, 1962- 
1965, 37-38.
165Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 9 July 1962.
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might be instituted in Ontario, and it advertised to its membership and the community at 
large that Morden Lazarus, Political Action Director for the Ontario Federation of 
Labour, who was travelling across Ontario advocating Medicare, would be the TBDLC’s 
guest lecturer.166
One of the characteristics of collective bargaining in the 1950s was advocacy by 
the International UAW and Canadian business alike of long-term and company-wide 
contracts. The benefit of the long-term, company-wide contract was that it gave stability 
to the company-union bargaining process, and it eliminated the threat of spontaneous 
strike action and company lock-outs (a result of labour relations legislation). Charlotte 
Yates points to the dynamics of this process of bargaining as fraught with ‘conflict.’167 
She observes that different companies tried to implement such contracts in complicated 
and inconsistent ways. As regards the UAW of the early 1950s, Yates notes that General 
Motors accepted the union as a ‘more or less permanent motor in the workplace and 
therefore sought to negotiate regulations which would curb union disruption of 
production and stabilize union-management relations.’ She contrasts this with the 
attitude of the Ford Company of Canada, which “continued anti-union practices intended 
either to circumvent or avoid the union altogether.”
However, Yates and Wells both characterise the “workplace compromise” of the 
1950s as one based on a “Fordist” framework with “mass production based on a division 
of labour.’169 Such distinctions are important if we are to understand the process of 
bargaining and compromise that took place at the Fort William plant. The strategies of 
the Company were similar to those utilised by Ford Canada in its relations with the UAW
166Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 10 December 1962.
167Yates, From Plant to Politics, 195.
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in southern Ontario. Capitalising upon divisions within the union, the company
attempted to use the threat of plant closure, or return to a voluntary dues check-off, to
turn segments of the membership against the union leadership. Local 1075, in the
meantime, drew upon the collective experience and leadership of personnel at the UAW
Canadian Regional Office in Windsor as well as upon their own unique experience in
northwestern Ontario, to frustrate these attempts.
Collective agreements at Can-Car, then, tended to favour the long-term,
maintaining the prerogatives of management to conduct its affairs as it saw fit. This was
not unlike conditions in the larger automotive plants in southern Ontario, such as
Windsor and Oshawa, where,
under Taylorism, semi-skilled workers performed repetitive tasks while managers 
and technical staff, such as engineers, exercised a near monopoly not only over 
day-to-day workplace governance but also over strategic decisions concerning 
technological innovation, new investments, and the organization of work.170
Furthermore, the relations of management and union were such that ‘Canadian Fordism
developed into one of the weakest in the industrialized world. ’ While it is true that
Reuther and the UAW International were encouraging the membership in Canada to
appreciate the stability offered by long-term, company-wide contract, it is also true that
the smaller, more regionalised locals in Canada went into the company-union bargaining
relationship at a distinct disadvantage. This knowledge helps us to understand some of
the problems Local 1075 experienced in its relations with the company during the later
1950s and early 1960s. In Canada,
despite organized labour's wartime gains, Canada’s Fordism reflected a balance of 
class forces that remained heavily lopsided in favour of capital. Under these 
circumstances, and unlike the more statist versions of Fordism, Canadian Fordism 
was built around a “Wagner model” of labour relations named after the 1935
169Wells, “The Impact of the Postwar Compromise on Canadian Unionism,” 147.
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National Labour Relations Act in the U.S., known as the Wagner Act. That Act 
established conditions for setting collective bargaining in motion, including the 
right to organize independent unions, the right to strike, and the obligation to 
bargain in good faith. The Wagner Act did not, however, compel the employer 
and the union to agree on a contract. Moreover, Canada's Wagner model was 
even more restrictive of unions than was the U.S. model, particularly because 
strike rights were so limited.171
As we shall see in the next chapter, one of the most effective means for capital to avoid 
its responsibilities to its workers was to employ what unionists described as “the run­
away” plant. In 1953, the Local complained that the company had a hiring policy of 
discriminating against local workers.172 In September of 1953, the Company chose to 
stall negotiations over the issues of Blue Cross and a company pension plan and 
precipitated the job action we have already noted that the membership took in hopes of 
addressing this problem.
In June of 1954 the Local complained that the company was abrogating the 
grievance procedures in the collective agreement. And in August of 1954, Norman 
Bicknell, International Representative to the Local, reported to the Executive on behalf of 
the Bargaining Committee that all the difficulties the local had been experiencing on the 
part of the company were “a definite reflection of a considered policy on the part of the 
CMA. The corporations are out to use their money to fight unions, rather than grant pay 
increases.”173 The Local felt driven to take legal action against Can-Car. The 
International UAW supported the local’s action by hiring E.B. Jolliffe as counsel and 
launching  a “charge of company violation of the Labour Act.”174 This episode was not 
the first, nor would it be the last, in a relationship between the Local and the company 
that could be characterised as one of conflict. But the conflict, in this sense, was not open
171 Ibid., 149.
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and mounting hostility. Rather, management-union relations were marked by constant 
and drawn-out testing of the contractual obligations of each party. It is notable also that, 
up to negotiation of the contract of 1962-1965, the contracts had been for no longer than 
two years. Such contracts could be contrasted with those at GM of Canada which, as 
early as 1950, agreed to the UAW's demands for a company paid pension plan, limited 
health care coverage, and a gradual hourly reduction in the work week, in exchange for a
1 7̂five-year contract. The character of production in Thunder Bay which was regional 
and peripheral to southern Ontario, placed workers at a disadvantage as compared with 
the centralised bargaining processes in the UAW locals of southern Ontario.
In the UAW pamphlet for 1961, the UAW placed some emphasis on the gains 
made by its skilled workers during the 1947-1960 period. The skilled trades played an 
uncertain part in the initial policies of the UAW, considering the industrial character of 
its constituency. The dichotomy between the craft union and the industrial union, 
between the skilled worker and the unskilled or semi-skilled worker, was fraught with 
contradiction. From its beginning, the UAW had incorporated within its constitution 
provisions protecting the interests and integrity of its skilled members. Remembering 
that the CIO members of the 1950s were originally members of the American Federation 
of Labor in the 1930s, it is not strange to find that the industrial unions remained 
interested in extending the rights of their members and that protecting the position of the 
skilled or craft worker was one means of accomplishing this. This distinction of skilled 
worker in the context of these union locals following the war is important. Don Wells 
points out that, in the post-war period,
Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 25 Aug. 1954.
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industrial unionism shifted from a greater emphasis on mobilizing workers 
through militancy and class solidarity to one which centred on bargaining multi­
year contracts that guaranteed labour peace. This required workers to drop any 
ambitions they had for greater participation in decision-making in their 
workplaces and in their own unions.1 6
Without going into much detail here about the participation of workers in their respective
unions, it should be noted that workers wanted greater autonomy and recognition of their
skill or trade on the shop floor. The application of Taylorism in job speed-ups and the
threat of automation in the workplace were visible forms of interference in what workers
believed should be theirs: the shop floor. What is more, the exercise of such managerial
prerogatives as factory automation to enhance production were viewed by workers as
direct threats to their jobs. At best, such managerial changes as workplace automation
could reduce the work employees would have to do while sustaining productivity; at the
worst, automation would replace workers and leave Canada, as Walter Reuther said in
1954, in “a social and economic nightmare in which men walk idle and hungry, made idle
as producers because the mechanical monsters around them cannot replace them as
177consumers.”
In light of these changes taking place in the workplace, it was important for the 
union to emphasise its “Protecting,” “Enhancing,” or “Preserving” the rights of its 
membership: the skilled workers. At Can-Car, such trades included the blacksmiths, the 
assorted shop mechanics, the jig and toolmakers, the various electricians, and similar 
groups. The chief effect of automation on industry would be change, very rapid change. 
We must understand the importance of automation in the light of changing modes of 
production to appreciate why the discussion of automation is so important to our 
consideration of skilled work in the 1950s. The best synopsis of automation was given
176Wells, “The Impact of the Postwar Compromise on Canadian Unionism,” 150-51.
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by William Westly, of McGill University’s Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
in an address to the 9th Annual Industrial Relations Conference in 1956. By 1956, the
effects of automation were being felt throughout Canada’s manufacturing industry. The
following is a description of his address:
Unemployment, the speaker thought, would be “minimal in an expanding 
economy.” He pointed out that “many of the industries which have been 
automating rather rapidly during the past few years have had little or no 
unemployment due to their rapid expansion.” Nevertheless, it would be 
impossible to avoid changes to the ranks or grades of the workers, and this could 
be “a very serious matter to a skilled workman who has at stake years of 
experience which will become devalued with the advent of the new machine.” 
“Since automation, by definition, changes not only the power of the 
worker but his skills, it is bound to change the distribution of ranks. A few 
workers will be up-graded or hired to shepherd the new highly complex machines, 
but many others whose skills have been displaced by the changes will be forced to 
accept simpler jobs and lower grades.”178
Unemployment was dependent on the character of the economy. As long as the Canadian
economy was in an expansive mode, the effects of automation would be minimal. A
great many unionists in the 1950s were not so sure about the expanding nature of the
Canadian economy. But the effect of industrial automation upon the skilled trades
seemed to be quite certain. Unions such as the UAW took the matter of automation very
seriously, and this may be one of the reasons why it was so important, especially in the
later 1950s and early 1960s, for unions to address this issue of the preservation of skilled
workers as a class of employee.
In considering automation or the role of the skilled trades in Local 1075, a
complication arises that is quite historical in nature (as most complications are). There
arose in the 1950s an antagonism within the UAW itself (though not restricted to it)
between the skilled and unskilled workers within its ranks. This antagonism was visible
‘ Labour Gazette 55 (1955): 529.
178 Labour Gazette 57 (1957): 1178.
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in Local 1075, and the clash of interests between these types of workers became serious
as the 1950s progressed. An article in the Labour Gazette for 1956 summarises the
difficult straits in which the UAW found itself:
A new departure in collective bargaining has been initiated by the UAW which 
will mean two sets of demands, two sets of negotiations, and two contracts - one 
for the skilled workers in the union and another for the unskilled workers.. .  The 
change in policy has been forced upon the union by a bitter antagonism which has 
been growing within its ranks, and which if not dealt with might split the whole 
organization. This division is between the skilled and the unskilled workers in the
179union.
The philosophy of the UAW International in such negotiations, with separate ones for
skilled and unskilled workers, was that such bargaining “was contrary to the spirit and
constitution of the union.” But the changes in industry affected their skilled members.
The article described what it believed the divisions were:
Since the war cyclical layoffs have almost ceased to affect the skilled employees, 
but have become increasingly severe in their effects on production workers.
The differential between skilled and unskilled wage rates, which was once 50 per 
cent, has been reduced, according to some estimates, to 35 per cent during the 
same period. The reduction in this differential has lessened the skilled men's pride 
of position as well as affecting their relative earnings, and has become a sore 
point with the journeymen.180
The antagonism here is obvious and we see that, whether real or not, skilled workers
perceived their positions within the union and on the shop floor as being “at risk”. We
see also that the antagonism was not solely from the skilled workers. Those workers
classified as unskilled noted the differential treatment they were receiving from union and
management alike. The issue of skilled and unskilled workers complicates an analysis of
class and illustrates that, within the union, there were interests in conflict.
179
Ibid., 134. 
nQ Labour Gazette 57 (1957): 134.
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Turning now to Local 1075, we can identify efforts in bargaining to secure rights 
and privileges for the skilled workers explicitly in the collective agreement. The contract 
of 1958-1960 includes a comprehensive listing and description of the Canadian Car 
Company Labour Classifications. Concerning the classification of employees, the 
contract states that:
62. In the event of an employee transferring to a higher rated classification, he 
shall be paid at least the minimum rate for the higher classification. It is 
understood that such transfer will not result in the reduction of an employee's 
wage rate in case of promotion in related work.
63. Nothing in the application of the terms of this Agreement shall serve to 
reduce the wage rates of any present employees at the time of its execution.
The collective agreement between Can-Car and the UAW did not involve separate
agreements but rather included clauses pertaining to this or that specific group of
classifications. In the collective agreement of 1958 a general wage increase of 2 cents
per hour was to be applied to all classifications, effective 1 March 1959, but the following
clause provided that, effective 1 May, there would be a further increase of 2 cents per
hour for Labour Grades 11, 12, and 13 (these employees comprised the highest grades at
the plant). Such negotiations achieving some gains for all members, but greater gains for
a segment of its workers, caused problems in the Local. From one point of view, the
gains may not have been enough; from another point of view, the wage gains for the
skilled workers of the union may have been out of keeping with the principles of
industrial unionism. In contrast to the collective agreement of 1958-1960, that of 1952-
1953 included nothing separating the increases in wages of the skilled from the unskilled
workers.
The UAW recognised the antagonism between its skilled and unskilled workers. 
But the Canadian Region also acknowledged that the situation in Canada was different 
than that of the United States. In regard to Fort William, Norman Bicknell moved as
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early as 25 January 1954 to prepare the Local for the initiative launched by the UAW
International, the tentative program for a “Skilled Trades Council of the UAW.” He
argued that “a Canadian approach was necessary, since the skilled trades category was
inapplicable to the Fort William Can-Car plant.”181 Such an argument may have been
based on the premise that the UAW local in Fort William was not old and that the
traditions, or contractual obligations, of skilled trades did not exist in Fort William.
Workers in the union, however, were not convinced by his argument. Bicknell went on
to assure the membership that the establishment of a Skilled Trades Council was no threat
to production workers, since
the Skilled Trades seek no favouritism. They only request the security already 
gained for the Production Worker. Their major objectives are: an adequate 
training program, the automatic progression of wages, and the elimination of
1 O ')
overlapping classifications.
Despite the “inapplicability” of the skilled trades category to Canadian industry, skilled 
trades councils or committees were established in the middle 1950s by the UAW 
International, the UAW Canada Region, and Local 1075. As we saw in the 1958 
contract, the interests of skilled workers were better addressed by the different levels of 
organised labour. In Local 1075, the efforts of Norman Bicknell illustrated the need to 
eliminate the appearance of a worker hierarchy. It was in the interests of the union to 
have its workers appear equal. Such is also the case if one applied the concept of class. 
The gradual implementation of provincial training and apprenticeship programs during 
the 1960s would allay, to some extent, the changes taking place in the workplace. They 
provided opportunities for unskilled workers to aspire to the positions occupied by the 
skilled trades.
1 81Local 1075 Regular Membership Minutes, 25 Jan. 1954.
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Education, the UAW pamphlet for 1961 stated, had as its goal the intention that
democracy [should] spring from its [the union's] roots, rather than to have a union 
“managed” from above, with special attention being paid to keeping the union 
informed on the changing conditions in the economy and on the world scene 
which affect the well-being of all who work for a living...  Area and region-wide 
education conferences supplement the local union activities.183
We recognise in this statement a number of familiar themes, that an industrial union
should be “democratic”; that a union's leadership should be representative of its
membership, that a local's values should stem from its “grass roots”; and that the
education programs of the UAW should “supplement” initiatives begun at the level of the
union local itself. We can debate here the problems that arise in the above statement, the
problems and contradictions that are made visible when we read the statement in the
historical context of the UAW and the 1950s.
Again, as happens so often, we must go back to what has been said before in a
different context. The policies of the UAW International concerning the collective
bargaining and contractual obligations of its member locals tended towards compromises
between the large American companies of the automotive industry and the UAW. This
compromise, in return for job security and a gradual increase of wages, called for action
1 R4.by union leaders to reduce the militancy of the rank and file. Wells contrasts this
“responsible unionism” with an earlier form of unionism in which the struggles of the
militant rank and file
were part of a broader working-class mobilization [of] the 1930s and early 1940s. 
These struggles against their authoritarian anti-union employer were sustained by 
considerable solidarity generated inside the plants and in working-class1 R̂neighborhoods.
By the 1950s, the compromise, also described by Yates, had significantly altered the
183 “Programme of the Canadian UAW,” 14 Jan. 1961.
1 R4
Yates, From Plant to Politics'. 194-98.
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conditions in which union and management operated. The union's approach to company
relations was changing:
Between 1941 and 1961.. . this bigger labour movement was not necessarily a 
more activist one. This was so, in part, because the post-war phase of growth, in 
particular, was fostered by a framework of industrial legality which changed what 
unions could do. Gone was the union recognition strike, replaced by 
administrative procedures; gone was the sympathy strike, virtually precluded by t  
regulation of the timing of strikes. Not quite gone, but apparently diminished in 
importance, was the union leader whose authority depended mainly on the ability 
to foster a fighting spirit in the rank and file.186
The words that have been used to describe the “new unionism” of the 1950s are
“stability,” “union security,” and increased “bureaucracy.” Stability in employment and
union security were products of the changes that had taken place earlier, in the 1940s.
Among these changes were the federal government’s introduction of PC 1003 in 1944
and the Rand Formula for dues check-off in 1945. By the 1950s, the UAW was able to
consolidate its position in industry and offer services to its membership, thereby
necessitating an increase in union administrative personnel.
The Rand Formula and the changes taking place in Canadian unions during the
1950s were important in influencing the relations between union leadership and
membership. Wells writes that the
Rand Formula was later adopted in most union contracts in mass industry. The 
union's [the UAW's] new financial security, however, was won at a price. In 
many ways, Rand's decision required union leaders to become more responsible 
to employers than to their members. It weakened the ties between union leaders 
and members, especially because union representatives no longer collected dues 
from each worker. Rand also put teeth in union leaders’ obligation to repudiate 
workers' direct action. Failure to do so could lead to the forfeiture of union dues 
payments. The resulting institutional separation of union leaders from their 
members became increasingly embedded in Canada's Wagner model. As labour
185Wells, “The Impact of the Postwar Compromise on Canadian Unionism,” 152.
186Tillotson, “ ‘When our membership awakens’: Welfare Work and Canadian Union Activism, 1950- 
1965,” Labour/Le Travail 40 (Fall 1997): 138.
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historian Bryan Palmer has concluded, Rand “set the tone for the post-war 
period.”187
In the UAW International and Canadian Region, we see a “more hierarchical, 
bureaucratic and legalistic unionism” arising “to replace the more militant rank and file 
centred, and class-oriented unionism of the 1930s and 1940s.”188
How did these changes in union orientation affect the leadership and membership 
of a small, relatively newly-established union local such as Local 1075? Such a question, 
in the context of changing union administration and bureaucracy, is an important one. In 
terms of education, the problems involved in the changing strategies of union leadership 
become apparent. As we saw in the excerpt from the UAW pamphlet for 1961, the UAW 
used the rhetoric of “union democracy,” “springing from its roots,” and “education” to 
supplement “the local union activities.” The use of the term “rhetoric” to describe the 
language of UAW leadership is, in this sense, ironic. In a way, the language of the union 
reflected not the reality, but the ideal, of the union's operation. Unionists in the 1950s, I 
would argue, were aware of these changes in the administration of the UAW. Leaders at 
the level of the local were especially aware of what the UAW should be, in contrast to 
what it actually was.
The process of “educating” the membership was an important priority for the 
local union. Being a “grass roots democratic union” was not only an ideal for the local 
union, it was an ideal that could become a reality. What is less obvious as one considers 
the higher administrative chain, is that the union leadership was drawn from the ranks of 
the membership. One can see, in reading the Union’s minutes, a worker becomes a shop 
steward, a shop steward becomes a committeeman, a committeeman becomes a member
187Wells, “The Impact of the Postwar Compromise on Canadian Unionism,” 150.
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of the Local Executive, and the Executive member is recruited to become a member of 
the UAW Regional organisation.189 Education made the recruiting of leaders possible. 
By educating its membership, young and old alike, in “changing conditions in the 
economy and on the world scene which affect the well-being of all who work for a 
living,” the union Local could hope to create a body of labour activists who were 
involved in various facets of the union and of the Fort William community in general.
Initiatives in education could come from one of two directions: from the Local’s 
leadership and membership or as part of an educational program co-ordinated by the 
Regional UAW or local and regional labour bodies. This is necessarily a simplification 
of the complex of relations between the Local and other labour organisations. But the 
responsibility lay mainly with the Local and its leaders to involve themselves, or not 
involve themselves in educational programs that came their way. And, of course, many 
of the decisions made by the Local Executive in the early days were made under the 
direction of the International Representative, Norman Bicknell. As early as June of 1952, 
four months following the local’s founding, the Local Executive was planning 
educational seminars for members on parliamentary procedure, local arbitration
i onprocedures, collective bargaining, and public speaking. These were general topics the 
Executive believed were necessary to build what it had set for itself a few months before, 
a “virile union, dedicated to the welfare of the workers which it represents, and assuming 
its democratic responsibilities as a significant force for social progress in the community 
at large.”191 In April 1953 the Executive was evaluating the educational value of
189Two members o f the Local's Executive were promoted to the UAW Regional Office during the time of 
this study: Frank Fairchild was recruited to the UAW Regional Staff in 1960, and A lf Johnston followed
him in 1963. Both were president o f the Local at the time o f their promotion.190Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 24 June 1952.
^  Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 23 March 1952.
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conventions and regional conferences compared to local methods of education, such as 
leaflets, papers, brochures, and local seminars. It was decided at this meeting to direct 
the greater part of its educational funds towards “Local Union Activities.”192
The advantage of local educational activities, in the context of the Fort William 
plant, were many. As the 1950s progressed, the UAW Canadian Region directed more 
and more funds into educational initiatives demanding a greater degree of union 
centralisation. An example was the Canadian UAW Council's setting-up of a Canadian 
UAW Education Centre near Port Elgin in 1957. The distances involved in travelling to 
Port Elgin diminished the usefulness of such a centre for the majority of workers in 
Thunder Bay. Efforts in 1962 to set up a CLC Labour College, in conjunction with 
McGill University, met with a lack of interest when the Local was asked by UAW 
Region if it would contribute nominees to fill the UAW's slate of college applicants.193 
For the majority of workers in Fort William, the feasibility of partaking in the educational 
undertakings of the union or labour movement in southern Ontario was limited.
This, by no means, dampened the efforts of unionists in Thunder Bay to educate 
themselves and their co-workers in unionism. The union Executive provided access for 
their fellow workers to many publications relevant to political activity. Through the 
1950s the local’s leadership brought in to their offices the federal Parliament’s Hansard, 
the Labour Gazette, the UAW’s Ammunition newspaper, and publications from the OFL 
and the CCL (later, the CLC). The UAW propaganda sheet provided in this chapter is an 
accurate presentation of information the membership was given during the period under 
consideration.
19?
Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 6 April 1953.
1 QO
Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 23 April 1962. The UAW International initially sponsored four 
applicants each year for the CLC Labour College.




This book contains the Permanent Record of the Minutes 
Of the Executive and General Meetings of Local 1075 UAW-CIO.
As such, it is more than a mere record of proceedings,
But may be regarded in future as an authentic history of the growth 
And development of a virile union,
Dedicated to the welfare of the workers which it represents,
And assuming its democratic responsibilities as a significant force 
For social progress in the community at large.
Signed, George Fawcett, Recording Secretary.
These words stand on the front page of Local 1075 ’s first bound collection of the 
minutes of the Executive and General Meetings. They were penned in March 1952 prior 
to Fawcett’s recording of the minutes of the Local’s founding meeting. The meeting had 
been announced a few days before throughout the plant and in Fort William’s local paper. 
The workers at the Can-Car plant would vote upon union affiliation. The question 
concerning union affiliation was not a new one for the one thousand skilled and unskilled 
workers at the plant. In the years leading up to 1952 the issue had been brought up 
several times, by petitions and in the sharing of opinions on the shop floor. Should the 
bargaining unit representing workers at the plant remain affiliated to a craft union, or 
should it join one of the new industrial unions? In this instance the vote went 
overwhelmingly in favour of becoming a local of the United Autoworkers of America.
Local 1075 UAW developed a strong presence in the communities of Fort 
William and Port Arthur during the 1950s. As well, the Local created institutions and 
programs that facilitated communication and interaction among its membership, its 
leadership, and the community. The early and mid-1950s were times of rapid economic
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development in Ontario and Canada. The transition of the plant from a wartime economy
to an economy driven by consumer needs allowed the maintenance of a workforce
averaging 900 to 1, 000 people. One of the central means of facilitating change in the
union, and the methods of conducting union affairs, was the union Local’s Executive.
Much has been written on the role of union leadership and Executive committees
in the affairs of unions and their membership. As well, there are studies emphasising the
relationships between high-ranking union officials in national and international affairs,
union leadership at local levels, and the rank and file membership. Much of this work
deals, however, with union locals that had very large memberships. Studies of the UAW
itself, with work by Charlotte Yates and Pamela Sugiman figuring large, have examined
issues of union, company and government politics, ethnicity and gender in Canada. But,
necessarily, most work has been conducted at a national or regional level (regional here
meaning the larger locals centred in the manufacturing centres of southern Ontario.) This
chapter will contribute to this growing body of literature by providing a case study of a
small local in an isolated community. It is hoped that the similarities and differences
appearing in the study will advance understanding of the complex relations between
unions, locals, and the membership at large.
In examining the union leadership, certain questions need to be asked: what were
the interests of the leadership, and how did these interests correspond with those of the
membership? But rather than gauge the relative success, or lack of success, of the
leadership in regards to the membership they sought to represent, we might ask questions
of a different sort. Mark Leier writes,
in assessing the labour leadership, we need to ask if other ends might have been 
pursued, if other strategies might have been more effective, or how successful 
these leaders were, not in getting any agreement but in getting the best possible
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agreement. We might also ask how their actions and results compared with the
dreams and agendas of the workers they claimed to speak for.194
In consideration of theories on bureaucratisation and the institutionalisation of unions, the 
political and theoretical differences separating a union bureaucracy from its membership 
will vary, depending on the historical contexts of time and place. On a macro level, 
Charlotte Yates’ study of the Canadian Region of the UAW indicates a growing tendency 
towards accommodation and corporate compliance by the national and international 
leadership during the 1950s and 1960s. On a macro level, the UAW in Canada grew out 
of the militant tradition of the American industrial unions of the late 1930s. The 1940s 
was a decade of tremendous growth in membership of both the industrial and trade 
unions in Canada. With the promulgation of PC 1003 and the right of unions to represent 
workers in Canada entrenched in federal law, the future of organised labour seemed 
assured.
The preceding chapter shows the connection between the rapid growth and 
entrenchment of industrial unions in Canada. It indicates possible reasons why the 
workers in the Can-Car plant opted in the early 1950s for the leadership of the UAW as 
opposed to the craft union establishment in the plant previously, the IAM. The image put 
forward by the UAW during its decade of growth in the 1940s was one of militancy with 
a tradition of democracy empowering workers. The reality for the union at large, 
however, was one of increasing regulation and bureaucracy at the highest levels of 
administration.
The Local in Fort William, though, was new to the structure of the Regional and 
International UAW. Those very factors that made the UAW so appealing to workers
194 Mark Leier, “Which Side Are They On? Thinking About the Labour Bureaucracy,” Labour/ Le Travail 
37 (Spring 1996): 284.
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during the 1940s drew the workers of Can-Car, and some of the existing leadership of the 
old union, to it. The changes in practices of leadership in regional and international 
labour politics were not necessarily those of the Local leadership. It is difficult to 
delineate the various structures of a union, between those elements characterising the 
leadership and of the membership, and it is even more so in regards to an examination at 
the level of the local. Some of the personalities figuring large in the workings of the 
union local do not typify the traits of ‘a leader’ at all. We must get away from Walter 
Reuther and the large international union, and focus on workers fulfilling a limited 
leadership position and having no ambition to work in any greater capacity.
The term, “leadership,” in the context of the union Local of the 1950s and 1960s, 
included men and women in various capacities as shop stewards, committeemen, and 
executive. In this union Local, women played a very small role in the conduct of union 
affairs (there was only one woman working on the shop floor during the period under 
consideration.) It is obvious, then, that the union leadership was male dominated and that 
issues in relating to the interests of women would arise only in the context of their being 
wives, mothers, and daughters. As we will see in the next chapter, women did play some 
role in the development of union policy and conduct, but it was largely peripheral to the 
shop floor, and most of the relations between the women and men of the union involved 
the women as wives, mothers, and daughters and would largely have been reproduced in 
the home or in the community. It would rarely have spilled over into the politics of work 
or union affairs.
The initial members of the Local Executive were largely drawn from those men 
who led the drive, in 1950 and 1951, to associate the workers of the plant with the UAW. 
Karl Steeve was a leading proponent of association with the UAW. He was Chairman of
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the Negotiation Committee for Lodge 719 IAM in their negotiations with the Canadian 
Car and Foundry Company in the early months of 1951.195 Steeve became the first 
president of Local 1075 UAW in April 1952. Other early members of the local Executive 
were, for the most part, older workers, most of whom retired from Can-Car in the 
following ten years.
By the late 1950s the leadership of the Local had changed substantially. New 
members of the various committees and the Executive itself were drawn from a growing 
cadre of younger workers. The majority of the leadership had worked at the plant during 
the war and continued their service to the company in the years following. As well, many 
of the workers during the 1950s had initially been drawn to the plant during the war-years 
and had received their training at various schools throughout the area, an important 
facility having been the technical school at Port Arthur Collegiate Institute.
In examining the composition of the union local’s leadership in the years 
following 1952, several questions arise: Did the Local draw into its cadre of leaders any 
men who had been in the Canadian armed forces preceding the demobilisation of 1945- 
1946? Did the leadership distinguish itself from the bulk of the union membership, using 
existing dichotomies between skilled and unskilled workers? Were there any elements 
within the union leadership that drew upon existing traditions of Canadian socialism, 
trade unionism, or labourism, in their union activities?
The demobilisation of the Canadian armed forces had a limited impact upon the 
plant’s workforce. While political rhetoric abounded in the years following 1944 about 
the need for women working in manufacturing to leave the labour force in order to open
195 The members o f the negotiating committees for the collective contract, 1951-1952, between Can-Car 
and Lodge 719 IAM, were for the company: R.E. Henderson, Division Works Manager; George Walsh, 
Industrial Relations Manager; and J.T. Asquith, Vice-President and General Manager; for the union: Karl 
Steeve, Chairman; R.M. Maxwell, E.B. Kempton, William Parsons, K. Gibson, W.G. Will, and A.E. Knox.
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jobs for returning war veterans, the situation in the Fort William plant involved a 
downscaling of the existing labour force, with the return of only a few veterans. Alf 
Johnston, a young worker beginning his employment at the plant in 1940, recalls that he 
was one of the few workers to have volunteered for active war duty. He returned to work 
at the plant in 1946, supported the transition from the IAM to the UAW in 1951 and 
1952, became involved in union work as a steward, and served as a committeeman and 
then vice-president of the union Local in the late months of 1958. Recalls Johnston, 
virtually none of the leadership of the union during the post-war years, excepting himself, 
had served in the armed forces during the war.
The role of existing dichotomies, between skilled and unskilled workers, has 
already been discussed above. Can-Car did not have a workforce with a great deal of 
seniority and, considering that most of the work force at the plant during the 1950s began 
working there just before the war, issues relating to skilled and unskilled labour were 
minor.
The tradition of labourism, worker militantism, or socialism is a difficult subject
to analyse and examine in detail when generalising about workers and union leaders.
Different individuals held to different sets of belief, depending on their own personal past
lives and their correspondingly personal socio-economic contexts. Joseph Schumpeter, in
his important book, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, describes the state of
ideology in the United States, thus:
Another revival is less easy to explain- the Marxian revival in the United States. 
This phenomenon is so interesting because until the twenties there was no 
Marxian strain of importance in either the American labor movement or in the 
thought of the American intellectual. What Marxism there was always had been 
superficial, insignificant and without standing.
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The ability to conceptualise traditions of socialism and labour/ trade unionism and to
associate them to this or that geographic or political region is something that is not so
easy to do today. Schumpeter was able further to say, pertaining to socialist thought
generally, that, “Outside of Russia, therefore, the American phenomenon stands
alone.”196 The American phenomenon, Schumpeter believed, could be placed outside or
separate from the familiar examples of Russian Communism, German Social Democracy,
British Labourism, or social democracy in Canada.
The Canadian traditions pertaining to the labour movement are not so simple to
delineate. The “American phenomenon” itself has been shown, time and again since the
1950s, to be a complex of labour movements within the United States of America.
Indeed, in examining the labour movement in Canada, the union Local in Thunder Bay,
and the differences between leaders and rank and file, we must remember the very
complexity of those concepts under discussion. Such considerations involve the historian
as well, and to cite Schumpeter,
One’s views about what classes [or labour structures] are and about what calls 
them into existence do not uniquely determine what the interests of those classes 
are and how each class will act on what “it” — its leaders for instance or the rank 
and file — considers or feels, in the long run or in the short, erroneously or 
correctly, to be its interest or interests. The problem of group interest is full of 
thorns and pitfalls of its own, quite irrespective of the nature of the groups under 
study.197
The character of unionism in Thunder Bay in the 1950s is open to some generalisation. 
But the values of the few leaders examined in this analysis can only be inferred in a most 
general way as those of the membership. In the case of Local 1075, however, the 
political traditions expressed by the leadership do not seem exceptional.
196 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers 
Publishers, 1947), 4.
197 Ibid., 14, in citation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
An earlier work on labour at the Lakehead, Jean Morrison’s Community and 
Conflict, examined the internal workings of trade unions and radical parties. Morrison 
treated “these institutions as important, though not the sole expressions of working class 
activity.” She discussed the “reactions to labour unrest and industrial conflict from 
within the working class and from without, and the effect of these reactions on 
community relationships.”198 Morrison cited E.P. Thompson in her own introduction 
and, in this way, created some continuity between the methodology of Community and 
Conflict and that of this thesis. The historical context of her study, 1903-1913, though, is 
quite different from that of the 1950s. That much is obvious. The nature of employment, 
the role of manufacturing in Fort William, the influence of the two world wars, and the 
development of organised labour in the region, had changed the attitudes of many 
workers between the turn of the century and the 1950s profoundly.
The activities of the radical Finns in Thunder Bay in the earlier part of the century 
are important in understanding the traditions of labour at the Lakehead. Joan Sangster 
describes the Women’s Labor League of the 1920s, and the prominent role Finnish 
women played in it, to emphasise the “the ethnic strengths of the Communist Party” in 
Canada.199 The appeal of early radical politics to ethnic communities in northern of 
Ontario is significant. Early studies of the region’s labour history have in common an 
emphasis on a politics which is both radical and militant. Morrison, in an article on the 
working class, observed in relation to a growing body of literature on the north-west of 
Ontario, that “the drain of Northern Ontario’s immense wealth to southern Ontario and 
beyond through the exploitation of its natural resources is a theme common to [this
198 Jean Morrison, “Community and Conflict: A Study o f the Working Class and its Relationships at the 
Canadian Lakehead,” 1903-1913 (unpublished M.A. thesis, Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, 1974), ii.
199 Joan Sangster, Dreams o f  Equality: Women on the Canadian Left, 1920-1950 (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart Inc., 1989), 26-53.
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literature]. Each has something to say about the producers of all that wealth and about 
their experiences as workers in the mines and mills, on the railways, and in the bush 
camps of northern Ontario.”200 Thus, the themes of ethnicity, the nature of the mode of 
production, and the nature of the resources extracted early developed a tradition unique to 
the region at the Lakehead.
In the 1950s the tradition of unionism in Ontario was generally of a different sort, 
and the political culture of many unionists in northern Ontario, working in industries 
other than primary extraction, can be characterised as less radical. Indeed, the term 
‘labourism’ could well be used to describe the philosophy of some of the leadership of 
the early local. Having initially been members, or potential members, of the International 
Association of Machinists, many workers at the Can-Car plant would have identified with 
the traditions and policies inherent in the Canadian trade unionism that developed out of 
the Depression years of the 1930s. The conservatism of the craft union tradition has been 
noted in many studies on craft and industrial unionism in Canada. In fact, many unionists 
during the late 1930s and the 1940s came to prefer the militant identified with the actions 
of the CIO and CCL unions of the United States and Canada.
The unionists in Fort William came increasingly to compare, not the political or 
economic relationships of northern with southern Ontario, but rather the relations of 
workers at the Lakehead with workers in other locals, and the ability of their own plant, 
embodied in the management of Canadian Car, to compete with other manufacturing 
centres in Canada and the United States for production contracts. An effective means of 
describing how the attitudes of workers and their relations to production changed from 
the earlier part of the century might be to compare workers in their economic and social
200 Jean Morrison, “The Working Class in Northern Ontario,” Labour/Le Travailleur 7 (Spring 1981), 151.
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context of the 1950s to that observed for workers roughly forty years before.
Considering Morrison’s study of workers at the Lakehead, 1903-1913, we see that:
though action and reaction during the decade under discussion, the relationship of 
the working class with the middle class in the Lakehead underwent a change from 
one of concord to one of discord. In 1903, a liaison between organized labour and 
the local business community came into being based largely on faith in 
conciliation as a means of resolving industrial conflict and on distrust of 
monopoly as shown in support for municipal ownership. In 1913, this liaison 
dissolved through the failure of conciliation to prevent a strike against a 
municipally-owned enterprise.
The intervening decade was one of intense class conflict. Its 
manifestations included not only union-led strikes and socialist-led political 
action, but violent confrontations between the railway corporations and their 
immigrant workers. The community could contain and even attempt to mediate 
increasing social tensions as long as violence figured only in strikes against 
outside corporations, and as long as socialist influence with trade unions and 
immigrants remained negligible. But when anti-union policies of a municipally- 
owned enterprise brought on the strike of 1913 in which violence flared and in 
which trade unions, the immigrants and the socialists united, the result was the 
division of the community by class strife.201
The class conflict characterising the early years of the twentieth century, in the south of
Ontario as well as the north, stands in contrast with the affluent years of the early and
middle 1950s. Bryan Palmer describes the 1950s as a decade of “coming together.”
Generalisations regarding manufacturing in the province of Ontario can be applied to
manufacturing at the Lakehead.
The 1950s marked a point of departure for Canadian labour, as the strains and 
tensions of the post-war upheaval dissipated in years of relative prosperity. This 
decade marked the supposed “end of ideology,” an appearance conditioned, in 
part, by the crushing of the communist presence within the trade union movement, 
and managerial adoption of “human relations” orientations to the perennial 
“labour problem.” Strikes were less common than they were throughout the 
1940s and were more often successful in winning wage, condition, and benefit 
agreements. Survival and defence of basic rights were no longer as central as 
they were in the 1930s and 1940s. The organized working class appeared to have 
reached a new plateau of authority and power, and union membership 
stabilized.. .
Labour’s relative effectiveness throughout the 1950s, and the widening 
parameters of union demands, which increasingly reflected concern over
201 Morrison, Community and Conflict, 4.
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automation, job security, and company-financed benefits, drew some hostile fire 
from capital and the state, especially during the closing years of the decade, as the 
economy dipped into recession.202
It was in this climate of relative economic prosperity that workers in the 1950s combined 
work and union politics. The leadership of the union Local Executive tended to 
dissociate itself from the radical politics of the 1930s as well as from the anti-communist 
struggles that characterised the later years of the 1940s in many of the CIO industrial 
unions. Rather, the union leaders in Fort William supported the tradition of the Co­
operative Commonwealth Federation. This was in keeping with the fact that Charles 
Millard, Donald McDonald, and A.R. Mosher are names associated with the larger 
industrial unions of the 1940s, the communist purges of the CCL Canadian and 
International unions, and the open endorsement by CCL unions of the CCF federal and 
provincial parties.
The Local Executive identified itself in the 1950s with the CCF and George 
Fawcett, Recording Secretary of the Local from 1952 to 1962, served as recording- 
secretary for the provincial CCF riding association in Fort William. George Fawcett was 
strong in his political beliefs and he wrote to the local newspaper proclaiming the virtues 
of being a socialist. In a debate with an American tourist in “Letters to the Editor,” 
Fawcett proclaimed:
I am a Socialist. In your country I would be looked upon with suspicion, perhaps 
persecuted, despite the fact that your country produced one of the greatest 
Socialists of all time in the person of Eugene Victor Debbs. In Canada, I am 
respected, even by die-hard Conservatives. You see, I am a CANADIAN 
Socialist, and this, to me, is also something very special.203
202 Bryan Palmer, Working-Class Experience: The Rise and Reconstitution o f  Canadian Labour, 1800-1980 
(Toronto: Butterworth and Co., 1983), 252.
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Fawcett considered himself to be a Canadian socialist. Fawcett believed that the Local 
could be instrumental in addressing issues of class in society. He regularly addressed 
letters to the editor from the early 1950s until his death in January 1963. Fawcett was an 
example of a union leader devoted to his Local. He definitely identified himself with the 
class interests of his union and fellow workers and the language he used was of class 
struggle. Various Executive leaders during the years 1952-1965 espoused similar 
convictions and laboured to maintain the Local’s support for the provincial and federal 
CCF. Karl Steeve, first president of the local, supported Fawcett’s appeals to the 
Executive to support the CCF officially with donations of money and campaigning for 
membership. Later union leaders, such as Frank Fairchild, president during 1958-1960, 
and Alf Johnston, president 1960-1963, were receptive to George Burt’s instructions to 
foster greater co-operation between the union Local and the provincial CCF (George Burt 
was Director of the Canadian Region UAW).
One of the first actions of the union Executive was to set up a Political Action 
Committee to involve the union in the politics of the nation, the province, and the 
municipality. George Fawcett chaired the first Political Action Committee, and Fawcett 
was very influential in the early years of the union in involving the union local with the 
CCF. One of the first actions of the PAC, on 12 January 1953, was to endorse the CCF 
federal candidate for Fort William in the federal election of that year.204 On 24 June 
1953, Fawcett moved that the Local endorse William Johnston, CCF candidate for the 
federal riding of Fort William, as a suitable candidate to represent organised labour in 
Thunder Bay. A later meeting of the Executive, in July, accepted the motion that the
204 Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 12 Jan. 1953.
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Local give one hundred dollars to “support the CCL-CCF program via radio” in Fort 
William.
The Local’s leadership interpreted the responsibility of the union to encourage 
political activity as requiring support of the CCF. The debates about the union’s support 
for the CCF at the Lakehead occurred mostly in the early years of the union local, 1952- 
1955. As has been established in other histories of the CCF, most notably Walter 
Young’s polemical The Anatomy o f a Party: The national CCF, 1932-1961, began its 
withdrawal from the politics of the CCF in the early 1950s.205 The Local, though, had 
only just begun to get involved in the CCF. The late 1950s were characterised by an 
economic depression, and the battle to save the plant from closing, beginning in the fall 
of 1958. From that point, until the end of 1961, the union Local focused most of its 
energies upon campaigning for the continuance of plant production in Fort William. The 
fact that the leadership of the union openly supported the CCF until 1958 with the 
Local’s funds testifies to the fact that the leadership held the CCF to be acting in the 
interests of Canada’s workers.
It is misleading, though, to believe that the Local’s leadership or membership 
were unanimous in supporting a political party representing “labour.” Discontent arose 
on the shop floor not long after the open endorsement of the CCF candidate by the 
Executive in the summer of 1953. At a general meeting in August, members initiated 
“some discussion on the $100 spent for political action, several members not agreeing 
with the executive.” Some members argued that “politics was an issue for the 
individual,” and that the greater part of the membership should not have to pay for the
205 Walter Young, The Anatomy o f  a Party: The National CCF, 1932-1962 (Toronto: University o f Toronto 
Press, 1969).
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political predilections of a few notables. It is interesting to note that, in this instance, no 
one attempted to put the issue of political affiliation to the vote at a general membership 
meeting. The rank and file were told by the Executive, most likely by Fawcett himself, 
that the CCL and the Canadian Region of the UAW had openly endorsed CCF 
candidates. It was not until the fall of 1953 that Arthur Schultz, the International UAW’s 
PAC Director, came to the Lakehead to confirm to the membership what the relationship 
of the local to the CCF would be. Schultz told “the local it is eligible to send a delegate 
to the CCF convention.” In a message to the Executive, Schultz confided that the 
sending of a delegate would “give the PAC [of the local] some chance to put over their 
arguments (to the membership) for closer union-CCF co-operation.” Finally, Schultz 
outlined to the membership that “the local is not an affiliate of the CCF, but that its 
members were urged to get involved in the CCF riding [association].”207
We see here attempts by the Local’s Executive and the union leadership to define 
the relationship of the union Local to regional, provincial, and national politics.
Relations between the CCF and the CCL or UAW were complex. In terms of the Local, 
questions pertaining to support, both verbal and monetary, were very important in the 
attempt to be collective, and at the same time, autonomous in its decision-making. 
However, the issue over political affiliation did not die so easily. In December of 1953, a 
significant proportion of the membership put forward a signed petition, with a motion,
90 S“requesting equal donations to all political parties.” This motion was defeated, and a 
visit in January 1954, by Donald MacDonald, Ontario leader of the CCF (and Secretary 
of the CCL), to the Local and the Fort William riding was, in a sense, the symbolic death
207 Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 13 Oct. 1953.
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of this issue. It was not to be raised again, at least not as the record indicates, until the 
issue of affiliation to the New Party arose in 1960.
To cement ties to the Party, the Local’s leadership referred members to the 
example set by union officials and party leaders. George Burt wrote the Executive 
recommending endorsement of the CCF; and in April 1954, David Milne, vice-president 
of the Local, and Norman Bicknell affirmed their support of the CCF to the rank and file, 
claiming that “they backed up Labour proposals in every instance.” Such statements 
were backed up by referring “doubtful members to Hansard [the record of the debates in 
the House of Commons].”209 By 1958, the local was conducting “CCF Support Votes” at
9 1 0its regular membership meetings to confirm continued support of the party.
Discussion of the “New Party” began at the Local in February 1960. Talk 
surrounding the restructuring of the national CCF had been circulating since the federal 
election in 1958, an election that saw the Diefenbaker-led Conservatives achieve a 
sweeping majority, and the CCF sitting with a disappointing few seats. Interestingly, 
Douglas Fisher, one of the younger members of Parliament, had been elected for the CCF 
from the neighbouring riding of Port Arthur. In August 1961, Recording-Secretary 
George Fawcett attended the founding convention of the NDP and reported to the Local 
the great potential for a “reinvigorated relationship between the NDP and the labour 
movement.”211
The development of party affiliation for the Local 1075 was a gradual process. 
Behind the principle of party affiliation was the philosophy of political action and the 
underlying need for the labour movement and, more concretely, individual labour
209 Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 26 April 1954.
210 Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 26 Feb. 1958.
211 Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 23 Aug. 1961.
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organisations to affiliate with, openly endorse, and monetarily support a socialist political 
party that addressed the needs of workers. Throughout the period 1952-1962, issues such 
as unemployment, old-age pensions, health and medical coverage, and job security were 
put forward by various labour bodies as important and addressed by the CCF in 
Parliament.212
The leadership of the Local worked for its membership in a number of ways. 
Directing its interests in political matters was obviously one way of furthering the 
interests of labour. Getting involved in municipal politics was another. Another method 
of assessing the achievement of a Local’s leadership is to examine it under duress, such 
as during a strike action or an external threat to the workers’ employment. Such an 
episode arose in the autumn of 1958 when the Canadian economy went into recession.213 
Workers later referred to the incident as “the Plant Closure.” The “Plant Closure” 
involved the near closing of production at the Can-Car plant in Fort William in 1958 and 
1959. How did the Local’s leadership handle this crisis and its threat of job loss? What 
methods or strategies were employed in the handling of the problem? What factors were 
identified as the causes of the problem, and what did the union hope to do to combat 
them?
Again, the Plant Closure was a significant event that would hold the imagination 
of workers for years afterwards. Placing it within an historical context, we see that the 
problems in a marginal, or peripheral economy, such as that of Thunder Bay, places a 
great deal of stress upon the secondary sectors of production and manufacturing. Prior to 
1950 production at the plant in Fort William had mainly focused upon the manufacturing
212 Note the absence o f equal opportunity employment, universal day-care, and maternal leaves o f  absence. 
These issues were brought to the attention of the union local, via CLC pamphlets and late 1950s copies o f  
Labour Gazette. Discussion amongst the local’s executive, though, was minimal.
2,3 James Struthers, The Limits o f  Affluence: Welfare in Ontario, 1920-1970 (T oronto: Ontario Historical
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of war goods. The geographic location of Thunder Bay far from southern Ontario but 
relatively close to the markets of Winnipeg to the west and Duluth to the south, placed 
the plant in a favourable position. With the economic boom of the early 1950s, the plant 
was able to maintain an operation employing some 900 personnel building buses.
It needs to be stated here that the Canadian Car and Foundry Division was owned 
and operated by A.V. Roe (Ltd.) Canada. More significantly, the Fort William plant had 
a “sister” plant in Montreal. In 1958, economic conditions in Canada were not good, and 
the Diefenbaker administration began closing a considerable part of the country’s 
military production. Most important, perhaps, for A.V. Roe was the cancellation, in 
1958, of the project to supply the British and American airforces with a multi-purpose jet 
interceptor, the Avro Arrow. To make matters worse for A.V. Roe, the Montreal Can- 
Car plant had been massively overhauled in the middle 1950s at a cost of millions of 
dollars, to service the (then) expanding market for railway box-cars.
By 1958, however, the market for jet interceptors and boxcars had largely 
disappeared. The development of the Russian Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs) had reduced the dependence of NATO upon interceptors as a significant 
deterrent to Russian bombers, and Premier Frost’s government’s massive expenditures on 
Ontario’s infrastructure involved enlarged and improved highways and encouraged the 
transition in bulk shipping from railways to trucks.214 In 1957 and 1958 the Local 
petitioned the provincial government and the City of Toronto, claiming that the Toronto 
Transit Corporation (TTC) was making large purchases of buses from the United States
Studies Series, 1994), 185.
214 The rail strike of 1952 contributed to the transition from rail transportation, as did the development of, 
deep-water sea-ways and overland pipelines. For a complete discussion, see Rea’s The Prosperous Years, 
56-81.
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instead of buying Canadian. The reaction the Local received from the TTC was quite 
negative:
In reply to the suggestion of Local 1075, United Automobile Workers, Fort 
William, that the TTC buy Canadian rather than American buses, a TTC union 
delegate declared that the Canadian buses were unsatisfactory. He expected TTC 
employees would go on strike if they were asked to drive the buses made in Fort 
William.’215
The Local was disappointed with the response it received in 1957 and early 1958 
concerning its objections to the actions of the TTC. The citation listed above is ironic 
considering that the objection to the Local came not from the company but rather from 
the TTC union. Obviously, other interests than those of class came into play in this 
instance. It was amidst these difficulties, in the late summer of 1958, that the union 
Local learned “that the Montreal plant is preparing for Fort William equipment.”216
Word of this change in operations came from the office employees of Can-Car, 
Local 81 of the Office Employees International Union, who “mistakenly” came across 
communications between the managements of the Fort William and Montreal plants on 
August 25, 1958. The response of the leadership of the two union locals was to form a 
Joint Planning Committee and to develop a strategy to counter the company’s plans. This 
became an example of workers of the plant combining their class interests to face the 
challenge posed by the threat of the plant’s closing. The two had not maintained 
communications prior to 1958. The company management did not officially confirm 
rumours about a change in operations until September 27. The issue of the plant’s 
closing would not be resolved until the early months of 1962.
The threat of a plant closure played itself out in many theatres and extended 
through the years 1958 to 1962. Not only did it involve the union Local and the plant
215 The Canadian Forum, Aug. 1958, 101.
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management, but it also drew in a host of interests that saw the plant’s closing as a very
important issue in the Fort William community. These included: the Fort William and
Port Arthur City Councils, the Fort William and Port Arthur Chambers of Commerce, the
Northwestern Ontario Development Association, and the Members of Parliament for Fort
William, Hubert Badanai (Liberal), and for Port Arthur, Douglas Fisher (CCF). Efforts
to keep the plant in Fort William culminated in a major conference in Ottawa in January
1960, involving the leaders of the union, the mayors of Fort William and Port Arthur, the
MPs for Fort William and Port Arthur and various representatives of the Lakehead
community, to meet with various federal cabinet ministers and the Prime Minister
himself. Until 1961, rumours emanating from the Prime Minister’s Office suggested that
a contract would be assigned to Can-Car for the production of the “Bobcat,” a vehicle
intended to serve in the military as an all-terrain amphibious armoured personnel carrier.
An “Editorial” in the Daily-Times for 1 February 1961 still expressed hope for a military
contract of some sort:
In an impressive contribution to the budget debate in the House of Commons, 
Hubert Badanai [Liberal MP for Fort William] presented, among others, two 
proposals for government action which carry special interest for the people of the 
twin cities at the head of the lakes and for Northwestern Ontario generally. The 
Fort William member pleaded for the rebuilding of Canada’s merchant marine, 
and for the manufacture of the Bobcat, the amphibious vehicle which could be 
produced in the Fort William plant of the Canadian Car Company.217
The results of the “Ottawa trip” proved to be disappointing. The trip was reported 
to the union membership as having determined:
1) That the Bobcat contract would not be forthcoming.
2) That Can-Car was reluctant to find bids to contracts for the Fort William 
plant, and that the company “was neglecting a Production Sharing Office in 
Chicago,” according to Minister of Defense Production O’Hurley.
2,6 Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 25 Aug. 1958.
717 Fort William Daily-Times, 1 Feb. 1961.
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3) That Diefenbaker told Parliament that he “doesn’t want to interfere with Free 
Enterprise.”218
The UAW International stepped up pressure on the company itself by petitioning
910A.V. Roe’s head office in Toronto. The International met with the top management of 
A.V. Roe and representatives of the Frost government in Toronto. By December 1958, 
the UAW had forced the company to recognise the need to give notice of closure, and it 
received word on December 10 that the plant would close in 1959. The meeting, in 
December 1958, between the UAW and Can-Car, found the following:
1) The Company had not been intending to announce the plant closure until well 
after Christmas.
2) That Harwood (General Manager of Can-Car) said the move was to centralize 
production in Montreal and be closer to markets and resources.
3) That the conversion of the Montreal plant was a mistake.
4) That the Company intended to sell the Fort William plant.
5) George Burt stated that ‘there was no hope outside of the Federal 
Government.
6) That the plant would stay open to June 1959.220
The reaction of the union local to these findings was to petition all levels of government, 
to present a fifteen minute broadcast on local television, and to hold a public meeting 
early in the New Year.221
The “Ottawa Trip” discussed above was the culmination of a great deal of work 
by the union Local leadership and the many individuals and organisations in the 
community listed earlier. Ultimately, the efforts to maintain production at the Lakehead 
succeeded, and by 1962 A.V. Roe had committed to keeping the plant in operation. 
Efforts to keep the plant open were ongoing through the years 1958 to 1962 and the local 
newspaper The Fort William Daily-Times displayed a continual interest in the plant’s
2n Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 6 Feb. 1961.
219 Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 10 Dec. 1958.
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survival. It was with great joy that the paper proclaimed on 12 May 1961 that “Local
Canadian Car Plant Producing Tree Farmer”:
Fort William Canadian Car officially took the wraps off its latest innovation 
Thursday afternoon with the unveiling of the Garrett Tree Fanner, an economy 
tractor specially designed for woods operations.222
The collective efforts of the community of Fort William compelled the company 
to maintain production at the plant for a while longer (actually, it operates to this day). 
The endeavour, though, created conflict within the ranks of the leadership and the 
membership of the local. Turmoil and discontent were all too evident in the leadership 
and the rank and file during the period 1958-1962. The president of the local going into 
the crisis, David Milne, was requested on 22 September 1958, two weeks after rumours 
of the plant’s closing began to circulate, by the “executive, stewards, and various
99"̂committees, to resign.” Milne, who was not without his supporters, refused to resign, 
and conflict ensued between various members of the leadership over who should lead the 
Local in the turbulent times ahead. Ultimately, Milne referred the issue to George Burt, 
Canadian Director, and it was resolved to hold a vote of confidence in October 1958, 
which did not occur. To save face, Milne resigned on October 9 at a general meeting, 
noting in reflection to the members that ‘we must forget the past and look to our
9 9 4future.’ Milne was succeeded by Frank Fairchild, his vice-president. The union Local 
minutes suggest that Milne was removed from office because of his quiet nature, a 
characteristic not deemed suitable in the emergency the leadership believed to be at hand.
221 Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 14 Dec. 1958.
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One of the means to resolve the problem of the plant’s closing, put forward by 
Can-Car in early 1960, was to begin the production of mobile homes (pre-fabricated 
homes). It was suggested that contracts for mobile homes could help the plant. The Fort 
William Daily-Times explained that “the same deal which produced fancier and sleeker 
aircraft for the air lines (government backing for defence plus mass production methods) 
is the key which may move the Fort William plant into the new domestic field.”225 The 
newspaper favoured the company’s strategy in relying upon “government backing” to 
keep the Fort William plant in production. But issues surrounding changes in job 
specifications, and the hiring of outside contractors, served to break the union local into 
opposing camps with some for, and others against the mobile home contracts. However, 
the survival of the plant was assured when, one month following the tree farmer 
announcement, the Daily-Times declared that the “Canadian Car Company announced in 
Montreal today it has been awarded a federal government contract for construction of 345 
mobile homes, worth $3,360,000. Current company plans call for 121 of the units to be 
manufactured at Fort William plant.”226
The period 1958 to 1962 was one of turmoil for the union. While the community 
of Fort William was uniting its efforts to keep the plant open, members within the union 
chose this period to display their discontent. The four-year-long effort to ensure that 
Can-Car remained in Fort William displayed a complex reality of class and class struggle. 
While the union managed to co-ordinate its efforts with other elements in the community, 
thereby appealing to interests besides those of class, there were workers who chose to 
neglect their class interests. In February 1961 some members of the union attempted to
Fort William Daily-Times, 11 May 1960.
226 Fort William Daily-Times, 22 June 1961.
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avoid paying union dues and the Company supported their action.227 These members 
took advantage of the uncertainty surrounding the plant’s future and used company 
support to defy their union. Amidst the instability of the times, the company began the 
use of “Time-Study” as a psychological ‘speed-up weapon,’ an example of Taylorism 
popular in the 1950s and 1960s. A final showdown, illustrating the division in the Local, 
occurred in an incident in June 1962 when some members of the union complained to 
management that the union office in the plant had a coffee pot, accessible only to the 
union leadership, and the Company unilaterally removed the coffee-pot from the union’s 
offices. The Executive, angered by this action, declared that it would do some “sleuthing 
to find out who the members were.”228 The Executive and General Meeting minutes for 
1958 to 1962 displayed ongoing tensions within the ranks of the membership.
The overall impression the union leadership gave was one of positive action.
They sought to involve themselves not only in union affairs but also in community 
concerns. They were proponents of ties with the Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation and they sought to extend their links in Fort William and Port Arthur. Some 
leaders sought election as school trustees or city aldermen and sat upon various 
committees and organisations. Two notable union leaders, Frank Fairchild in 1960 and 
Alf Johnston in 1963, went on to work for the Canadian Regional UAW as District 
Directors and Educational Directors. Both individuals had begun their employment at the 
Can-Car in Fort William, and both maintained close ties with the union Local when they 
went on to other responsibilities in the UAW.
The efforts of the union and the community to save the plant in Fort William 
illustrate the collective interests of the community in conflict with economic interests in
121 Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 6 Feb. 1961.
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southern Ontario and beyond. During the plant’s closing, the company used the rhetoric 
of “centralisation” to justify the moving of Fort William’s equipment to the Can-Car 
plant in Montreal. The community of Fort William interpreted continued production at 
the plant as a great victory. To close, here is an editorial appearing in the Fort William 
Daily-Times in July 1961, that illustrates the community’s determination to keep the plant % 
open:
PRESSURE NEEDED
Citizens will recall the efforts made at several levels to maintain the Fort 
William plant of Canadian Car as a place of employment for local people.
Members of the union at the plant were joined by the city council and other civic 
organizations in promoting pressure to the end that manufacturing should not be 
discontinued. Resolutions were passed; letters written. Deputations were sent to 
Ottawa to confer with government departments which had the power to keep the 
plant open.
Such activity should be recalled, because there is no room for doubt that 
the recent orders for mobile homes, and new orders for airplane parts are 
definitely dividends from the extreme interest the community showed in the 
situation. If everybody had sat back at the time of the crisis, doing nothing, 
saying nothing, the work would not be coming to Fort William at this time.
Only by concerted, energetic campaigning on the part of all interested 
civic organizations will Ottawa be impressed by the need eventually [to recognize 
the economic needs of the Lakehead].229
This editorial is a wonderful example of the combined efforts of the Fort William
community to keep the plant open. The Local played a large role in these efforts. It also
shows how the class interests of the union were augmented by elements of Fort William’s
business and political community to co-ordinate efforts and meet the challenge posed by
big business in southern Ontario and Montreal. The continuation of employment at the
plant was a great victory not only for the union Local but also for the community at large.
22SLocal 1075 Executive Minutes, 25 June 1962.
229 Fort William Daily-Times, 28 July 1961.




The first ten years following the formation of Local 1075 UAW were important in the 
development of traits peculiar to the industrial union. The transition into an industrial
v
union of the 1950s was marked by an increase in services to the membership of the local.
The Canadian Regional Office in Windsor attached a International Representative to the 
Local to help it in its early development; and the Local’s leadership found itself able to 
implement programs and initiatives from some of the larger locals in the south of 
Ontario, such as a Political Action Committee, a Ladies' Auxiliary, and a Retirees Club.
The union Local witnessed the emergence of a leadership, drawn from workers living in 
Fort William, which guided its membership into political action, and the strong central 
leadership of George Burt’s administration offered the local leadership opportunities to 
involve themselves in national and international initiatives as well.
The importance of these initiatives can be better understood when we consider 
that “such institutions start by controlling economic relations between men and go on to 
permeate all human relations.”230 This chapter examines three significant institutions that 
developed over the course of the first years after 1952 and considers the development of 
these institutions at the level of the union Local. The three are: the Ladies' Auxiliary, the 
Political Action Committee (PAC), and the Retirees Club. What was the importance of 
the formation and development of these three institutions? What did the members or 
leadership of these various institutions hope to contribute to their union? Did these 
institutions have the support of the Local, and how did such support manifest itself?
230 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, 48.
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Studying these three organisations enables us to achieve better understanding of 
what the Local achieved as it worked for its membership. Except for the Executive and 
the PAC, the leadership of the four institutions was independent and autonomous of each 
other. The institutions changed leadership regularly over the span of the 1950s and, as 
the leadership of a particular institution changed, so did the demands and expectations of 
the institution. To go back to Lukacs for a moment, it is important to study the impact 
that, collectively, men and women had by examining human relations within the 
framework of institutions.231
The Political Action Committee
The Political Action Committee (PAC) was an important instrument of the 
industrial union and one of the early distinguishing characteristics of the UAW.232 Gad 
Horowitz wrote that, “In the United States, organized socialism is dead; in Canada 
socialism, though far from national power, is a significant political force and the official 
‘political arm’ of the labour movement.”233 These concepts, the political arm and the 
labour movement, are important in understanding what the Political Action Committee 
did. The PAC was an important instrument for the furtherance of class interests.
For the union local, political action is an extension of national and international 
economic and social issues. The purpose of this analysis is not to focus on the Local
231 Methodologically, the preference for studying institutions in this way are many. Most of the written 
records collected in the local’s files are records o f  committee minutes. In the context o f  today, considering 
the brief nature of contemporary records, this is not a bad thing. Fortunately, the records o f various
institutions, such as the Ladies’ Auxiliary and the Local Executive, prior to 1965, are very detailed.
232 The UAW constitution itself required every union local to have a standing committee on political 
action. One short pamphlet, written by someone from Regional headquarters, and dated 1960, states the 
following for the membership: “The UAW regards political action as the everyday housekeeping job of  
democracy and is forever urging its members and locals to be politically active - in keeping with the direct 
relationship it sees between the ballot-box and the bread-box.” This grassroots rhetoric is characteristic of 
much that was written for the union membership regarding political action in the 1950s.
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itself to any significant degree: rather, the PAC, at the local level, acted as an instrument 
for education and action. Many of the directives given to the PAC came from the Local's 
Executive, which received most of its information from the union International, from the 
District, or from local, regional, and national labour bodies.234 The PAC was not as 
important a committee, as the Bargaining Committee was, but the PAC represented the 
capacity of industrial unions to take political action. The concepts of socialism, politics, 
and labour need to be considered and so we must shift our focus from the local itself to 
regional and national politics. Only in this way can we understand why it was important 
that PACs existed and how it was that politics was mediated at the local level.
Horowitz's analysis refers to the politics of conservatism, liberalism, and 
socialism, because these political concepts were very important to activists in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Irving Abella's Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: the CIO, 
the Communist Party and the Canadian Congress o f Labour, 1935-1956 focuses the 
politics of labour and government at the time of the Local's formation and 
development. But the political conditions of the 1950s demanded that unions and 
labour to become politically involved. Industrial unions, such as the UAW and the 
United Steelworkers of America, had political action committees long before the 1950s. 
The industrial unions were known for their militancy and their willingness to become 
involved in a more radical type of politics.
233Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1968), 3,
234 The PAC was a committee o f  the Local Executive and its members, to a large degree, were active on
the Executive as well.
235 Abella's book brings us up to the point o f  merger o f the TLC and CCL in 1956, to form the Canadian 
Labour Congress. For Canadian labour at the time, the strengthened labour body only lessened slightly the 
perceived threat o f communism to the labour movement and Canadian politics generally. See Irving 
Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: the CIO, the Communist Party and the Canadian 
Congress o f  Labour, 1935-1956 (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1973).
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Mark Leier has characterised the early bureaucratic development of the labour
council, in this instance, the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council, as possessing a
political program he described as labourism:
Labourism was a class-conscious doctrine, based on a labour theory of value, but 
neither the conception of class nor the labour theory of value were constructed 
along strict socialist lines.. .  In this picture of society, divided into parasites and 
producers, capitalism was not necessarily viewed as bad.236
A political program acknowledging the different roles that individuals played in the mode
of production did not describe the political platform of the UAW in Canada. Yet, it
cannot be said to be unrepresentative of the thinking of many workers in Canada during
the 1950s. When dealing with the politics of the UAW International itself, before and
after the involvement of district and local union leaders, the definitions and political aims
of these concepts change. The UAW did not hold to the traditions of Gomperism, as the
earlier trade unions had, in which unions refused to subscribe to any political ideology or,
more importantly, to any political party. To identify the politics of an institution, in this
case the International UAW, the Canadian Region, or the Local itself, one must identify
the politics of the leadership, which consisted of individuals with differing loyalties and
degrees of commitment.
Before the 1950s, the UAW was taking the stand that political action and political
education were very important.237 Many labour leaders reacted to the recent growth in
Leier, Red Flags and Red Tape, 92-93.
237The actual form which this politics was to take was, by the 1950s, fairly clear. Abella suggests that 
George Burt and, to a larger degree, the caucus o f  Walter Reuther had come to grips with the communist 
question before the middle o f the 1940s. It was not until the mid-1950s that the UAW could really be said 
“to have gotten its house in order.” For further reading, refer to Kevin Boyle, ‘There Are No Union 
Sorrows that the Union Can't Heal: The Struggle for Racial Equality in the United Automobile Workers, 
1940-1960,’ Labor History (1996): 5-23; and Daniel Nelson, “How the UAW Grew,” Labour History 
(1995): 5-24. An excellent article that examines communism in the light o f workers’ militancy in the 
1950s and in the context o f Canadian labour, is Shirly Tillotson, “ ‘When our membership awakens’: 
Welfare Work and Canadian Union Activism, 1950-1965,” Labour/Le Travail 40 (Fall 1997): 137-69.
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union membership with a mixture of awe and concern. They believed what one Canadian
academic has noticed:
Too many of the new union members had joined without informing themselves 
about unionism. Consequently, they lacked “union consciousness”; that is, they 
did not understand that the labour movement was a co-operative enterprise, a 
democratic body of workers whose effectiveness depended on shared 
responsibility, inspired by an understanding of unionism's larger meanings, the 
membership tended to play the union like a slot machine - dues in, higher wages 
out (maybe).238
Correspondence among labour leaders emphasised the need to maintain worker 
militancy. Of course, militancy by the 1950s was increasingly defined within 
bureaucratic and legislative controls. Militancy advocating illegal wildcat strikes and 
plant slowdowns was becoming rare, as any reading of the Local’s records and 
correspondence make very clear. But one notable activist of Local 1075 believed, from 
the Local’s inception in 1952, that the role it could play in the community was important, 
political, and social: “This social function [the local’s first membership dance, named 
“The UAW Victory Dance,” in 1952] heralded the establishment of the UAW-CIO in the 
labour picture at the Lakehead as a force for progress, not only in the plant of Canadian 
Car, but in the entire community. Something new had been added, and it was here to 
stay.”239 For this labour activist, the arrival of the UAW in Fort William was to be not 
only a workplace innovation but also a progressive reality changing the values and mores 
of the community. It was also a means for the class interests of Fort William’s workers 
to express itself in the community. He believed that the UAW gave something to the 
community that had been lacking before its arrival.
Tillotson, When our membership awakens,” 137.
239 Local 1075 Executive Minutes, 20 May 1952. The speaker in this instance is George Fawcett.
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The Political Action Committee took on a peculiar character in the industrial
union in the 1950s. For the union Local, this difference was a part of its character and
developed into its fabric.
The UAW's strategy in dealing with government did change in this period [1950- 
1957]. However, strikes, which until 1949 had been a major part of UAW 
strategy to pressure governments, were abandoned as a means of gaining political 
leverage with governments. Lobbying replaced this more militant strategy in 
UAW dealings with the federal government.240
The PAC became an organ to involve the Local’s membership in local, regional, and 
national politics. The Local became, soon after its founding, a firm supporter of the Co­
operative Commonwealth Federation; it began to lobby municipal government in the 
interests of its membership; the Local actively, and in some occasions financially, 
supported labour candidates for municipal office, such as alderman, or school board 
trustee. Despite opposition to some of these positions, the Local Executive made it its’ 
responsibility to convince the membership that they should be politically aware. It did 
this with the support of the Regional Office and with resolutions from labour 
organisations such as the CCL (and later, the CLC).
From its very inception, Norman Bicknell, International Representative to the 
Local, urged the new Executive to form a PAC and involve the workers in local and 
national politics. The activism of the 1950s, observes Tillotson, represented
the attempt to democratize the basis of their [labour bureaucrats] institutional 
power. This democratization project, admittedly, was limited by its intolerance of 
the communist political minority. But activism could be and was promoted in 
ways that accommodated the large range of political opinion on the socialist left 
and liberal centre of Canadian life in the 1950s.241
740
Charlotte Yates, “From Plant to Politics: the Canadian UAW, 1936-1984,” (PhD thesis in Political
Science, Carleton, 1988), 221.
241 Tillotson, “When our membership awakens,” 141.
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In terms of the Local itself, the language of politics, recorded quite faithfully in the 
Executive minutes, was pro-action.242 The language used by the Executive borrowed 
heavily from the CCL, identifying the interests of the plant’s workers with the Canadian 
labour movement and, in some instances, with international labour. In a way, the 
political initiatives were sent from International and District headquarters to the Local to 
be interpreted and carried out as the Local saw fit.
Charlotte Yates characterises the politics of the early 1950s as having been mostly 
between the UAW and the respective companies. She maintains that, during the years 
1950 and 1957, “the state in Canada played a minimal role in developing a compromise 
between capital and labour . .  .This lack of involvement by governments meant that the 
hammering out of a compromise between corporations and organized labour took place in 
the sphere of private production.”243 As has been mentioned before, the first strike action 
taken by the local occurred in 1955. Comparing the first UAW contract with Can-Car 
with larger manufactories in southern Ontario, however, we see that the Fort William 
plant did not fall far short.
The Ladies’ Auxiliary244
The examination of the Ladies’ Auxiliary opens up some interesting themes for 
discussion. Of course, the first that comes to mind is the issue of gender. As was
242
As stated, the minutes o f the Executive and General meetings are free o f resolutions against communist, 
or suspected communist, agitators. In a way, I think that leaders and membership alike tried to keep this 
‘witch-hunt’ type o f politics out o f  the union and, most important, off the shop floor. Politics, as such, was 
open to discussion, and the strong sympathies of some few o f the local's leadership were instrumental in the 
union’s adopting resolutions in support o f the local, provincial, and federal CCF. In its support o f the CCF, 
the UAW in Canada was very “socialist” minded. Not all the membership agreed with this.
243 Yates, “From Plant to Politics,” 195.
244
The work done, to date, on union ladies’ auxiliaries is very scant. Much of the work done to date 
seems to have been focused on women involved in waged-labour themselves, rather than upon those 
involved indirectly through marriage to a union spouse. The importance of mothers, wives, and daughters
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
118
mentioned in the chapter preceding, the number of women employed in the plant after
1945 was negligible, at least, on the shop floor. The activities of the Auxiliary allow us
to see how women were perceived as being involved in the process of production. As
well, the Auxiliary’s records enable us to consider how the women conceived of
themselves in this process. The Auxiliary was made up, for the most part, of women
married to union leaders. We see that the relationship was:
based on the family form that currently predominates in advanced capitalism; that 
is, a breadwinner husband and a relatively dependent w ife.. .  For full-time 
housewives, dependence on the husband’s wages is absolute. As a result, in 
families with a male breadwinner, the wife has a vested interest in his wages.245
This examination allows us to consider which women involved themselves actively in the
union’s struggles, how they thought their work could best be conducted, and what
impression the union Local had of the Auxiliary’s activities.
How was the Auxiliary first established? Ladies’ Auxiliary #320 of Local 1075
was founded on February 10, 1954, largely through the good offices of the
Local’s International Representative, Norman Bicknell, and the president of the Local,
Karl Steeve. The minutes of the first meeting record how, “Bro. Karl Steeve opened the
meeting and thanked the ladies for their attendance, and outlined the organisational
efforts of himself in getting the Auxiliary going and read a letter from Catherine Gelles
expressing her regrets in being unable to attend.” Catherine Gelles headed the Ladies'
Auxiliaries for Canada District UAW. A Russell Paul spoke next on what an Auxiliary
could do to help the local union, and Bicknell spoke to the women on the connection
between the union and the Auxiliary.
in the support of their union men, though, has never been questioned.
245 Meg Luxton, “From Ladies’ Auxiliaries to Wives’ Committees,” in Linda Briskin and Lynda Yanz,
eds., Union Sisters: Women in the Labour Movement (Toronto: The Women’s Press, 1983), 334.
246 Ladies' Auxiliary General Meeting Minutes, 10 Feb. 1954.
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From the beginning, then, we see that the Ladies’ Auxiliary was an initiative of
the male leadership of the union Local. This finding is corroborated in large part by the
findings of Paula Pfeffer when she states that the male leadership of a union initially
prescribed the roles of a ladies’ auxiliary.247 An auxiliary could do a number of things:
support the union local during a strike, raise funds for special activities, maintaining the
morale of union workers in their home. In the case of the Ladies' Auxiliary of Local
1075, the first president was the Local President's wife. It would not be difficult to see
that one way or another, the Auxiliary was perceived as a support, but subordinate to, the
union Local's Executive. In part, such a role of subordination to the union was caused, as
Meg Luxton has observed, by the structure of the union:
The [industrial] union movement’s relationship to wives of union members is 
further complicated by the structure of the union. Unions are designed to be 
collective defence organizations of the paid workers in a given work situation.
The existence of the union requires a basic autonomy from any outside influence. 
As a result, there is no structure for including others who are not part of that work 
situation and non-union members have no place in the union.248
In this regard, the union Executive did assume that the Auxiliary would operate under the
union leadership’s control. The initial money granted to the Auxiliary by the Local was
to cover all the expenses of setting it up and provide an extra $100 for miscellaneous
expenses. The money in cash was placed, on the recommendation of the Local’s
Executive, at the Bank of Montreal “in trust in the name of the Auxiliary.”249 Signing
authority was reserved for the Local Executive. This money was placed in trust for the
Auxiliary instead of being given to the Auxiliary’s own leadership to dispose of. At a
247 Pfeffer, Paula, “The Women Behind the Union: Halena Wilson, Rosina Tucker, and the Ladies’
Auxiliary to the B rotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,” Labor History 36 (Fall 1995), 557.
248 Luxton, “From Ladies’ Auxiliaries to Wives’ Committees,” 335.
249 Ladies' Auxiliary General Meeting Minutes, 10 Feb. 1954.
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meeting a little later, it was reported that the account had been changed by the Local
Executive from a trust fund to one in the name of the Auxiliary.250
One of the actions of the Local's Executive the Ladies’ Auxiliary least appreciated
was the creation of an advisory committee for the Auxiliary. On 26 May 1955, the
secretary of the Auxiliary
was instructed to write to the Local 1075 saying that we had just learned that an 
advisory committee has been appointed to help us and we had never been notified 
of this by Local 1075. If we could have formal notice of this and the names of the 
men appointed we would be glad to meet with them.251
The advisory committee was a nominal body, which would have included, chiefly,
Norman Bicknell of the central UAW office. This incident, in a small way, shows how
two institutions, the Auxiliary and the Local Executive, could come into conflict on
issues of autonomy. For the most part, though, the ladies accepted their role as a support
network operating in the interests of the union.
The autonomy of the Auxiliary was not the only issue creating conflict and
differences of opinion. Strike action tended to strain relations between the two
organisations the most. One woman recalls the 1955 strike at the plant, which lasted
from May 16 to 29, and the stress it caused in relations, not only between the Auxiliary
and the Local, but also between husbands and wives.252 The threat of lost income, the
resulting inability to feed children, and the fear of job loss, caused many women to
question the militancy of their husbands in that strike. What is more, in years when many
women thought that they had never had it so good for their families, they believed that
what the union was asking of the company was unreasonable.
250 Ladies'Auxiliary General Meeting Minutes, 15 Feb. 1954.
251 Ladies' Auxiliary General Meeting Minutes, 26 May 1955.
252 Interview with Betty Steeve.
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Despite such differences, there were many things the Auxiliary could do for the 
union. One of the first actions of the Auxiliary was to take over the cleaning of the 
Local’s main office. The Auxiliary believed it could save the Local money while doing 
the work itself in return for a small monthly contribution of $15.00 to the Auxiliary's 
coffers. The ability to generate an income allowed the Auxiliary to do a number of 
things. The most obvious was to support the union in terms of entertainment and 
refreshment. But an income generated by the Auxiliary would allow it to become 
independent of financial contributions from the Local. The Auxiliary's leadership 
anticipated a growth like that of some of the larger ones in southern Ontario, such as 
Ladies' Auxiliary #233 of Local 600 LAW.254
The generation of income increased the services the Auxiliary could provide to 
the union. The ladies offered to provide sandwiches and drinks at general membership 
meetings, take charge of setting up and running recreational dances for the membership, 
and serve coffee and snacks to other union institutions, such as the “Old Timers’
Club.”255 Such opportunities to perform services provided these women with a chance to 
fulfil traditional functions as supporters of the local union.
But, of course, the Auxiliary was not only to provide domestic services for the 
male-dominated union Local. Betty Steeve, founding member and first president of the 
Ladies Auxiliary, recalls that a second and equally important function of the Auxiliary
'JZf.
was to provide support for the women themselves. Here we have corroboration of 
what Paula Pfeffer referred to in her study: “the women’s organization took on meaning
254 Ladies' Auxiliary General Meeting Minutes, 15 March 1954.
255Ladies ’Auxiliary General Meeting Minutes, 22 March 1956.
256Interview with Betty Steeve.
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in the lives of the women themselves.”257 The Auxiliary took on a role as an educational 
organisatioin, it involved itself in community issues, and it tried to develop an interest in 
labour and women's issues in Ontario and Canada generally.
From the beginning, the Auxiliary carried on a regular correspondence with 
Catherine Gelles in Windsor. The national office provided opportunities for the women 
in Fort William to involve themselves in the larger organisation of the National Ladies' 
Auxiliary for the UAW-CIO in Canada. Again, even at the national level, much of the 
correspondence the women of Local 1075 received was in the form of exhortations to 
support the strike actions of various UAW locals throughout the country with monetary
o c o
assistance. The women were also sent films and publications from Windsor, such as a 
film about Windsor’s Local 200 UAW, to learn what the UAW was doing in Canada.
Besides supporting the union in this way, through the contribution of money or 
other resources, and the receiving of educational materials, the National Office 
encouraged the women to involve themselves politically. At their first meeting they 
decided to advertise their meetings in the “Club Events” of the Fort William Daily-Times 
as well as on CKPR radio on “Chappies Parade of Events.”259 The Auxiliary was 
sometimes invited to send delegates to labour bodies to confer on important and 
contemporary issues, such as the Thunder Bay and District Labour Council's call to 
discuss “the Unemployment Question” in 1954. Often the National Office urged the 
Auxiliary to send delegates to the UAW's own Womens’ Conferences but the Local
257Pfeffer, “The Women Behind the Union,” 558.
258An example was a call for support of the striking brothers o f Local 833 UAW. Because the Auxiliary 
generally consisted o f a very small, but dedicated, membership, its funds were limited. In this instance, the 
Auxiliary was unable to contribute to Local 833. Ladies' Auxiliary General Meeting Minutes, 14 Sept.
1954.
259Ladies'Auxiliary General Meeting Minutes, 10 Feb. 1954.
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rarely had the resources to send its women members to meetings in southern Ontario or to
become active in politics in this way.260
The Auxiliary passed many resolutions of its own, such as one sent to Fort
William City Hall to protest the “private enterprise ownership of a proposed gas line.”261
The women believed that it was in their interest, as well as their responsibility, to involve
themselves in causes which they thought important to their community. This was
significant in explaining why the leadership of the Auxiliary thought it important to
endorse candidates for various municipal positions:
Russell Paul, M. Chicoli, R. Raussel were running for alderman, it was stated, and 
William Talbot for Board of Education. These men are members of our Local 
Union or Thunder Bay District Labour Council and the Sisters were asked to 
remember these names and to vote for them in the coming city election.262
The issue here is not that the initiative for political involvement came from the Auxiliary.
In each of these circumstances, the Auxiliary derived its information, directly or
indirectly, from various municipal institutions or from the Local's PAC. But it is
important to note that many women used the Auxiliary as a means to involve themselves
in the affairs of the community around them.
One cannot say, though, that the Auxiliary spoke for the majority of the women of
Local 1075 UAW. The significant members of the Auxiliary were very capable women
but it may not be coincidental that they were, in the main, the wives of the Local's
Executive members. The names of the Auxiliary leadership, as well as the regular
membership, between 1954 and 1958, closely mirrored the leadership of the Local itself.
260Some women managed to attend national conferences if  they could have them coincide with their own 
family holidays in southern Ontario. One of the perennial problems for delegates from Thunder Bay, in all 
spheres of the local's leadership and institutions, was lack o f representation in national and international 
conferences because o f  Fort William's geographic isolation from southern Ontario and the northeastern
United States.
261Ladies' Auxiliary General Meeting Minutes, 28 Oct. 1954.
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This is not surprising. But the Auxiliary always had to deal with a membership that was, 
at the core, small and dependable. The Auxiliary was, then, a very small group of 
dedicated women, mostly married to men who were equally dedicated to the union cause, 
but it was their hope to have the Auxiliary appeal to a greater number of mothers, wives, 
and daughters of the members of Local 1075.
The Auxiliary had to recruit its membership, and it did this varying effect. 
Initially, notices in the newspaper, on radio, and on the shop bulletin board sufficed to 
bring women to the meetings, but it soon became evident that this was not enough. The 
Auxiliary attempted to appeal to a greater number of women by offering activities such as 
bake sales, a bingo, a card party, and occasional door prizes at membership meetings.
The Auxiliary sent delegations to union membership meetings to encourage the men to 
convince their wives, mothers and sisters to come out to the Auxiliary meetings.263 The 
membership of the Auxiliary during the 1950s averaged between seven and forty, with 
many of the meetings being attended by between five and fifteen women. This was very 
small considering that the union represented more almost one thousand men at the plant.
It has been hinted at before that the women of the Auxiliary constructed 
something more for themselves than the union leadership had anticipated. The leaders of 
the Auxiliary identified themselves as workers’ wives. The language recorded in the 
Auxiliary’s minutes suggested a genuine class consciousness because these women knew 
that they lived on limited budgets and they believed that their husbands’ “hard-earned 
money” was eroded by the selfishness of corporate and local businesses. Issues 
concerning the purchase of household goods, the maintenance of newly purchased items, 
the ongoing buying of groceries and children's clothes, were all important to the women
263Ladies' Auxiliary General Meeting Minutes, 24 Sept. 1954.
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of the Auxiliary.264 They thought that women should be knowledgeable consumers, and 
they believed it was their responsibility to ensure that community businesses did not take 
advantage of customers by artificially inflating the prices of various commodities. The 
Auxiliary operated during the 1950s like a consumers’ association. This might sound like 
a “bourgeois” activity but it is important to realise that these women felt themselves to be 
acting in the interests of women with small incomes (as wives of working men). The 
actions directed by the women took two forms: general boycotts on direction and in 
solidarity with the union Local because a business was anti-union or ran an open shop; 
and a boycott directed and conducted by the women themselves. The latter tended to be 
smaller and occurred in reaction to prices which they believed to be unjustified and 
hurtful to the small consumer in Fort William. The items at issue were most often 
foodstuffs, kitchen goods, articles of clothing, and women's hygiene products.265
Before concluding this discussion of the Auxiliary, it should be noted again that 
the women involved themselves in community politics and issues. In 1957 the women 
wrote C.B. Devlin, General Manager of Can-Car, and George Picknell of Great Lakes 
Paper “asking for permission to make a tour of said plants at their convenience.”266 They 
wanted to acquaint themselves with the workings of the plants and show that women 
were a visible force, not only to their men folk but also to management. By 1957 the 
Auxiliary was regularly sending representatives to the Thunder Bay and District Labour 
Council and members were proudly present at the first meeting of the TBDLC in 1956.267 
The women were proud to think that they too were involved in the bringing together of
264 For an excellent survey of the development o f  consumerism in Canada in the 1950s and the concept of 
woman as “homemaker” and “chief consumer o f household goods,” see Joy Parr’s Domestic Goods: the 
Material, the Moral and the Economic in the Postwar Years (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1999).
265 Interview with Betty Steeve.
266Ladies' Auxiliary General Meeting Minutes, 24 Jan. 1957.
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Canada’s two largest labour organisations. The role of the Auxiliary, in these respects 
and those noted earlier, was very important. With the gradual changes in employment 
taking place through the 1960s and 1970s, the women of Local 1075 had less and less 
time to dedicate to their Ladies’ Auxiliary. The Auxiliary operated in fits and starts.
By the late 1960s the Auxiliary was no longer in existence. One regret that Betty 
Steeve expresses about the late 1960s and 1970s was that “the new working woman had 
less and less time for her Auxiliary, until the work that the Auxiliary did could no longer
'y /r  o
be conducted.” Betty asks now if the work the Auxiliary did for its union has ever
been replaced. And well may she ask. The dissolution of the Auxiliary was part of a
larger national trend in economics and the women’s liberation movement. A further
study might be conducted to find how women involved themselves in the union affairs of
Local 1075 after the late 1960s. Luxton observed in 1983 that,
Many ladies’ auxiliaries have declined in membership and in activities over the 
last decade; some have even dissolved. However, a new organizational form has 
emerged that reflects the service-politics tension in new ways and is closely 
linked to the women’s liberation movement. Usually referred to as “wives’ 
committees,” these are remarkably different from ladies’ auxiliaries. Like 
traditional auxiliaries, their membership is comprised of women who are married 
to trade union members, and their activities are oriented to supporting the 
struggles of predominantly male trade unions. However, in sharp contrast with 
the auxiliaries, these committees prioritize the autonomy of the wives’ 
committees, including the right to control funds and make political decisions apart 
from the union.269
Future work may point to women becoming active in the union through direct 
employment in the plant, beginning to take place in the late 1960s, and through 
involvement in the labour movement at the Lakehead.
267 Ladies'Auxiliary General Meeting Minutes, 28 Feb. 1957.
268Interview with Betty Steeve.
269 Luxton, “From Ladies’ Auxiliaries to Wives’ Committees,” 337.
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“The Old Timers Club”
The Retired Workers’ Chapter Local 1075 UAW-CIO began later than the 
Ladies’ Auxiliary, but it has a much longer history and still continues. The Retired 
Workers’ Chapter first met on the afternoon of 29 December 1957, with five participating
77 f)members. It met under the aegis of the union Local's President and Vice-President, 
respectively David Milne and Frank Fairchild. The purpose of the committee, the 
original minutes state, was, “to help retired members keep their standard of living as high
771as possible.” We shall consider how the Retired Workers’ Chapter began to involve
itself in the affairs of the Local, the issues and concerns the Chapter chose to address, and
the changing ways in which retired workers construed their rights and responsibilities in
the community and society generally.
The Retired Workers’ Chapter was not the only association of elderly workers at
the plant. There was also the tradition of the “Quarter Century Club” at the plant.
Gordon Burkowski writes of the Quarter Century Club that:
Quarter Century Clubs were a part of Canadian Car and Foundry long before a 
club was started at the Lakehead. At the Company's plants in Southern Ontario, 
Quebec and Nova Scotia, the first chapters were formed in 1943. Among the first 
members were employees whose date of hire was earlier than the founding of Car 
Car [not the one in Fort William, but that of the one in Nova Scotia] itself back in 
1909... In the early 1960s, Fort William's turn finally came to celebrate its own 
pioneers - and to look back to the days 25 years earlier when a handful of workers 
began to build airplanes at the Lakehead. The first Organizational Meeting of the 
Quarter Century Club in Fort William was held on March 20,1964. Over the 
next 18 months, the first 55 presentations were made of the traditional quarter- 
century engraved wrist-watches.272
270 The initial tally o f  retired members which the Retired Workers' "committee" believed they had under 
their care was 32. Retired Workers Chapter General Meeting Minutes, 29 Dec. 1957. The chapter 
originally affiliated not only to the UAW but also to the United Senior Citizens o f Ontario (USCO).
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The Quarter Century Club had about it the pomp and ceremony of early trade union 
rituals. We find in the above citation a tradition that extends well into the past. But, if 
we were to attempt to fit it into the notion of what we hold a club to be, we would find it 
fails on more than one account. The Quarter Century Club, instituted at the plant in 
1964, expressed the new Human Resources philosophy that was taking hold of industry. 
This club did not have a continuous function nor did it operate in the form of a 
bureaucracy or institution. It arose out of the trade union tradition, but those senior 
workers inducted into it did not earn any rights or responsibilities as a result. This club 
was restricted to “a lot of fanfare” and “the sharing of stories.”273
What early form of organisation was there in the plant that looked after the rights 
of workers no longer employed at the plant? The early records of the Local Executive do 
make reference to an “Old Timers’ Club.” Again, the function of the Club was largely 
informal, and it operated as a meeting of retired workers gathering to discuss issues 
relevant to themselves. Formally, as early as 1952, the Club corresponded with the Local 
on important issues such as the payment of pensions. Issues affecting the retired workers 
collectively could be referred to the union Executive to be brought up with management 
at their earliest convenience. The membership would initially have been small. The 
plant, having been closed down untill937, would have had few men qualified to retire on 
any sort of company plan. By the 1950s though, conditions in the workplace had 
changed enough to make collective action on the part of retired workers more and more 
necessary. Elderly workers were also beginning to realise that they had class interests, as 
retired workers, that required action and that their needs would not be met except through 
some sort of association.
273 Ibid., 112.
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We have mentioned already the 1951 collective agreement between Canadian Car 
and Foundry and I AM Lodge 719, which excluded retired workers from the scope of the 
agreement. By 1958 contracts between the company and the UAW included provisions 
for social security in the form of standard hospital coverage, a Blue Cross supplementary 
plan, and a Physician's Services Plan, for which the company paid 60% and the 
individual worker 40%.274 By 1965, the Collective Agreement in article 49 provided a 
non-contributory Pension Plan instituted 1 January 1963.275
The fight for benefits for the worker, including those provided for the retirees, 
either by company or government, was a long one. In 1952, the Canadian Manufacturing 
Association was dedicating study and resources to the question of pension and welfare 
plans. As it was recorded in the Labour Gazette, “because of the introduction of welfare 
plans into the Canadian scene, and because it requires many to explore new paths, it is
on f\appropriate to give some consideration to welfare plans at present in operation.” In 
1953, the CMA surveyed employers on “The Older Worker Problem” and received some 
suggestions: decrease of wages; revision of company pension plans, or the decision not to
277place older workers on the plan; and having a government pension at age 65. In the 
early 1950s, the CCL itself did not table great reforms in pension plans because of the 
emphasis the Congress placed at their conferences on health insurance; at the most, the 
CCL called for a pension plan of $65 at age 65, although debate continued as to whether 
or not there should be a means test before one collected it. The debates surrounding the 
means test went back to Canada’s first national old age pension scheme which was
274Agreement Between Canadian Car Company Ltd. and International Union United Automobile, Aircraft 
and Agriculture Implement Workers o f  America, 1958-1960, 43.
Agreement, 1965-1968, 26.
276 Labour Gazette 53 (1953) 902.
277 Labour Gazette 54 (1954) 979.
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inaugurated by the Mackenzie King administration in 1927. Pension entitlement was 
made universal for all those aged seventy and over in 1951,278
Amidst such social reform ideas, retired workers began to petition their union to 
remember retired workers when the bargaining committee met with company officials. It 
was with exactly such interests in mind that the Retired Workers’ Chapter was founded in 
1957. At their second meeting the retirees set themselves the following goals: that retired 
members sit on the Local's Election and Entertainment Committees; that retired members 
take a more active part in community service; that retired members prepare for retirement 
those members about to retire from the plant; and that retired workers be represented on
770the Community Chest, the Red Cross, and the Hospital Board. The Chapter also 
lobbied to obtain occasional employment for retired workers around the plant and as 
parking meter Commissioners in Fort William.
Retired workers also wanted to organise their own dinners, have their own guest 
speakers, and speak on contemporary issues important to them. Whenever the Local 
Executive lobbied the City of Fort William, the Retirees wanted to be there to ensure that 
their request for free, or reduced-fare, municipal bus passes for seniors was heard. Frank 
Fairchild, President of the Local in the late 1950s, urged the retirees to become active in 
those issues important to them. The Local itself created a per capita tax of one cent, on 
union dues, to set up a retired members program.
The initial impetus for the Retired Workers’ Chapter came from the union Local's 
leadership in the person of Fairchild. He helped to elect the Chapter’s Executive, recruit 
its membership, and give it a program. In 1957, the UAW International had decided ‘to 
get all retired members into one large group embracing members who are retired from all
Struthers, The Limits o f  Affluence, 75.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
unions.’280 The Retired Workers’ Chapter of Local 1075 began modestly but responded
to the changing economic and social circumstances of the 1950s. Indeed, the slow gains
for retired workers in the 1950s grew out of the economic uncertainty of the late 1940s.
James Struthers accurately encapsulates this as follows:
Across the province, throughout the late 1940s, a combination of unanticipated 
prosperity, the deepening impact of the Cold war, and the resulting collapse of a 
wartime political climate favourable to social democracy eroded support for 
further experimentation with social planning and social security as an ‘era of 
austerity’ gave way to an era of unprecedented affluence “corrosive of the social 
solidarity that had inspired the austerity welfare state.” By the decade’s end, 
according to one analyst of this era, “most Ontarians were in no mood.. .  to create 
a socialist heaven on earth, especially one directed by bureaucrats. They wished 
only to drive their new cars down one of Ontario’s many new expressways, or 
mow their suburban lawns.” Or as CCF leader Donald MacDonald put it, 
“Everybody just wanted to relax. The normal apathy of the electorate vis-a-vis 
politics became even more pronounced with relatively good times.”281
By the 1960s, a large number of personnel were retiring from the plant and bringing with 
them the expectations that had been developed through negotiation at the bargaining table 
and through government legislation. Significant increases in pensions, on the part of the 
federal government, were not to take place again until 1962. Such developments led to 
a larger and more visible membership, making it necessary for labour organisations to 
take the needs of their retired members seriously.
279Retired Workers Chapter General Meeting Minutes, 5 Jan. 1958.
280Retired Workers Chapter General Meeting Minutes, 10 May 1958.
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CONCLUSION
The initial ten years of Local 1075 UAW were divided into an early period of six 
years of steady development in politics and awareness followed by a period, 1958-1962, 
of economic uncertainty. The change of workers at Can-Car from the jurisdiction of the 
IAM to the UAW in 1952 was part of a larger historical process mirroring changes in 
industry in Canada during the 1940s. Most of the 1950s witnessed the development of a 
fairly militant and politically aware organisation. The workers at the plant witnessed not 
only an increase in wages and the obtaining of job security, but also the introduction of 
the closed shop, and the dues check-off (the dues check-off was not initiated in the plant 
until 1953).
Coupled with progressive increases in wages and benefits, the union members 
were introduced to the militant union Executive, the Political Action Committee, the 
Retirees Club, and a Ladies’ Auxiliary. The support network developed for the union’s 
membership during the 1950s was instrumental in providing not only male workers but 
also women and the retired with the opportunity to participate actively in the politics of 
the Canadian labour movement.
This thesis sought in its first chapter to develop a theoretical framework in which 
the history of labour was interpreted through a tradition that is Canadian and Marxist. An 
examination of the union Local displayed the characteristics of class and class struggle.
A sense of the exploitation inherent in the mode of production in Thunder Bay may well 
have been one of the elements that contributed to the transfer of the union local into the 
UAW in 1952. The political and militant character of the UAW in the 1940s was 
appealing to a workforce in Fort William that wished to become directly involved in the
282 Ibid., 204.
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changes taking place in Canadian industry. Can-Car’s actions against the UAW in the 
1950s made visible the conflicting interests in the community and on the shop floor.
The second chapter sought to outline the reasons why industrial unionism 
appealed to so many Canadian workers in the 1940s and how this might have influenced 
workers in Fort William in the early 1950s. The transition of the Local from the IAM to 
the UAW was a gradual one. Between 1945 and 1952 the plant had gone through 
considerable change. Not only had women been almost entirely eliminated from the 
workforce in 1945 but workers in 1952 saw production in the plant change from aircraft 
to buses. Reasons were suggested why the change to the UAW was so appealing. 
Chapter Three outlined the political and economic objectives of the UAW and the gains 
the international union sought for its constituency. Local 1075 did well for its members, 
compared with the achievements of the UAW generally.
Chapters Four and Five outlined the formation and activities of four important 
union organisations; the Local Executive, the Political Action Committee, the Ladies’ 
Auxiliary, and the Retired Workers’ Chapter. These four organisations were not just 
important to the union Local for what they did but also because they would come to 
represent the interests of different constituencies, such as retired workers and workers’ 
wives.
Concerning class and class straggle, evidence suggests that conflict took place in 
the ranks of the union local as well as outside of it. It is difficult to gauge how the 
workers of Can-Car would have fared if they had continued under the leadership of the 
IAM. The crisis of 1958-1962 suggested that employment at the plant came very close to 
being terminated. The Local was instrumental in the efforts of the workers and the Fort 
William community to keep the plant open. They petitioned not only government but
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
also various community organisations in the effort to mobilise support. One is tempted to 
say that Local 1075 UAW is one reason why the Fort William plant continues to employ 
900 personnel to this day. The crisis of 1958 was not the last crisis at the plant by any 
means! Hopefully, in the future, more research may be done to comprehend the 
importance of organised labour in maintaining “work for workers” in Thunder Bay. The 
class interests of workers in Fort William become apparent when the fight for continued 
employment is made such an important issue. It is wrong to suggest that workers 
identified continually with their union and their fellow workers in the ongoing fight 
against capital. It would be silly to suggest, though, that in 1958 when workers 
discovered (against the company’s wishes) that their jobs would soon be terminated that 
that crisis did not create class consciousness. The historical fact remains that the plant 
continued operations past 1962 and the efforts of the workers and their leaders are largely 
to thank for that fact. This thesis does not suggest that the Can-Car Company may not 
have come to regret its failure to close the plant but it does maintain that, had it not been 
for the workers and the Fort William community, the Fort William plant would not be in 
operation today. That is the reality of class struggle and the achievement of workers in a 
small manufacturing town.
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Appendix 1
PROGRAM OF THE CANADIAN UAW 283 
THE PRESENT (1947-1960)
Wages: Post-war gains and fringe benefits have lifted the standard of living of 
UAW members to an all-time high.
40-Hour Week: The UAW led the way in Canada from 48 or more hours per week to the 
40-hour-week. Some plants had it much earlier, but many now forget that it was 
not until the 5-year agreement in 1950 that the 44-hour-week was progressively 
reduced to 40 hours at General Motors. Dozens of feeder plants also cut down, 
under steady UAW pressure, to the 40-hour week - with no loss in take-home pay.
Statutory Holidays: The Canadian UAW, which began with four paid statutory holidays, 
then six, finally nailed down in this period eight and more paid statutory holidays.
Pensions: Taken for granted now but almost beyond belief for all but a few when the 
Canadian UAW went to the mat with management in 1950 for the UAW- 
negotiated non-contributory (by the worker), vested, funded and jointly- 
administered pensions which have already aided several thousand Canadian 
workers to enter retirement with at least a minimum standard of decency and 
respect. Benefits in many cases have been lifted beyond the $100-a-month mark 
after 30 years at age 65. Disability pensions provide even greater benefits at 
earlier retirement age.
Health Benefits: The Canadian UAW was the first union to negotiate fully-paid medical- 
hospital-surgical coverage for workers and their dependants - in the 112-day Ford 
strike in 1954-1955. Weekly sickness and accident benefits compensate workers 
for lost time - up to $55 and higher for 26 weeks. In at least one contract, even 
drugs are prepaid.
Annual Improvement Factor: The long-term agreements had many protections built into 
them. One of the foremost was the annual age increase. When the second 
'improvement factor' contract was worked out in 1955-1956, the UAW 
negotiated the same automatic (6 cent) increases in Canada that its U.S. members
got.
Company-Wide Contracts: Just as workers in individual plants found it advantageous to 
form local unions, so did locals covering workers in separate plants of the same 
employer find it to their advantage to unite their forces in company-wide 
agreements. Thus, in 1953, the Windsor, St. Catherines, London and Toronto 
plants of General Motors signed a 'Master Agreement', joined by the Oshawa 
local in 1956. The Ford locals in Windsor, Oakville and Etobicoke won a 
'Provincial Agreement' in their 1954-1955 strike. Massey-Ferguson workers in 
Toronto, Brantford and Woodstock negotiated their first 'Master Agreement' in
283 This educational pamphlet was prepared for a Canadian Region Conference focused on the fact that “all 
major contracts in the automobile and agricultural implement industries, in both Canada and the United 
States, come up for renewal in 1961.” Local 1075 and Can-Car were not a part o f this “Master Agreement” 
or industry-wide bargaining process at this stage, because o f the problems the Local and the plant were 
experiencing regarding the future o f the plant. Many o f the gains made by the UAW, described here in 
some detail, had already been achieved by Local 1075.
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1954. A number of smaller plants - Duplate, Ontario Steel, etc. - also have such 
contracts.
Skilled Trades: From the modest beginning of a few cents more per hour for skilled
workers in the early post-war contracts, the UAW moved in the 1947-1960 period 
contracts. Recognition of the trades marked the winning of one of the longest and 
most difficult struggles the union has had at the bargaining table. Today the 
UAW stands first in its protections for its skilled trades members, including their 
constitutional right to direct representation at the bargaining table and to separate 
ratification. I,
Retired Workers: In most major UAW centres, the union has established Retired
Workers programmes to ensure the continuing interest and participation in the 
affairs of the union by many hundreds of members now on pension, and going on 
pension. In addition to membership rights, the pensioners are encouraged to set 
up their own organization for recreational, educational and political action 
activities.
Education: Right from its inception, the UAW has given high priority to the promotion 
among its members of education in the purposes, aims and programmes of the 
UAW specifically, and the labour movement generally. Its goal has always been 
to have democracy spring from its roots, rather than to have a union 'managed' 
from above, with special attention being paid to keeping the union informed on 
the changing conditions in the economy and on the world scene which affect the 
well-being of all who work for a living. The Canadian UAW has a full-time 
education director on the Canadian Regional Staff, and education committees 
operating at the local union level. Area and region-wide education conferences 
supplement the local union activities.
Canadian UAW Council: Democratically elected delegates representing the UAW's more 
than 65 000 Canadian members meet every three months to recommend policy 
for the Canadian Region. The Council, comprised of about 135 delegates, is the 
springboard for many of the union's main efforts on the legislative fronts, such as 
resolutions and delegations to the provincial and federal Parliaments. It has also 
developed a ‘Strike Assistance Fund’ which supplements aid to UAW strikes in 
Canada. In 1957, the Canadian UAW Council purchased 12 1/2 acres on the Lake 
Huron shore near Port Elgin and opened a Canadian UAW Education Centre 
which has since been developed to become the outstanding labour education 
centre in all of Canada. It serves as a vacation spot for members and their 
families, as well.
PAC: Political Action, like education, is a ‘must’ in the UAW, with every local union 
being required by the constitution to have a standing committee on political 
action. The UAW regards political action as “the everyday housekeeping job of 
democracy” and is forever urging its members and locals to be politically active - 
in keeping with the direct relationship it sees between the ballot-box and the 
bread-box.
Union Shop: The union progressed in the 1950s from the Rand Formula it has won so 
dramatically in its early days to the full union shop. Workers covered by the 
contract were now required to join the union as a condition of employment.
S.U.B., Severance Pay: It was known as G.A.W. (Guaranteed Annual Wage) during the 
preparatory part of the union’s drive to ease the load of layoffs, but at the 
bargaining table it came out SUB, (Supplemental Unemployment Benefit). Either
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
137
set of letters, the UAW pioneered the way. A measure of severance pay was 
added.
i




UNION LOCAL’S ARCHIVAL MATERIAL
Agreement Between Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Ltd. And Lakehead Lodge 
#719, IAM, Fort William (1951-1952)
Agreements Between Hawker-Siddeley Canada Ltd. Canadian Car Fort William Division 
and International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement 
Workers o f America, Local 1075 (1952 through to 1965)
Ladies ’ Auxiliary #320 of Local 1075
General and Executive Meeting Minutes (1952-1958)
Local 1075 UA WExecutive Meeting Minutes (1952-1965)
Local 1075 UA WRegular Membership Minutes (1952-1965)
Retired Workers ’ Chapter Local 1075 General Meeting Minutes (1957-1975)
NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES
Fort William Daily-Times (1952-1963)
Labour Gazette vols. 52-63 (1952-1963)
The Canadian Forum (1950-1965)
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